• About
    • Mission
    • Biographical Information
    • Contact Us
  • Defense
  • Energy
  • Logistics
  • Innovation
  • In the News
  • Follow
  • Like
  • Linkedin
  • Youtube
February 1, 2011November 20, 2013Daniel Gouré, Ph.D.

← Back
← Previous Post
Next Post →

The Pentagon Must Prepare For Future Conflicts

February 1, 2011November 20, 2013Daniel Gouré, Ph.D.

Even though the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan are not over, the U.S. military must start preparing for the next wars. The Marine Corps is trying to reinstitute amphibious warfare training. The Army is returning to practicing for conventional combined arms operations. The Navy and Air Force are jointly working on the concept and capabilities for something called AirSea battle in which they cooperate closely in defeating a major adversary.

An important aspect of preparing for future conflicts is to identify the lessons learned from the current conflicts and change the way the military operates to reflect those lessons. I would propose three important lessons emerging from the experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan. The first is the likelihood of being surprised with respect to the nature, location and rapid timelines of future conflicts. As a result, it will be difficult to ensure that U.S. forces have all the necessary training, skills, organizations and equipment at the start necessary to achieving success. The second lesson is ensuring that U.S. forces have the best possible weapons and equipment prior to the start of any conflict. One reason it was so difficult for the Army to respond to the situation in Iraq was the need to make up for almost fifteen years of underfunding. Also, this is the reason for continuing to field advanced military capabilities such as the F-22, F-35, Ground Combat Vehicle or Virginia-class attack submarine, just to name a few, even if the likelihood of major conventional conflict seems remote. The third lesson is based on the first two: the likelihood of surprise and the possibility that the military will have to address inadequacies in existing capabilities. So, lesson three is to have a system in place to meet the urgent needs from the field that will inevitably appear.

The Army responded to the surprises of Iraq and Afghanistan and the lack of adequate equipment by creating two specialized organizations, the Rapid Equipping Force (REF) and the Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI). The purpose of the REF is to respond to specific, urgent operational needs faced by commanders and soldiers in the field. Its goal is to identify, test and field a response to such needs within 180 days. The RFI is designed to ensure that all deploying units possess the appropriate equipment in kit form for its intended mission prior to deployment. The REF and RFI have been particularly important in providing troops in combat with new or improved soldier clothing and individual equipment.

Initially stood up as immediate responses to perceived inadequacies in the military’s preparation for war, the REF and RFI have been converted to permanent organizations. This is a good first step in learning the lessons from the current conflicts. Yet, more needs to be done. The 2009 Defense Science Board report, Fulfillment of Urgent Operational Needs, concluded that the Department of Defense “lacks the ability to rapidly field new capabilities to the warfighter in a systematic and effective way.” It recommended that the Department of Defense separate urgent acquisitions from the more deliberate acquisition process, create a new agency, the Rapid Acquisition and Fielding Agency, and establish a separate and flexible fund to support rapid acquisition and fielding.

In addition, the Pentagon needs to ensure funding for research and development (R&D) programs at a level that sustains innovation. The REF and RFI to a significant extent were a response to the lack of adequate peacetime investment. Robust R&D funding is needed to avoid a major disconnect between future operational needs. For example, without a new advanced fighter development program, the teams of skilled designers and scientists in the industrial base will begin to atrophy. At the other end of the spectrum, without funding for R&D the ability of U.S. industry to provide advanced soldier clothing and individual equipment will decline. R&D funding also is a mechanism for current industry participants and non-traditional suppliers to stay engaged in supporting national defense in a limited way as contract volume decreases.

Print | PDF | EMail

Find Archived Articles:

This entry was posted in Early Warning Blog. Bookmark the permalink.
Sign Up For
LexNext Emails
1600 Wilson Boulevard - Suite 203
Arlington, VA 22209 USA
Phone: 703.522.5828
Fax: 703.522.5837
© 2023 Lexington Institute

Sign Up for LexNext Emails

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Sign Up for LexNext Emails

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.