

**THE LIMITS OF ALLIANCES:
THE DECLINE OF AMERICA'S TRADITIONAL ALLIANCES
AND THE SEARCH FOR NEW ALLIES**

Dr. Daniel Gouré

April 2004



1600 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 900
Arlington, VA 22209

Tel : 703.522.5828 Fax : 703.522.5837

www.lexingtoninstitute.org mail@lexingtoninstitute.org

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Executive Summary

It is time to rethink both the purposes of U.S.-alliance relationships and the character of the partners the United States needs in order to address the threats of a new international environment. The unity of the West in the face of collective dangers can no longer be taken for granted. The United States needs to consider a major revision in its security strategy that takes into account the limits of current alliances and the need to create relationships with allies of the future.

In addressing the questions of the future of alliance relationships and the desirable characteristics of future allies, it is important to recognize that there are limits to the extent current and prospective allies can or cannot collaborate with the United States. It appears that many traditional allies have neither the capability nor the will to act as full partners with the United States in countering the new threats to global security. This does not mean that they are of no value as allies or coalition partners. Rather, the changing locus of 21st Century threats and new political and decision-making forces means that there will be real limits on how and when other countries will act in concert with the United States.

The criteria by which the United States judges the value of its current relationships and assesses the virtues of potential allies has changed with the end of the Cold war and the rise of new threats. What the United States prizes most in its allies, current or future, is not obeisance, nor even simple deference. It does not seek the inevitable lowest-common-denominator consensus that arises from alliance structures directed more at preserving an internal balance of power among the members than achieving common purposes. Rather, it is their consent, freely given, to join with America in the pursuit of common security objectives. This collaboration must derive first from a common view of the threat, and second from an agreement on a strategy by which to address that threat.

It is increasingly evident that the glue which held the Cold War alliances together is no longer a strong binding agent. Threat perceptions vary widely among alliance members. Recent polling suggests that a significant fraction of European public opinion holds the United States to be a greater threat to international security than either rogue states or international terrorists. The sense of shared risk is also weakened. The United States sees itself as particularly vulnerable while Europe and Asian allies, with some

notable exceptions, see themselves as less vulnerable and seek to act in ways to ensure that reduced vulnerability. As the locus of security concerns has shifted from central Europe and Northeast Asia to an arc running from Turkey through the Middle East to central, south and southeast Asia, the ability of many traditional allies to make a substantive contribution to the fight against the new threats has diminished. Nor are most of these allies willing to spend the resources necessary to enhance their ability to participate in distant operations. Thus, the basic rationale and bargain central to the Cold War-alliance system is weakened as the international environment changed.

In addition to a shared vision, the United States also values real military capabilities, particularly those that can be projected into distant regions where the threat of instability and terrorism looms large. Most traditional allies deploy limited military capabilities and continue to rely on the United States for any “heavy lifting.” Aging populations, weak economies and high government debt will restrict further the ability of many U.S. allies to invest adequately in defense capabilities. Efforts such as NATO’s Response Force are, in practice, attempts to derive some, albeit limited, utility from the great mass of nearly useless European military forces. In addition, most traditional allies can only deploy a small fraction of their available armed forces, leaving future coalitions in search of new partners with sufficient numbers under arms and the will to deploy them.

Pursuing a transformation in military capabilities, the United States is likely to field forces in the future that are too sophisticated to mesh effectively with those of most allies. Some allies that could make the investments necessary for a modern, expeditionary military are avoiding investing in real military capabilities by arguing the value of so-called “soft” capabilities in the management of current security threats. This has increasingly placed some allies at odds with the U.S. over security issues. As a result, the United States almost certainly will have to rethink its expectations regarding the place of some allies and friends in its future security plans.

Finally, the locus of security concerns is shifting, from those coterminous with the boundary lines between the Soviet Empire and the West, particularly in Central Europe and Northeast Asia, to an arc that stretches from North Africa through the Middle east and South/Central Asia to the western Pacific. Bases in Europe and Northeast Asia are less relevant in the new security geography. Nations of greater interest to the United States as partners in view of the new geography of international security include the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, India, Turkey, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Australia.

The experiences of the past decade have made it increasingly evident that the old alliances no longer serve U.S. interests as well as they once did. Alliance politics and decision-making processes have imposed temporal and operational limits on the ability of the United States to respond to threats. This is particularly problematic in an era when speed of response is necessary in order to address a new class of mobile targets that may only be accessible for a short period of time. Technological incompatibilities also increase the difficulty of operating U.S. and allied forces together. The lesson of Kosovo, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) is that efforts to

restrict the scope, scale and tempo to reflect the lesser capabilities of allied forces, in comparison to those deployed by the United States, can significantly compromise the character of an operation.

More importantly, no alliance can survive when the parties actively disagree on such basic questions as the nature of the threat and the right of self-defense. When one nation or group within an alliance is of the opinion that its security is threatened by the actions of others within the alliance, then the alliance relationship is effectively sundered. Broader differences in values and perceptions only make it harder still to hold such alliances together. Thus, one can conclude that the fate of NATO, at least currently structured, is very much in doubt. So too may be the relationship with the Republic of Korea, if not now, then once the peninsula is reunited.

Ultimately, the United States must seek out new allies to expand and enhance its global security. In part, this has been the rationale behind NATO's expansion into Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Security is being exported to those regions. In addition, U.S. and NATO forces could now be better positioned to deal with security threats still further east. This eastward orientation of U.S. security concerns should naturally lead to consideration of developing closer security ties with nations of the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia. The support of the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) states, Australia, Pakistan, India, Singapore, the Philippines and Indonesia has been vital to the success of the global war on terrorism, including operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The United States needs allies willing to commit usable military forces to coalition or alliance operations. Over the past decade, some traditional allies such as Great Britain and Australia have repeatedly demonstrated both the will and the capable forces desired by the United States. But shrinking force structures, declining budgets and changing government policies have made it increasingly difficult for many traditional allies to provide the quantity, much less the quality, of military assistance the United States desires. The United States will be forced to look elsewhere for the additional support it will require.

The United States should pursue two strategic objectives in the development of new alliance relations. First it must seek to secure vital locations from which it can rapidly and decisively project power throughout a geographic arc that extends from the eastern Mediterranean to Southeast Asia. One linchpin of this geo-strategy is the Persian Gulf, in particular the smaller states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). These moderate states have provided vital bases for U.S. and coalition forces for more than a decade. Given the vulnerability of these small nations to military threats and terrorist attacks, the United States may wish to consider providing them with formal security guarantees. A second linchpin would be the democratic and democratizing states of Southeast Asia, notably Australia, the Philippines, Singapore and Indonesia. It probably would be difficult, and at present premature, to try and organize these states into some form of collective defense arrangement. But it is clearly in their interests, as well as in that of the United States, to engage in a greater degree of regional collaboration on security matters.

The United States also needs to seek out those countries in or near the Middle East-Asian strategic arc that could provide a significant military force to coalition operations. The United States needs to establish closer security ties with friendly, preferably democratic, states in this area that appear likely to maintain significant deployable military power over the next several decades. Two states that should be considered are Turkey and India. Both will be capable of maintaining large military establishments. Both have security interests in many ways similar to those of the United States with respect to instability and terrorism arising along the strategic arc.

Finally, the United States needs to continue to provide security guarantees to its traditional allies in East Asia. These nations face real military threats. Moreover, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are among Asia's true economic and political success stories. Their well-being and security matters greatly and they live in a volatile and changing region. Moreover, these nations serve as advance outposts for U.S. regional influence and power projection, much as the GCC does in the Persian Gulf. All three possess significant military capabilities that complement that of the United States.

Table of Contents

Executive Summary	2
Chapter I:	
Introduction	7
Chapter II:	
The New U.S. National Security Strategy and Criteria for Choosing Allies	15
A. Traditional U.S. Views of Allies and Alliances	
B. Alliances and Allies after the Cold War	
C. Beyond September 11: A New U.S. Security Strategy and New Roles for Allies	
Chapter III:	
Fielding Forces: The Limits of Allied Military Capabilities	32
A. Current Allied Contributions to the Common Defense	
B. Programs and Plans for the Modernization of Allied Military Forces	
C. Transformation and the Allies	
D. The Resource Base for Allied Defense Modernization	
E. A Net Assessment: The Limits of What the Allies Can Really Provide	
Chapter IV:	
Divergence of Values	58
A. Cultural Divides	
B. Policy Divides	
C. September 11 and Changing Values	
D. The Impact of Values on Alliance Behavior	
Chapter V:	
Alliances for the Future	80
A. The Changing Role of Alliances	
B. Restructuring NATO	
C. New Allies and Alliances	

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CHAPTER I:

Introduction

The history of the past century, in particular, was dominated by a series of destructive national rivalries that left battlefields and graveyards across the Earth. Germany fought France, the Axis fought the Allies and then the East fought the West in proxy wars and tense standoffs against a backdrop of nuclear Armageddon.

Competition between great nations is inevitable, but armed conflict in our world is not. More and more civilized nations find ourselves on the same side – united by common dangers of terrorist violence and chaos.

President George W. Bush, June 2002

As President Bush points out, much has changed in the international security environment since the end of the Cold War. A world that was half free and half enslaved is now more free than not. No longer is the central concern of U.S. national security containment of the Soviet Empire, and deterrence of the threat of massive conventional or nuclear attack on the United States and its global allies. There is no need to marshal the full power of an imposing global coalition in the defense of the Free World. Most of the battle lines drawn across the landscapes of Europe, Asia and the Middle East in barbed wire and minefields, mark the places where the victorious armies of the last world war met one another, have been eradicated.

The character and geographic loci of the principle challenges to U.S. security have changed in the new century. The specter of global terrorism and rampant proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has replaced thermonuclear war as the main threat to national security. Despite, or perhaps because of, the events of September 11, the theaters of conflict are generally far from the vital economic and population centers of the developed world. These theaters include countries that were at the margins of the Cold War systems of alliances or were not even independent countries in the 20th Century.

Many features of the international security environment have changed, but one that has not is the challenge of alliance management. This is not a new phenomenon. One

only has to read the communiqués between Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt, not to mention those that involved other allies such as General de Gaulle, to understand how challenging the process of creating and managing a coalition can be.

The first half of Bush's pronouncement, speaking to the changes in the international security environment, is certainly true. The second half of his statement, reflecting his view of what unites the civilized world, is open to question. As recent events have demonstrated, it is not clear that many U.S. allies, much less all civilized nations, see themselves as threatened by terrorism and chaos as does the United States. Indeed, of late, citizens of nations long considered among Washington's closest allies even accused the United States as being a prime contributor to the current chaos. For its part, the United States has raised questions regarding the commitment of some allies to the common defense.

For the first two years of the Bush Administration, alliance relations were colored by the feeling in much of the world, and even in parts of America, that Washington didn't care about our allies or their concerns. On a series of issues, such as the Kyoto and Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaties, steel tariffs, the International Criminal Court, U.S. policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the so called "axis of evil," the United States and many allies, particularly those in Europe, clashed repeatedly and even publicly. Allied concerns crystallized in the often-used expression "American unilateralism." This phrase referred not only to the unwillingness of the new Administration to bow to the will of the putative international majority on social and political issues, but also to Washington's evident willingness (and its certain ability) to employ military power to address a set of self-defined security challenges. In this context, many foreign observers focused their attention on the single sentence in the 35-page National Security Strategy of the United States that suggested that America might act preemptively against the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists.¹

The Bush Administration has been very clear regarding its unhappiness with Europe's lack of investment in its defenses, and the desire of some governments to focus on developing European security concepts and defense capabilities at the expense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Alliance. This has been a perennial theme in U.S. relations with its European allies. More broadly, Washington was concerned that many of its allies, particularly in Europe, desired nothing more than to focus on their parochial regional political and economic interests at the expense of an effort to address the threats of a new century.

Disagreements between the United States and its allies over the imminence of threats or the manner in which they should be addressed occurred with some frequency during the Cold War. The NATO consultative process was designed, in part, to ensure that these expected disagreements could be managed without posing a significant challenge to Alliance solidarity.

¹ Brian Cove, "A Breathtaking Assertion of Pax Americana," European Affairs, Volume 3, Number 4, Fall 2002, pp. 20-26.

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States and its allies collectively sought to redefine the value and purposes of their relationships. The challenge was particularly acute for that longest and most complex of alliances, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The two critical questions for NATO were: should the Alliance be expanded to include some or all of the newly liberated nations of the former Soviet Bloc, and what tasks should a post-Cold War NATO be prepared to undertake? There was the famous dictum, from a leading Republican member of Congress, that NATO must go out of area or it would go out of business.² Over time, the Allies redefined the goals of the Alliance, laid out plans for developing the necessary military capabilities to support these new goals and restructured and simplified the NATO command structure to reflect that organization's new focus. The new NATO went to war in Kosovo and Afghanistan. These changes led NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson to declare recently that "We have adapted and transformed. Gone out of area instead of out of business. Created a robust platform for dealing with 21st century challenges."³

Since September 11, the ongoing war on terrorism demonstrated both the power of a unified global alliance system and the difficulty of attending to maintain a sense of common purpose and shared values in the absence of a dominant threat. U.S. allies provided significant military assistance in the war in Afghanistan and in the global hunt for al Qaeda.

At the same time, differences over the scope of the war on terrorism, policy towards the Islamic world, and the disarming of Iraq demonstrated the growing fault lines within the Alliance. German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder's willingness to campaign in the recent German elections on his government's opposition to the U.S. policy towards Iraq may be a harbinger of the kinds of conflicts over values and interests that could dominate Alliance politics in the future. What is different now is the extent to which some U.S. allies appear to be actively working to thwart U.S. national security policies. No longer does the possibility of a breach with the United States threaten their security or even survival. On the other side of the Atlantic, comments by senior Administration officials on the importance of so-called "coalitions of the willing" seemed, to many, particularly in Europe, to marginalize the value of the Alliance.

Equally difficult challenges to alliance relationships were emerging in Asia. Many observers thought that relations between the Bush Administration and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) reached the lowest point early in 2002. In that year's State of the Union speech, President Bush referred to North Korea as one of the states in the "axis of evil." The Administration's position also brought it into conflict with two of the most important U.S. allies in Asia, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan. The Bush position was seen as a repudiation of the "Sunshine Policy" pursued by both former ROK President Kim Dae Jung and his successor Roh Moo-hyun. Facing corruption

² Senator Richard Lugar, "NATO: Out of Area or Out of Business", Remarks Delivered to the Open Forum of the U.S. State Department, August 2, 1993, Washington, D.C.

³ NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, "Speech to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly," NATO Press Office, November 11, 2003.

scandals involving his own family and charges of ineffectiveness in office, President Kim hoped that his lasting legacy would be an opening to North Korea. Washington's position inflamed public opinion in a South Korea that increasingly did not see the North as a threat to its security, but did see the United States as standing in the way of peaceful reunification.

Observers have suggested a number of reasons for the profound divergence in interests between long-standing allies and the onset, in some instances, of active hostility to U.S. policies on the part of traditional allies. One school of thought, simply stated, was that the collapse of the old alliance system was inevitable. This theory argues that under conditions in which a single nation possesses a disproportionate quantity of power in the international system, other nations inevitably act to limit that power. With the end of the Cold War the United States was cast in the role of the world's sole superpower. As a result, even current allies saw it in their interest to constrain the ability of the United States to exercise that power.⁴ A second view is that by its attempts to maintain its superpower status and operate as an empire, the United States will provoke precisely the kind of oppositional forces that it is seeking to avoid.⁵ Yet a third view goes farther than the mechanistic case put forward by the "balancers" and argues that great power conflict is inevitable. Moreover, according to this viewpoint, much of the current conflict over security policy reflects a decline in U.S. power and preeminence and the rise of competitors, notably the European Union and China.⁶

Other analysts, while accepting the argument that there are growing tensions with traditional U.S.-led alliances, do not accept the argument that a breakdown of the Cold War alliance system is inevitable. Indeed, they take issue with the determinist cases put forward by the likes of Christopher Layne and Charles Kupchan. Joseph Joffe, for one, argues that no combination of states or collectives such as the European Union (EU) can hope to successfully counterbalance American soft power, much less the hard power Washington possesses.⁷ Other analysts note that what divides prospective "balancers" is likely to be greater than the single factor which might unite them: opposition to U.S. power.⁸

Even if a systemic cause for tensions between the United States and its Cold War allies does not exist, the reality is that profound differences on a host of issues appear to be emerging. Exacerbating differences based on divergent views of the threat and the best means for dealing with them is a growing sentiment that can only be characterized as simple anti-Americanism. There has always been an undercurrent of anti-Americanism in U.S. relations with its major allies, particularly in Europe. Indeed, many current

⁴ Christopher Layne, 1993. "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," International Security, Volume 17, Number 4, 1993 pp. 5-51.

⁵ Jack Snyder, "Imperial Temptations," The National Interest, Number 71, Spring 2003, pp.29-40 and G. John Ikenberry, "America's Imperial Ambition," Foreign Affairs, Volume 81, Number 5, September/October 2002, pp. 44-60.

⁶ Charles Kupchan, The End of the American Era, Knopf, New York, 2002.

⁷ Joseph Joffe, "Who's Afraid of Mr. Big," The National Interest, Summer 2001.

⁸ Richard Weitz, "Why Russia and China Have Not Formed An Anti-American Alliance," Naval War College Review, Volume 51, Number 4, Autumn 2003, pp. 39-62.

criticisms of U.S. society, culture, politics and government are strikingly similar to those made by European elites a century ago.⁹ One change from the past is the extent to which it has become overt, even within elite circles. Another is the extent to which relations with the United States have become an issue in the domestic politics of some allied countries.

Perhaps much of the current wave of anti-American rhetoric could be dismissed as the venting of pent-up feelings that would naturally arise from the very length and depth of the relationship between the United States and its major allies, particularly the members of the NATO Alliance. But behind this growing anti-American sentiment there appears to be a conflict over a wide range of policies that in turn reflects differences in basic approaches towards international relations and security policy.

Ironically, each side has accused the other of self-centeredness. From the European perspective, American leadership, once welcomed, is now cast as national egocentrism and an unwillingness to consider other perspectives. From the American point of view, the demand by some governments that themselves fail to provide adequately for their own security or contribute significantly to the common defense in the post-Cold War era, to nonetheless demand an equal voice in security decisions, is unjustified.

It has taken nearly a decade from the end of the Cold War for the fissiparous tendencies, long present in the relationships between the United States and many traditional friends, to rise to the level of major challenges to the continuing good order and discipline of those alliances. The problem is not simply the lack of serious common security threats. Current disputes reflect a deeper division between the United States and some allies that are the product of decades-long trends in demographics, economics, regional politics and cultural mutation.

Ultimately, whatever forces have produced this “stew,” the reality is that the United States and a number of its major allies have arrived at very different conclusions about the appropriate national security strategy to pursue in the 21st Century. One observer of the trans-Atlantic scene described this as the difference between the European view, on the one hand, that security must be based on balancing power and order, and the contending U.S. view, on the other hand, that security must be a matter of balancing power and weakness.¹⁰ Proponents of the power and order formulation argue that U.S. efforts to enhance its security and that of its allies against terrorism and proliferation threaten the established international order. Suggested by one scholar, an even simpler explanation of the problem, at least with respect to German-U.S. security relations, was the former’s skepticism regarding the efficacy of war as a means of achieving national security objectives.¹¹ In part, this attitude seems to reflect a sense of exhaustion that has

⁹ Simon Schama, “The Unloved American: Two Centuries of Alienating Europe,” *New Yorker*, March 10, 2003, pp. 34-39.

¹⁰ Simon Serfaty, Lexington Seminar, June, 2003.

¹¹ Donald Abenheim, “Germany and the United States in the Age of Terror,” *Naval War College Review*, Volume 56, Number 4, Autumn 2003, pp.71-77.

gripped U.S., European and Asian allies following two World Wars and a half century of Cold War. It also reflects a belief, or perhaps more a wish, that the process of building regional and international institutions can create a set of norms and values to which all but the most extreme rogues can adhere. Membership in these institutions signifies, so the argument goes, a willingness to eschew the use of force to settle cross-border disputes. Under this approach to international security, even nations such as Iraq and North Korea, who violate the norms of those institutions, should be allowed to retain their membership in the hope that a process can be developed that would ultimately contain their aggressive impulses.

A more-telling cause of the growing conflict across both the Atlantic and Pacific is the inability of U.S. allies to free themselves from their reliance on the United States as the main guarantor of their security. Only the United States possesses a so-called full-spectrum military capable of defending the security of its global allies. The United States continues to provide the “public goods” necessary to the maintenance of a relatively peaceful world order. Yet this is a source of extreme frustration to some allied governments. The heading of one of columnist Tom Friedman’s articles expressed the tension succinctly: “They Hate Us! They Need Us!”¹²

For the Bush Administration, and indeed for the Administration that preceded it, the unwillingness of some allies to pay sufficient attention to their own security and to the collective defense was an equally galling source of conflict. Some in the United States argue that rather than seeking to balance U.S. power in the interest of achieving a more multi-polar world, these same nations are, in effect, opting out to focus on their local or regional interests. At a time when they do not feel directly threatened, these nations wish to reduce their investments in national security. These nations share a concern that the United States is contributing to regional or global instability.¹³ Efforts by the European Union to create a European Security and Defense Policy and an independent military capability were viewed with suspicion in Washington as an end run on NATO.

U.S. national security policy, as reflected in the 2002 The National Security Strategy of the United States, is based on a vision that does not, in principle, conflict with the wishes of its allies. The document declares that “Today the international community has the best chance since the rise of the nation-state in the 17th Century to build a world where great powers compete in peace instead of continually prepare for war.”¹⁴ Yet, in many ways this is a strategy that challenges what might be called the preferred doctrine of some U.S. allies on such issues as the nature of the international order, the role of international institutions in maintaining security, and limits on the use of force. While the Administration and its supporters would like to put a benign face on the more radical

¹² Thomas Friedman, “They Hate Us! They Need Us!” The New York Times, June 15, 2001, p. A32.

¹³ Robert Kagan, “Power and Weakness,” Policy Review, No. 113, June 2002, p. 12

¹⁴ The National Security Strategy of the United States, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 2002, p. ii

aspects of the new U.S. strategy, on many substantive points the United States and its allies appear to be at different ends of the security spectrum.¹⁵

It is no longer sufficient to simply assert the need for dialogue among allies or to wish that reforming existing relationships can, in the main, preserve the current set of U.S.-centered global alliances. The experience of the Iraq conflict gives further credence to the idea that the old alliance system may not be sufficient to address U.S. strategic needs and that Washington must find ways to deal with the limitations in traditional alliances and, where necessary, develop new relationships. Increasingly, the United States has found itself in the position of having to choose between the best strategy to achieve its national security goals and the strategy that will ensure support from allies. At the beginning of the U.S. effort to create an international consensus on using force if necessary to enforce U.N. sanctions on Iraq, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld asserted the United States should “avoid trying so hard to persuade others to join a coalition that we compromise on our goals.”¹⁶ These words only reflected the end of the process of alliance erosion begun when the Soviet Union collapsed.¹⁷ All the participants in the Cold War alliance structure share responsibility for the diminution of that system. Yet, it is not clear that even with the best of intentions, that erosion could have been prevented.

It is time to rethink both the purposes of U.S. alliance relationships and the character of the partners the United States needs in order to address the threats of a new international environment. If unity is no longer the central purpose of the U.S. global system of alliances, it is reasonable to ask the question: to what ends should the United States pursue alliance relationships? If the threat is no longer the Soviet Union, or even a regional hegemon or aggressor bent on subjugating America’s friends, but rather global terrorism and rogue states potentially armed with weapons of mass destruction, then it is appropriate to ask: whom should the United States seek out as allies to meet this new danger? If threats can emerge rapidly, from unanticipated quarters, can the United States tolerate being restricted in its responses by the relatively slow and deliberate decision-making processes that marked the consensus-based governance of Cold War alliances?

In addressing the questions of the future of alliance relationships and the desirable characteristics of future allies, it is important to recognize that there are limits to the extent current and prospective allies can or cannot collaborate with the United States. It appears that many traditional allies have neither the capability, nor the will, to act as full partners with the United States in countering the new threats to global security. This does not mean that they are of no value as allies or coalition partners. Rather, the changing locus of 21st Century threats and new political and decision-making forces means that there will be real limits on how and when other countries will act in concert with the United States.

¹⁵ See, for example Phillip Zelikow, “The Transformation of National Security,” The National Interest, Volume 71, Spring 2003, pp. 17-28; Joshua Muravchik, “The Bush Manifesto,” Commentary, Volume 114, Number 5, December 2002, pp. 23-30.

¹⁶ Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, cited in Snyder, op. cit., p. 34.

¹⁷ Josef Joffe, “Continental Divides,” The National Interest, Volume 71, Spring 2003, pp. 157-160.

The purpose of this study is to assess the limits of current and future U.S. alliance relationships and to assess the potential contributions that old and new allies could make to enhancing U.S. and international security. Too often, analysts and decision-makers confronted with problems in alliance relations move immediately to propose means for overcoming the difficulties and restoring those alliances to their former centrality in the members' strategies for managing their national security. They do not stop to consider whether there are hard limits to the ability of the United States and some of its once-closest allies to cooperate in the new international environment. Nor do they consider the practical limits to the capacity of some states to deploy the means necessary to act in concert with the United States.

Aging populations, weak economies and high government debt will restrict the ability of many U.S. allies to invest adequately in defense capabilities. Pursuing a transformation in military capabilities, the United States is likely to field forces in the future that are too sophisticated to mesh effectively with those of traditional allies. In addition, the absence of a unifying threat has allowed the allies to give greater weight to national perspectives and regional concerns in their security dealings. This has increasingly placed some allies at odds with the United States over security issues. As a result, the United States almost certainly will have to rethink its expectations regarding the place of some allies and friends in its future security plans.

In subsequent chapters this study will assess the potential contributions of old allies and new partners to meeting U.S. security requirements in the 21st Century. Chapter Two of this study will propose criteria against which U.S. decision-makers can assess the role of allies and coalition partners. The criteria reflect current U.S. national security and defense policies. Chapter Three will look at the potential limits on the ability of allies and friends to field the kinds of military and security capabilities that would make them capable of supporting common security strategies. Chapter Four will address the questions of divergent values and concepts of security and assess their impact on alliance and coalition solidarity and cooperation. Finally, Chapter Five will draw conclusions about the potential future contributions of both old and new allies to meeting U.S. security requirements, and suggests ways that decision-makers could address potentially profound limits to the capabilities and/or will of some states to be allies of the United States.

CHAPTER II:

The New U.S. National Security Strategy and Criteria for Choosing Allies

A. Traditional U.S. Views of Allies and Alliances

Today, the United States stands at the center of the broadest and deepest set of alliance relationships the world has ever known. Over a period of some 50 years, the United States created a web of security and international relationships, with itself at the center, that are in many ways the bones, sinews and muscle of the present international order. U.S.-sponsored and U.S.-led military alliances in Europe and Asia not only held the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact in check, but also provided an umbrella under which friendly nations were able to build democratic institutions within their own countries and in their respective regions as well. The strength of these institutions, particularly NATO (North American Treaty Organization) and the EU (European Union), were such that after the fall of the Soviet Union, they have been able to extend themselves to encompass many of the newly liberated states of Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia. In global economic policy and trade, world health and arms control, to name a few topics, the United States was a key architect of and participant in the institutions and arrangements that sustained the post-World War II international order.

The United States' interest in allies was and remains profoundly rooted in national self-interest. World War II and the Cold War added a core of power politics to the moral impulses that produced Wilsonian internationalism. While these two forces have operated in a state of tension in U.S. foreign and security policies, together they have conditioned U.S. security strategies and defense plans to consider first and foremost the place of overseas allies. President Roosevelt's observation in 1944, on the eve of victory and with an eye to the creation of post-war international order, remains equally true for the United States today.

We have learned that we cannot live alone, at peace; that our own well-being is dependent upon the well-being of other nations, far away ... We have learned the simple truth, as Emerson said, that 'the only way to have a friend is to be one.'¹

The United States recognized that, as the distant power, it required overseas allies in order to be able to effectively project power and defend its regional interests. Hence the description during World War II of Great Britain as America's "unsinkable aircraft carrier." More important, the U.S. government saw the value of a collective response to aggression, first to defeat the Axis powers and then to contain the Soviet Union. In the service of the latter objective, the purpose of alliance relationships was not simply to deter conflict or fight and win wars, should that be necessary, but to develop the political

¹ President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, "Inaugural Address," in John Meechan, Franklin and Winston, Random House, New York, 2002.

and economic strength that would inevitably overwhelm the Soviet Union as both adversary state and alternative political-economic model. Alliances were about the management of power in the broadest sense of the word. The interconnections between alliances, the power of a unified free world, the containment of the Soviet Union and U.S. self-interest were clearly spelled out in NSC-68, which became the basis for the U.S. and Western grand strategy for defeating the Soviet Union:

The immediate objectives – to the achievement of which such a build-up of strength is a necessary though not a sufficient condition – are a renewed initiative in the cold war and a situation to which the Kremlin would find it expedient to accommodate itself, first by relaxing tensions and pressures and then by gradual withdrawal. The United States cannot alone provide the resources required for such a build-up of strength. The other free countries must carry their part of the burden, but their ability and determination to do it will depend on the action the United States takes to develop its own strength and on the adequacy of its foreign political and economic policies. Improvement in political and economic conditions in the free world, as has been emphasized above, is necessary as a basis for building up the will and the means to resist and for dynamically affirming the integrity and vitality of our free and democratic way of life on which our ultimate victory depends.²

U.S. grand strategy therefore required both the creation and protection of a like-minded community of free, democratic and prosperous nations. Allies were both a means and an end in U.S. grand strategy. They were part of the balance of forces that deterred and contained the Soviet Union. The presence of allies alongside the United States simultaneously provided them the security to continue to have economic and political practices favorable to the world the United States sought to create, and diminished the power and appeal of the Soviet Union and the socialist political/economic model.

Soviet attempts to circumvent containment and Western efforts to counter those forays eventually extended the East-West struggle far beyond its original centers of conflict in Central Europe and the rim lands of Asia. This struggle demanded a new set of alliance relationships. Unlike those that were conceived of in NSC-68, the new allies were in the developing world and were most often not democracies. To an extent, these nations were important because they added to the overall power and political “weight” of the anti-Soviet coalition. Their real significance was a matter of circumstances having to do with geography, proximity to states deemed to be in the Soviet orbit or the presence of scarce resources such as oil.

The U.S. system of Cold War alliances recognized that these relationships could not be that of equals in economic or military power, at least not initially. Disparities in capabilities were acceptable so long as the members of the Cold War alliances held a common vision of the threat that motivated their relationship, agreed on a general strategy for dealing with that threat and were willing to share the risks associated with opposing aggression. This applied to the more-capable NATO members such as France,

² NSC-68 available: www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68-9.htm.

Germany and Great Britain but also to the smallest members such as Luxembourg, Iceland and Portugal. Alliance solidarity often appeared to matter more than actual military capability. This was particularly the case once NATO recognized that a high-confidence conventional defense of Europe was beyond its means. It was easier to tolerate wide divergences in actual military contributions to the Alliance because the true guarantor of NATO's security was its members' nuclear arsenals.

As U.S. alliance systems matured, the United States and some allies sought ways of improving the military capabilities of the Alliance as a whole. A shift in U.S. and NATO defense strategies from one based on massive retaliation to one emphasizing flexible response, including a credible forward conventional defense, added to the demand on members to field adequate conventional military capabilities. Usable military capability became an increasing issue within the Alliance as the Soviet Union acquired a full-spectrum nuclear capability, thereby calling into question the credibility of NATO's nuclear deterrent. The United States continually pressed many of its allies to increase the magnitude of their contribution to the common defense and to improve the quality of their armed forces. The subject of interoperability of equipment and forces as well as the so-called "two-way street" in defense trade across the Atlantic were often the source of the most protracted and intractable NATO arguments.

The strategy of flexible response also resulted in a requirement for highly capable command and control systems and a basic commonality of doctrine, tactics, procedures, logistics and the like. This was particularly necessary in NATO, which faced the most serious Soviet/Warsaw Pact threat and where differences in doctrines, tactics and equipment were common and often highly dysfunctional. The goal of NATO's vaunted integrated military command system was to create the basic decision-making and operational environment that would permit disparate national forces to conduct the common defense of Europe. Participation in the integrated command system and adherence to common standards and procedures, while not an absolute requirement for membership in the Alliance (witness France's departure from that system in 1966, but not from NATO), increasingly was taken as a measure of the degree of commitment by states to the common defense.³

The United States never developed a formal set of criteria for the selection of allies and the maintenance of alliance relationships. Since the late 1940s, successive Administrations paid homage to the need for allies, the importance of the community of free and democratic nations, the role that overseas bases played in U.S. security strategies and the contributions that those allies made to overall U.S. security and to the defense of the free world.

The criteria by which the United States selected its Cold War allies were a reflection of the character of the political-military struggle against the Soviet Union and its allies. As such, they were a product of the threat-based planning approach of that era.

³ Gen. Frederick Kroesen, USA (Ret.), "The Military Aspects of NATO Expansion," in Stephen Blank, ed., NATO After Enlargement: New Challenges, New Missions, New Forces, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 1998, pp. 47-50.

This approach was driven foremost by the concern about numbers, whether of military personnel, tanks, nuclear warheads, division equivalents or overall economic capabilities.⁴ It was also a function of the dominant planning scenarios. These scenarios focused primarily on a massive global conflict with selected sub-scenarios based on the strategic situation and balance of forces in various regions of the world. A second class of scenarios had their origins in the need to counter what was perceived in the West to be a new Soviet strategy, begun under Khrushchev, to circumvent containment by engagement with the so-called Third World. These scenarios generally envisioned limited conflicts, often unconventional in character, which would principally involve Soviet and U.S./Western surrogates.

Without question, the single most important criterion for a nation to be considered a U.S. ally during the Cold War was not its military capability but the degree of its allegiance to the grand coalition opposing Communism. For practical, political and even psychological reasons, it was critically important that the community of democratic nations, particularly in Europe, be solidly in the anti-Soviet camp. A conventional defense of Europe along the East-West dividing line, always difficult at best, would be rendered impossible should the strategic rear be undermined. Alliances also provided the reassurances necessary for member states to make their domestic and international investments in a free, democratic and capitalist system. Both in Europe and in Asia, alliances with the United States guaranteed to member states, including Germany and Japan, that there would be no reoccurrence of the terrible rivalries and wars of the first half of the 20th Century. In some instances this was a mixed blessing since a few states were inclined to spend substantially less than other alliance members on their own defense.

By definition, membership in the U.S.-centered Cold War alliances signified a common set of domestic institutions, national values and threat perceptions. Throughout the Cold War, it was a generally accepted idea in U.S. security policy that its major alliance relationships reflected a special bond. Speaking about the importance of such relationships in U.S. security policy, the authors of a paper on the role of alliances in the global war on terrorism observed that:

A formal treaty embodies shared values and congruent national interests. For America and its allies, it symbolizes a commitment to democracy, the rule of law, and free market capitalism. No matter how situations and paradigms change, shared values make it likely that allies will pursue a similar course of action for the same reasons. Hence, America's best weapon against the unexpected is its alliances.⁵

⁴ See John Prados, The Soviet Estimate, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1986; Phillip Karber and Jerald A. Combs, "The United States, NATO, and the Soviet Threat to Western Europe: Military Estimates and Policy Options, 1945-1963", Diplomatic History, Volume 22, Number 3, Summer 1998, pp. 399-429.

⁵ Paolo Pasicolan and Balbina Hwang, The Vital Role of Alliances in the Global War on Terrorism, Backgrounder No. 1607, The Heritage Foundation, October 24, 2002, p. 3.

For the most part, America's closest allies were democracies where the rule of law prevailed and military institutions were under civilian control. Even where this was not always the case, for example in Portugal, Greece, Turkey and South Korea, the United States and other regional allies sought to press those nations to reform their domestic politics. While democracy certainly was not a prerequisite to membership in a U.S.-led alliance, it was clear that Washington and the other allies preferred that type of government. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the character of a nation's domestic governance, its management of internal security, and the military and judicial system became explicit criteria for membership in an expanded NATO.

This did not mean agreement on all issues. The deliberate consultative process so central to NATO decision-making was designed to ensure that a consensus would emerge before action was taken. This was extremely important both politically and psychologically. It ensured that a unified Western front would be presented to the prospective threat. It also guaranteed that both the risks and burdens of the common defense would be shared among all member states. During the Cold War unanimity of commitment was important because solidarity was everything. It was viewed as more important than actual initiation of action by coalition. One of the tensions this need for consensus created in NATO was over the Alliance's tendency to be very slow to act.⁶

The issue of sides became increasingly important beginning in the 1960s with the end of colonialism and the rise of the Nonaligned movement. Many authoritarian and even dictatorial regimes without significant military capability or even a developing economy were treated as allies to the extent they offered some advantage in the East-West struggle. Often, this advantage was simply geographic; such nations were in critical strategic locations or were in close proximity to nations that appeared to be allied or, at least, cooperative with the Soviet Union.

The above discussion notwithstanding, hard military capability was also an important criterion by which the United States measured the value of and extent of cooperation achieved with its allies. A balance of forces between East and West adequate to support deterrence, depended on contributions from all alliance members. More important still was that such contributions as nations offered were of a character so as to be able to provide for more than local or national defense. The capability to operate in concert with other allies, and particularly with U.S. forces, was also a signpost of a capable ally. Interoperability required compatible equipment, which often meant that allies purchased U.S. weapons systems, and had a common set of tactics, techniques and procedures that were honed through frequent exercises. Nations that invested in serious military capabilities, pursued the goal of interoperability and had frequent interactions with U.S. forces, were naturally considered first-class allies.

The so-called "special relationship" between the United States and Great Britain suggests what in the business world would be termed "best practices" or a benchmark of alliance solidarity and cooperation. The persistence of this relationship over some 60

⁶ Douglas L. Bland, The Military Committee of the North Atlantic Alliance: A Study of Structure and Strategy, Praeger, New York, 1991.

years reflects the degree to which Great Britain meets all the nominal criteria discussed above. There has been a strong convergence of interests and values. Put simply, in times of danger America and Great Britain, to use a colloquial term, have always chosen to cover each others' backs. Both nations have been committed to sharing the risks and burdens that come with a central role in the Western alliance. Britain has sought to maintain a highly capable, full spectrum military that can support power projection requirements.

Over time, the maintenance of traditional alliance relationships came to be an end in itself for U.S. security policy. These alliances had produced a remarkable degree of predictability and stability in Europe and Asia. Moreover, the members of NATO and the key U.S. allies in Asia represented during the Cold War the majority of democratic and free-market-oriented nations. They also constituted some 70 percent of the world's trade. Even when NATO was in the midst of one of its frequent crises, the United States and Europe could continue to cooperate on basic and non-controversial issues. The work of the integrated military command and joint training activities went on regardless of the high-level disputes. This is what made NATO valuable in itself. In addition, so long as these European and Asian alliances stayed intact, such disruptive possibilities as Germany's or Japan's nuclear weapons potential did not have to be addressed. Thus, even when paralysis gripped the formal part of the alliances, there was value in the penumbra of cooperation.

During the Cold War, the Western allies were faced with a clear threat to their very existence. They had learned from bitter experience the dangers of disunity in the face of aggression. They had also learned that their security depended on more than just a preponderance of military power. A common set of values and ideals that could hold their alliances together in times of internal strife was as important to their security as raw military power. More broadly, an open global economic system and the maintenance of a peaceful international order would enable the allies to marshal their strength and focus their attention on the struggle with the Soviet bloc. What was remarkable in this age was the degree to which the allies had shared so much.

B. Alliances and Allies after the Cold War

The end of the Cold War inevitably resulted in a reappraisal of traditional alliance relationships by all parties. It was to be expected that U.S. interest in some Cold War allies would wane with the demise of the Soviet Union. The Warsaw Pact was abolished and Soviet forces in Eastern Europe were rapidly withdrawn. Moscow's surrogates were left without financial or military support. Soviet forces deployed abroad returned to their homeland. Nothing seemed a better indication of the change in the international environment and in the importance of U.S. allies than the 1991 Gulf War. A former Soviet client state, Iraq, was defeated by a coalition that included the majority of NATO countries, Japan, Australia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and even a former Soviet client, Syria. The United States appeared to have few enemies and many friends and could pick and choose how to deal with threats to its security.

Indeed, the problem for states, as many observers noted, was to ensure that important relationships were not severed or diminished in the rush of their publics – to enjoy a time of peace, and of governments to achieve a so-called “peace dividend” - by reducing defense expenditures and foreign commitments.

Both the first Bush Administration and the Clinton Administration viewed traditional relationships as essential to the maintenance of stability during the transition out of the Cold War. However, both, but particularly the latter, saw traditional approaches to national security and foreign policy as needing to change to reflect the altered circumstances. In particular, it was argued, that traditional threats were a lesser problem in the post-Cold War environment but that other dangers were looming larger in national security considerations. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger described the new views of national security thus:

So we are living in two worlds. The more traditional one needs a new definition of equilibrium which takes into adequate account the lower importance of weapons, conventional or nuclear. The other, the world that takes into account the genuinely universal problems – environment, population, development - I suppose those are genuinely universal problems. The challenge to our society seems to me to be to run these two world orders side by side and not neglect that there is a need for some new concepts of equilibrium.⁷

The belief that non-traditional or global issues were now central to U.S. security and domestic well-being was reflected in the Clinton Administration policy formulations.

The end of the Cold War fundamentally changed America’s security imperatives. The central security challenge of the past half-century – the threat of communist expansion – is gone. The dangers we face today are more diverse. Ethnic conflict is spreading and rogue states pose a serious danger to regional stability in many corners of the globe. The problem of weapons of mass destruction represents a major challenge to our security. Large scale environmental degradation, exacerbated by rapid population growth, threatens to undermine political stability in many countries and regions.”⁸

Non-traditional problems required new solutions and allies with capabilities different from classic military power. Conventional military forces were still required to address regional threats and to undergird efforts to prevent or control local religious, tribal and ethnic conflicts. Washington hoped that U.S. allies, particularly NATO countries, would restructure their defense policies and armed forces to make them more capable of handling regional security issues, possibly without major U.S. involvement.⁹ The new strategy’s emphasis on engagement and enlargement also demanded a greater role in national security for instruments of soft power intended to affect the domestic

⁷ Henry Kissinger, remarks at a conference in Prague, 1991, cited in Hans d’Orville, ed., The Search for Global Order, Interaction Council, New York, 1993, p. 135.

⁸ A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, The White House, Washington, D.C., February, 1995, p. i.

⁹ Secretary of Defense William Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., 1997, pp. 2-4.

environment in troubled countries, thereby making the resort to force less likely. The idea that security issues could be addressed by managing the internal political and economic environment of rogue and failed states was described by one observer as “foreign policy as social work.”¹⁰

Under this new strategy, traditional criteria for assessing the contribution of allies were relatively less important than during the Cold War. The absence of competing great powers tended to diminish the significance of commitment to traditional relationships as a criterion. The size of allied armies and their ability to conduct large-scale conventional operations was not as important as their capacity to undertake expeditionary operations and to field peacekeeping forces. The collapse of the Soviet “empire” allowed Washington to reconsider its relationship with some nations that had once been geographically desirable but whose governments were far from western democratic ideals. Economic power and trade policy, the size of foreign aid budgets, active participation in multilateral institutions and even a nations’ human rights policy all were defined as national security capabilities.

In Asia, it was somewhat easier for both the United States and its allies to see the need to maintain their security ties. In this region, the danger of what was termed backsliding – of a return to something akin to the Cold War militarized standoff – was possible. Almost alone among the states that had subscribed to Marxism, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea survived. It continued to pose a threat to its neighbors. In addition, the future course of China’s foreign and defense policies were unclear.

The burning question of the 1990s was what to do with NATO. The new range of threats to security did not seem to accord with the Alliance’s goals and structures. Moreover, European integration had progressed to a point that, in the absence of a serious threat to Europe, the members of the European Community could consider closer integration without the risk that this would somehow increase the danger to Europe.

Although military power was less central in national security calculations after the end of the Cold War, it was not unimportant. Indeed, one of the greatest sources of friction between the United States and many other members of NATO was their unwillingness to provide adequate resources for defense and the slowness with which they went about restructuring their militaries to meet the challenges of the new era. Not only were the majority of NATO military forces oriented towards Cold War missions, they lacked critical capabilities in such areas as communications, logistics, intelligence, precision strike and electronic warfare that would enable them to project power beyond the Alliance’s borders and operate alongside U.S. forces in out-of-area operations. Despite nearly a decade of effort, including the development of the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) to focus on acquiring needed enhancements, when NATO finally went to war for the first time, in Kosovo, allied forces proved woefully inadequate.

¹⁰ Michael Mandelbaum, “Foreign Policy as Social Work,” *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 75 , Number 1, January/February 1996, pp. 8-15

Last year, the Kosovo air war highlighted the impotence of Europe's armed forces. The Americans provided more than three-quarters of the bombs dropped, and most of the advanced communications equipment. Whereas the European members of NATO spend about 60 percent of what the U.S. does on defence, their ability to deploy force in a region such as the Balkans is a meager fraction of the Americans'.¹¹

A related issue was the relationship between a redirected NATO and the European Union. The United States had supported the development of an independent European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) (and later a more evolved European Security and Defense Policy) so long as the results were not a duplication of NATO assets, non-EU NATO members did not face discrimination and no actions were taken which would decouple the United States from Europe.¹² It was clear that from Washington's perspective, support for the creation of an ESDI and any related military capabilities was to be a political act in keeping with longstanding U.S. policy of encouraging European integration. ESDI could not be allowed to weaken NATO's military capability.

Thus emerged the grand bargain. The NATO Alliance would help to facilitate the creation of the ESDI, but not as a completely independent entity, likely to rob NATO both of resources and, potentially, of capability to be politically and militarily effective. ESDI would be built within NATO, possibly drawing on capabilities 'separable but not separate' from the alliance.¹³

The United States also saw NATO and the EU working in tandem to extend security and stability to the newly independent states of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. NATO had expanded with the accession of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary and had committed to adding still more members. The EU was planning to deepen its integration as well as expand eastward. In combination, NATO and the EU were effective instruments for attaining U.S. (and naturally European) security objectives.¹⁴

In essence, the United States wanted allies that were capable of taking care of the smaller security issues in their regions, much like a beat cop in a U.S. city. For serious threats, Washington wanted to retain control much like the FBI or the city SWAT team. At the same time, it continually encouraged NATO members to develop the capabilities to support new types of missions. But, overall, the United States in this period was willing to see Europe, in particular, take a greater role in providing for its own security as well as that of the Western world. As one European observer noted "The Clinton administration seemed instinctively willing to begin thinking of evolving the relationship

¹¹ Christoph Bertram, Charles Grant and François Heisbourg, "European Defense: The Next Steps," Center for European Reform, Issue 14, October/November 2000, p. 1.

¹² Kori Schake, Constructive Duplication: Reducing EU Reliance on U.S. Military Assets, Center for European Reform, Working Paper, January 2002, p. 5.

¹³ Robert Hunter, "The European Security and Defense Policy: NATO's Companion - or Competitor?," MR-1463-NDRI/RE, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2002, p. 13.

¹⁴ Simon Serfaty, "The Transatlantic Link Today," NATO Review, Volume 49, Number 1, Spring 2001, pp. 6-8.

with Europe along those lines, even though it is far from clear how such cooperation could be organized.”¹⁵

During the 1990s, the United States modified its criteria by which it defined the need for and value of its alliance relationships. U.S. security policy gave more emphasis to the political, economic and organizational contributions of allies. Although Washington struggled to get its European and Asian allies to enhance their conventional military capabilities, it was relatively tolerant of their continuing underfunding of their defensive capabilities. In a period of relative peace, with no serious threats to U.S. security, a diminution of allied military capabilities was not considered a particularly serious problem. The political value of U.S. relationships, their roles as hedges against Russian backsliding or the emergence of a peer competitor, and the contribution of alliances such as NATO to extending stability to democratizing states, were considered an adequate rationale for continuing a broad set of alliances.

It should not have been a surprise that in the post-Cold War era nations that had once been staunch allies should reconsider their relationships and even disparage somewhat those to whom they had once been so close. Free from fear, nations could test the boundaries of their newfound freedom from the confines of the alliance even at the price of downgrading long-established and, potentially, still-vital security relationships. One of the architects of Cold War alliance policy observed:

Before September 11 it was fashionable in some circles in America to speak of the end of history; it was certainly fashionable on the Continent to think that there was no longer the sort of danger that justified an Atlantic relationship. Indeed, it was commonplace to seek European identity in distinction from the United States and NATO ran the risk of becoming an institution that was used for liturgical purposes and occasional meetings but with less operational content.¹⁶

C. Beyond September 11: A New U.S. Security Strategy and New Roles for Allies

Prior to September 11, a debate had begun both in the United States and overseas on the nature of U.S. power and the relationship between the United States and its allies. After that date, rather than being muted by the presence of a common threat to the international system, it appeared to intensify. The various disputants in this debate tended to coalesce around two poles. The first concerned the question of U.S. power and how it was employed. Simply put, this is the question of unilateralism or, at its extreme, empire. Some observers treated unipolarity or empire as prospective ends, however misguided, of U.S. foreign and security policy.¹⁷ Others describe it as simply the natural

¹⁵ Christoph Bertram, “Starting Over Again,” NATO Review, Volume 49, Number 1, Spring 2001, pp. 9-11.

¹⁶ Henry Kissinger, “Foreign Policy in the Age of Terrorism,” The Center for Policy Studies, 2001 Rutenberg Lecture, October 31, 2001, p 6.

¹⁷ Christopher Layne, “America As European Hegemon,” The National Interest, Number 72, Summer 2002, pp. 17-30; Jack Snyder, “Imperial Temptations,” The National Interest, Number 71, Spring 2003, pp. 29-40; G. John Ikenberry, “America’s Imperial Ambition,” Foreign Affairs, Volume 81, Number 5, September/October 2002, pp. 44-60.

result of the absence of countervailing power to that of the United States and the fact that America now played the role as the main guarantor of international stability. This is an argument, in effect, for empire by default.¹⁸ Still others, certainly the majority of analysts and experts in the United States, reject the idea that the United States was behaving in a unilateral or imperial manner.¹⁹ A final sub-group circling this pole is that which, while rejecting the idea of a unipolar or imperial America, argued that it was the failure of others, notably U.S. allies, to invest in the instruments of international power that was leaving the United States to shoulder almost the entire burden of maintaining international security.²⁰

The other pole focused on the issue of concert or multipolarity. Those at this end of the debate argued that while U.S. power was indeed great, Americans should not and indeed could not act alone in the world. The United States not only would require the assistance of friends and allies but it was not as strong as some alleged advocates of unipolarity assumed.²¹ Some commentators holding this view went even farther, arguing the decline of the nation state and the rise of so-called soft power.²² In extremis, proponents of this perspective saw in the insistence by the United States of the right to take all necessary measures in its own defense a threat to their sense of an emerging world order. Others took issue less with the substance of U.S. foreign and security policy than with its style, the manner in which the United States displayed and employed its unequalled power.²³

This was and remains largely a false debate. The true issue is not whether U.S. policy is unipolar or multipolar. There have always been elements of both in U.S. foreign and security policy.²⁴ U.S. policy statements explicitly acknowledged the importance of America's connections to a wider world, the value of a concert of like-minded power and the role that international organizations and multilateral security institutions continued to

¹⁸ Andrew Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy, Harvard University Press, Boston, Mass., 2002; Michael Ignatieff, "The Challenges of American Imperial Power," Naval War College Review, Volume 56, Number 2, Spring, 2003, pp. 53-63; Stephen P. Rosen, "An Empire, If You Can Keep It," The National Interest, Volume 71, Spring 2003, pp. 51-62.

¹⁹ Henry Kissinger, "America At the Apex," The National Interest, Number 64, Summer 2001, pp. 9-18; Joseph Joffe, "Who's Afraid of Mr. Big," The National Interest, Number 64, Summer 2001, pp. 43-52.

²⁰ Robert Kagan, "Power and Weakness," Policy Review, Number 113, June/July 2002; Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment Revisited," The National Interest, Number 70, Winter 2002/2003, pp. 5-20.

²¹ Joseph S. Nye, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002; Strobe Talbott, "From Prague to Baghdad," Foreign Affairs, Volume 81, Number 6, November/December 2002, pp. 46-57; Conrad Black, "Counsel to Britain," The National Interest, Number 73, Fall 2003, pp. 71-76; Michael Mandelbaum, "The Inadequacy of American Power," Foreign Affairs, Volume 81, Number 5, September/October 2002, pp. 61-73; Charles Kupchan, The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the 21st Century, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2002.

²² Joseph Nye, "U.S. Power and Strategy After Iraq," Foreign Affairs, Volume 82, Number 4, July/August 2003, pp. 66-67; David Calleo, "Wealth, Power and Wisdom," The National Interest, Number 72, Summer 2003, pp. 5-16; Richard Rosecrance, "Croesus and Caesar," The National Interest, Volume 72, Summer 2003, pp. 31-34.

²³ Robert Tucker, "The End of a Contradiction," The National Interest, Number 69, Fall 2002, pp. 5-7.

²⁴ Andrew Bacevich, "Different Drummer, Same Drum," The National Interest, Volume 64, Summer 2001.

play in U.S. security policy.²⁵ Nor is the issue of an imperial or arrogant style in the conduct of foreign policy new. It is enough to remember the 1956 Suez crisis to recognize that the United States has at times exercised its preponderance of power in ways that were orthogonal to the particular interests of some allies.²⁶

This debate obscures the real issue - a growing division between the United States and some allies on the core factors that underlie any alliance - a definition of the common threat, an agreed strategic vision, and a willingness and capability to employ all means necessary to implement that strategic vision and defeat the common threat. Unilateralism, including that of some European nations in opposition to the United States, is not a necessary condition of the 21st Century. It is not America's strength, Europe's relative weakness, the relative importance of hard versus soft power or the tone of comments issuing from the Bush Administration that is the source of strife between the Western allies. It is instead, at its heart, a lack of wills on the part of former allies to treat the threat of terrorism and proliferation as the unifying problem of this era and to seek, above all, common solutions to this new danger. As Henry Kissinger declared recently:

The time has come to put an end to the debate on unilateralism versus multilateralism and to concentrate on substance.

The U.S.'s European adversaries in the recent controversies should stop encouraging their media's tendency to describe the American Administration as Rambo-like figures thirsting for war and the U.S. as if it were institutionally an obstacle to the fulfillment of Europe's purposes rather than a partner in achieving common aims.

America's military pre-eminence is a fact of life in international affairs for the foreseeable future. Balance of power politics by allies cannot change that reality. But America can strive to translate its dominance into a systematic fostering of international consensus. If the European allies meet the U.S. in the same spirit, the debates over unilateralism and multilateralism can be kept from turning into self-fulfilling prophecies.²⁷

Kissinger's comments lead naturally to the next question: what is the basis for the consensus he seeks? Is it about the best means for addressing the new threats of global terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or is it about how to manage U.S. power in the world? The Bush Administration has repeatedly argued that the coalition should be organized to fit the mission and not the other way around. In wartime, to alter a coalition's fundamental goals and strategy in order to ensure a political consensus is to court disaster. This the Clinton Administration discovered in Kosovo when it did an end-run around the United Nations.

Who should define American ends today? This is a question of agency but it leads directly to a fundamental question of policy. If the coalition –

²⁵ Philip Zelikow, "The Transformation of National Security," *The National Interest*, Number 71, Spring 2003, pp. 17-28.

²⁶ Henry Kissinger, "Role Reversal and Alliance Realities," *The Washington Post*, February 10, 2003, p. A31.

²⁷ Henry Kissinger, "Old Allies Face New Dilemmas," *Courier-Mail*, April 3, 2003, p. 14.

whether NATO, the wider Western alliance, ad hoc outfits such as the Gulf War alliance, the U.N. or the “international community” – defines America’s mission, we have one vision of America’s role in the world. If, on the other hand, the mission defines the coalition, we have an entirely different vision.²⁸

The Bush Administration believes that the mission should define the coalition and not the other way around. Moreover, Washington also believes that the fundamental purpose of security alliances should be to enhance the power of the members, both singly and collectively. On this point, Philip Zelikow describes the approach taken to alliance/coalition policy by the Bush Administration thusly:

... the Administration prefers multilateral strategies that rely on the sovereign accountability of states instead of strategies that limit sovereignty in order to link states together in a common enterprise – but which thereby dissipates responsibility.²⁹

If multipolarity is not the basis for a U.S. approach to alliances and coalitions, neither is empire. As Richard Haas recently pointed out, “...empire is about control – the center over the periphery. Successful empire demands both an ability and a willingness to exert and maintain control.”³⁰ It is as important to maintain control over the core of the empire as it is over adversaries on that periphery.³¹ What is remarkable is the extent to which the United States seeks to avoid organizing that core, the community of Western democracies, in pursuit of its security objectives.

The central security issue for the United States today is the global war on terrorism. America is testing both its traditional alliances and its new coalitions against the standard of their contributing to meeting the emerging threats of the 21st Century. As reflected in the National Security Strategy, the United States has a new strategic conception that directly influences how Washington perceives the role and contributions of allies and friends:

The war against terrorists of global reach is a global enterprise of uncertain duration. America will help nations that need our assistance in combating terror. And America will hold to account nations that are compromised by terror, including those who harbor terrorists – because the allies of terror are the enemies of civilization. The United States and countries cooperating with us must not allow the terrorists to develop new home bases. Together, we will seek to deny them sanctuary at every turn.³²

What the United States prizes most in its allies is not obeisance, nor even simple deference. It does not seek the inevitable lowest common denominator consensus that arises from alliance structures directed more at preserving an internal balance of power among the members than achieving common purposes. Rather, it is their consent, freely

²⁸ Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment Revisited,” *op. cit.*, p. 10.

²⁹ Zelikow, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

³⁰ Richard Haass, “Wars of Choice,” *The Washington Post*, November 23, 2003, p. B7.

³¹ Rosen, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-52.

³² *The National Security Strategy of the United States*, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

given, to join with America in the pursuit of common security objectives. This collaboration must derive first, from a common view of the threat and, second from an agreement on a strategy by which to address that threat.

The Administration has defined a basic view of the threat and the strategy that it feels must be followed if that threat is to be defeated. This definition was succinctly expressed by the President in June 2002:

The gravest danger to freedom lies at the perilous crossroads of radicalism and technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile technology – when that occurs, even weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations. Our enemies have declared this very intention, and have been caught seeking these terrible weapons. They want the capability to blackmail us, or to harm us, or to harm our friends – and we will oppose them with all our power.

For much of the last century, America's defense relied on the Cold War doctrines of deterrence and containment. In some cases, those strategies still apply. But new threats also require new thinking. Deterrence – the promise of massive retaliation against nations – means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend. Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies.

We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. We cannot put our faith in the word of tyrants, who solemnly sign non-proliferation treaties, and then systemically break them. If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long.³³

Because of the complex challenges posed by the global war on terrorism and rogue regimes seeking to acquire WMD, the United States does not ask that all states perceive the threat in exactly the same way or participate in all aspects of the common strategy. Unlike the Cold War, when the essence of membership in the Western alliance system was an equal share of the risk and the provision of similar components, largely conventional military forces, to a common defensive capability, now it is possible for allies and coalition partners to tailor their commitments and provide a wide range of capabilities. Intelligence assets, police forces and even financial expertise can all find a place in the basket of capabilities required for the war on terrorism.

In a speech before a European audience in 2002, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz provided a clear definition of the U.S. strategy for coalitions and partners in the new global war on terrorism:

From the beginning of the campaign against terrorism, Secretary Rumsfeld has emphasized the importance of setting the key goals and the key concepts of the operation correctly. Recently, he made a list of those that have

³³ George W. Bush, Remarks by the President at the 2002 Graduating Exercise of the United States Military Academy, West Point, N.Y., June 1, 2002.

been critical to the campaign so far. It's a long list, but let me share with you today a few of the most significant ones.

One of the most important concepts concerns the nature of coalitions in this campaign and the idea that 'the mission must determine the coalition, the coalition must not determine the mission.' Otherwise, as the Secretary says, the mission will be reduced to 'the lowest common denominator.'

As a corollary, there will not be a single coalition, but rather different coalitions for different missions, 'flexible' coalitions, as the Secretary calls them. This means that the coalition will not 'unravel' if some country stops doing something or fails to join in some missions. As Rumsfeld expressed it, 'Since no single coalition has 'raveled,' it is unlikely to unravel.'

In fact, our policy in this war has been to accept help from countries on whatever basis is most comfortable to them. Some will join us publicly; others will choose quiet and discrete forms of cooperation. We recognize that it is best for each country to characterize how they are helping, instead of doing it for them. Ultimately, this maximizes their cooperation and our effectiveness.³⁴

Nevertheless, there is a clear need for substantial conventional military capabilities, including Special Forces and paramilitaries, in the war on terrorism. This is particularly true when threats by rogue states, possibly armed with WMD, are considered. Thus, while the range of possible contributions to the common defense has been extended, the core capabilities required of those states capable of providing them are fighting forces that can be deployed widely and quickly to meet both the terrorist and rogue state threats.

The United States is challenging existing alliances and security relationships to create capabilities and structures that would allow them to respond better to the new security challenges. In particular, the Bush Administration has argued for the necessity of recasting the NATO Alliance and for member countries to restructure their militaries to be more capable of rapid responses to emerging threats:

The attacks of September 11 were also an attack on NATO, as NATO itself recognized when it invoked its Article V self-defense clause for the first time. NATO's core mission – collective defense of the transatlantic alliance of democracies – remains, but NATO must develop new structures and capabilities to carry out that mission under new circumstances. NATO must build a capability to field, at short notice, highly mobile, specially trained forces whenever they are needed to respond to a threat against any member of the alliance.

The alliance must be able to act wherever our interests are threatened, creating coalitions under NATO's own mandate, as well as contributing to mission-based coalitions.³⁵

³⁴ Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, "Als Allianz Waren Wir Nie Stärker," *Die Zeit*, February 2, 2002, p. 1.

³⁵ *The National Security Strategy of the United States*, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

Geography is again a significant consideration in U.S. assessment of the value of allies and coalition partners. Access to states or regions of concern is an important consideration in the creation of coalitions to fight terrorism. The United States found it necessary to develop security relationships with the former Soviet republics of Central Asia in order to prosecute the war on the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan. The smaller Gulf States have grown in significance as U.S. security partners over the past decade and certainly since September 11. Because of the dispersal of al Qaeda and related terrorist groups around the world, the United States has found it useful to engage or reengage a number of states in South and Southeast Asia such as the Philippines, India and Indonesia. During the Cold War, the geography of importance was associated primarily with U.S. defense of Europe and Northeast Asia. Secondary importance was given to geography related to defense of Southwest Asia. Now, the geography of importance runs from the Philippines and Indonesia through the Middle East and across North Africa.

In summary, the criteria the United States has established by which to assess the contribution of allies and friends to the attainment of essential national security objectives are: a shared set of basic values and principles; agreement on the nature of the threat to the United States, its allies and the international order; consensus on a basic strategic approach to meeting that threat; the availability to those allies and friends of the means necessary to deter, dissuade or defeat those threats; the will to employ those means; and, in certain circumstances, unique geo-strategic position. The search for friends is a means to an end, not an end in itself. According to the National Security Strategy:

America will implement its strategy by organizing coalitions – as broad as practical – of states able and willing to promote a balance of power that favors freedom. Effective coalition leadership requires clear priorities, an appreciation of others’ interests and consistent consultations among partners with a spirit of humility.³⁶

Clearly, not all allies will possess identical attributes with which to meet each criterion. Some possess secondary attributes of significance, such as economic power, cultural influence or even historic ties with the United States. Even as the National Security Strategy speaks of organizing broad task-oriented coalitions, it also acknowledges the unique role of U.S.-NATO allies in creating a positive international environment. “There is little of lasting consequence that the United States can accomplish in the world without the sustained cooperation of its allies and friends in Canada and Europe.”³⁷

It is useful to think about allies and coalition partners in three groupings or concentric circles.³⁸ The first is of core states. These are states that share U.S. values, threat assessments and strategic concepts. They are states of special significance. Also, they are able and willing to deploy significant military forces alongside those of the

³⁶ The National Security Strategy of the United States, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 25.

³⁸ I am indebted to Dr. Laurent Murawiec of the Hudson Institute for this idea. Lexington seminar, November 21, 2003.

United States. Nations that fall into this category would include Great Britain, Australia, Italy, Poland, Japan and Israel. The second circle consists of convergent states. These are nations that share some values, strategic conceptions and threat perceptions. They may possess significant military capabilities but be reluctant to deploy them, or they may have only limited military capabilities. Some traditional allies may have moved from a core status to convergent. This is also a circle that encompasses prospective new allies and partners. States that could be included in this circle would be France, Germany, India, Turkey, the Philippines, Kuwait, the Gulf States, Pakistan, Singapore and South Korea. The last circle consists of coincident states, those with which the United States has a coincidence of interests. They may share few common values, concepts or perceptions with the United States and its core allies. However, they may occupy geo-strategic positions of importance or possess other features to make them states of interest. States in this category might include Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, the nations of Central Asia and terrorist-fighting states such as Sri Lanka or Colombia.

Clearly, the United States would like to see many states, certainly the western democracies and long-term allies, in the first category. But there appear to be increasing limits on the will of allies and coalition partners to take such steps as would place them in that circle. While much time, effort and ink have been expended to establish blame for the current difficult state of U.S. relations with some of its long-time allies, the important issue is not who is at fault, but what limits are on the role and place allies and friends in U.S. national security planning and why do these limits now exist.

CHAPTER III:

Fielding Forces: The Limits of Allied Military Capabilities

As discussed in the previous chapter, the United States has had a number of reasons for pursuing alliances and other security relationships with nations around the world. Circumstances often dictated that these arrangements be with nations that were not the most militarily capable but that were of interest to the United States for geo-political or geo-strategic reasons.

Nevertheless, the military strength of allies and coalition partners and their willingness to contribute forces to common enterprises was a central feature of their value to the United States. Throughout most of the Cold War, U.S. allies provided the majority of ground and tactical air forces available in both Europe and Northwest Asia. Frontline states such as Germany, Turkey and South Korea maintained large ground forces that were forward deployed and backed up by an extensive reserve component. Even smaller allies such as Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Greece were expected to (and did) maintain significant conventional forces, which included armored divisions or brigades, tactical fighter squadrons, air-defense batteries and squadrons of surface ships and submarines. In some cases, such as on the Korean Peninsula, indigenous forces were expected to provide the bulk of the ground-combat capability at least in the initial phase of hostilities and possibility throughout the campaign. Over time, it became a standard planning assumption that longtime U.S. allies would also provide certain specialized capabilities such as theater air defense and mine countermeasure vessels. More generally, U.S. allies were committed to contributing significant conventional military capabilities to their own common defense. The allies also recognized that the weight of their voices in alliance or bilateral councils was directly related to the size and capability of their armed forces.¹

Throughout the Cold War, the United States almost always provided the single largest contingent of forces to each of its alliances and often the most capable units. In addition, the United States also deployed a variety of specialized capabilities from ballistic missiles, surveillance satellites and strategic bombers to nuclear aircraft carriers and attack submarines, precision weapons, high-performance fighters and strategic transport aircraft. But, U.S. war plans depended on the contributions of its allies both in terms of war-fighting capabilities and a host of supporting activities such as logistics, basing rights and intelligence sharing.

Special status was accorded to certain allies by virtue of their size, economic capacity and possession of critical strategic military capabilities. In addition to their conventional military power, France and Great Britain also occupied positions of special prominence because they possessed nuclear weapons. West Germany deployed the largest contingent of ground forces on the European Continent. These three nations and

¹ Jack E. Vincent, Ira L. Straus, and Richard R. Biondi, "Capability Theory and the Future of NATO's Decision-making Rules," *Journal of Peace Research*, 2001, Volume 38, Issue 1, pp. 67-86.

Japan were also economic powers capable of producing advanced military hardware, often of indigenous design.

With a few notable exceptions, the quantities of NATO forces – divisions, fighter squadrons and naval combatants – remained relatively steady throughout the Cold War.² The same was true for Japan, South Korea and other U.S. allies. Although the United States generally pressed its allies to contribute more in their own defense, the overall size of allied military forces reached a stable level by the early 1960s.

The dominant cause of friction between the United States and its various allies over the latter's contributions to the common defense was not the size of their investment, but its quality and character. Throughout the Cold War there existed a chronic disparity in defense between the United States and its major allies in the amount of resources spent on defense. On average, the NATO nations as a whole spent approximately two-thirds of what the United States spent on defense.³ This pattern continued even when the GDP (Gross Domestic Product) of European NATO rivaled that of the United States. Similarly, Japan spent only one percent of its GDP on defense when the United States was spending between 4.5 and 6 percent of its GDP on defense. If anything, the situation today is even more lopsided with defense spending among NATO Allies, with a few exceptions, continuing to decline.⁴

Historically (and today), U.S. allies often inefficiently expended what defense resources they possessed. NATO's defense establishment was marked by duplication of efforts, redundant capabilities and an oversized defense industrial base.⁵ European NATO spent proportionately less on defense research than did the United States, thereby limiting the technology content of their weapons systems and widening the gap between U.S. and non-U.S. NATO capabilities.⁶

Lack of adequate resources and the chronic misapplication of available funds exacerbated the perennial problem of the interoperability between U.S. and allied forces. The difficulty of operating, coordinating and synchronizing the operations of national forces is a lesson that the United States and its allies learned during World War II and then relearned throughout the rest of the 20th Century. Different technologies, operating procedures, military doctrines and languages contributed to the difficulty of achieving interoperability in allied and coalition operations.

² John Duffield, Power Rules: The Evolution of NATO's Conventional Force Posture, Stanford University Press, Palo Alto, CA, 2001.

³ Department of Defense, Report to the Congress on Allied Burden-sharing, September 2001.

⁴ International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2002-2003, Oxford University Press, London, 2003, pp. 248-249.

⁵ Jeffrey Bialos and Stuart Koehl, "Transatlantic Industrial Cooperation as Tool for Transformation: A Case of Compelling Logic but Limited Short-Term Prospects," in Daniel Hamilton, ed., Transatlantic Transformations: Equipping NATO for the 21st Century, Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University, 2003, pp. 151-152.

⁶ Charles Barry, "Coordinating with NATO," in Hans Binnendijk, ed., Transforming America's Military, National Defense University, Washington, D.C., 2003, pp. 232-233.

One of NATO's greatest achievements was the extent to which it was able to enhance interoperability among the forces of 16 nations. The integrated command structure provided the basis for coordinated strategic and operational planning, cooperation and transparency. NATO achieved a significant degree of commonality in its ground-based air defense system and its airborne early-warning capability based on the E-3 AWACS. Among the most important means of enhancing interoperability were the NATO Standardization Agreements (STANAGS). Often addressing such seemingly mundane items as the use of a common language (French and English) in both print and electronic communications, the type of jet fuel for NATO fighters, and the caliber of tank main-gun ammunition, STANAGS provided for a basic level of interoperability that enhanced Alliance deployments and operations. The conduct of joint exercises also contributed to enhancing the ability of allied forces to operate with one another.

Despite the progress NATO made over the decades since its founding, the limits of interoperability were clearly demonstrated in the 1998 Operation Allied Freedom in the Balkans.⁷ Within days of the onset of hostilities, it became evident that the majority of European forces lacked the essential communications, electronic warfare and suppression of enemy air defenses or precision-strike weapons to contribute to the air campaign. Many allied air forces, having focused for decades on defense of NATO airspace, lacked training in air-to-ground operations.⁸ Additional difficulties in transportation, intelligence and logistics hampered the deployment of NATO ground forces. British forces alone possessed a significant number of advanced capabilities, largely of U.S. design, including air-delivered precision weapons and submarine-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles.

The performance of NATO forces in Kosovo raised issues with respect to both the quality and character of the allied military contribution to the common defense in the new century. Even at the end of the 1990s, non-U.S. NATO forces remained oriented towards their erstwhile Cold War missions. This was despite extensive discussions of new missions for the Alliance. In particular, NATO Allies lacked the capabilities central to the conduct of out-of-area operations. The Allies, for the most part, had been slow to invest in the critical capabilities for conducting modern combined arms, high-speed combat (particularly, intelligence, communications, geo-location and precision-strike systems). A number of the Allies, notably Germany, still relied too heavily on conscripts, whose use outside of national borders was extremely circumscribed, if not prohibited outright.

The problems facing NATO nations were similar to those exhibited by allies elsewhere. Japan and South Korea had focused their defense resources on capabilities to defend their homelands. They too had failed to invest in the advanced instruments of

⁷ John E. Peters, Stuart Johnson, Nora Bensahel, Timothy Liston and Traci Williams, European Contributions to Operation Allied Force: Implications for Transatlantic Cooperation, MR-1391-AF, The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2001, Chapter Three.

⁸ Benjamin Lambeth, NATO'S Air War For Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment, MR-1365-AF, The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2001, pp 66-77. For a contrarian view see "French Chief Says His Forces Aren't Inferior," Defense Week, May 8, 2000, p. 16.

modern war, relying instead on the United States to provide the critical intelligence, communications, lift, logistics and long-range strike resources in the event a threat emerged.

September 11, 2001 made resolving the issue of the quality and character of allied forces both more urgent and problematic. From that point on, the U.S. and its allies faced a new threat of global scope, but centered in parts of the world far distant from the Cold War theaters of concern. Facing these threats required new and expanded intelligence capabilities, as well as forces that could be deployed rapidly and over long distances, to new and often austere locations. The United States was engaged in a process of defense transformation to meet these new requirements. In order to meet the new security challenge and ensure interoperability with U.S. forces, the Allies needed to enhance the quality and change the character of their military forces.

Their ability to do so was complicated by declining or flat defense budgets and by aging populations that virtually guaranteed shrinking cohorts of potential recruits. Canada is an example of the problem confronting most traditional U.S. allies. Canada's defense spending has declined since the end of the Cold war by nearly two-thirds, to 1.1 percent of GDP. Its equipment was aging, even obsolescent, at the end of the 1980s.⁹ Canada cannot afford its current military establishment, much less the number and types of forces it will need if it is to make more than a token contribution to the security of NATO or the Western Hemisphere.

But Canada's behavior is not particularly unusual. The majority of U.S. Cold War allies took the peace dividend afforded by the collapse of the Soviet Union, reducing defense budgets and slashing force structure. But even as new threats emerged, these allies have generally failed to reverse the trend of the past decade. Nor, in the case of most of Europe, has NATO expansion or the growth of the European Union changed the characteristic underinvestment in critical high-technology areas, duplication of defense efforts or the overcapacity of European defense industries.

It is ironic that one of the main-threat drivers is the rapid diffusion of advanced military technology throughout unstable regions and into the hands of unpredictable adversaries. At the same time, traditional U.S. allies are not investing in countervailing or transformational defense technologies to a degree and at a pace that would allow them to meet the threat and operate alongside U.S. forces. This is particularly important given the formulation in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) which noted that U.S. forces "must train and operate with allies and friends in peacetime as they would operate in war."¹⁰ It is by no means certain that U.S. forces will be able to train and operate with their allies in peacetime, much less in the event of conflict. As one European defense analyst wrote:

The Kosovo conflict showed just how dependent Europeans are on American military assets. The dominance of the U.S. in the recent Afghanistan

⁹ "On the Cheap," *The Economist*, November 25, 2003, p. 22.

¹⁰ *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., September 2001, p. 15.

campaign revealed that the transatlantic equipment gap is widening rather than being reduced. Europeans are finding it increasingly difficult to fight alongside the Americans.¹¹

When all is said and done, the United States must judge the value of its alliance relationships by the concrete contribution that those nations make to the common defense. The allied military response to September 11, Afghanistan, and Iraq provides one data point for assessing the value of allies and coalition partners. It speaks to what support they can provide today. Another data point is the current effort by U.S. allies, particularly in NATO and the European Union, to create what can be called a rapid-response capability. A third resource for assessing the potential Allied military contributions to common security tasks is to examine their modernization programs and projected defense budgets. This addresses what they may be able to do in the future and how well they can operate alongside U.S. forces. Yet another part of such an assessment must recognize the fact that geography still plays an important role in global military operations and assess the contribution that nations are making or could make as bases of operations for U.S. and other forces.

A. Current Allied Contributions to the Common Defense

Any current assessment of Allied contributions to the common defense must be based primarily on the array of challenges confronting the United States and its allies since September 11. After that date, a new class of threats emerged, one that challenged the political, geographic and defensive concepts and structure underpinning the Western alliance structure. This did not mean that traditional U.S. allies were automatically rendered irrelevant or impotent. Indeed, at the Munich Conference on Security Policy, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz said: “The ensuing war on terrorism has underscored that our transatlantic ties are not obsolete, they are essential.”¹² But it did require a reconsideration of when, how and by what means the allies would pursue the global war on terrorism. A Department of Defense Study of Allied contributions to common security and mutual security both acknowledged Allied support in the war on terrorism, and called for changes in security relationships:

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the ensuing war on terrorism have reinforced the need to continue strengthening and adapting our security relationships with allies and other friendly nations. The military and peacekeeping operations of the past decade have demonstrated the importance of responsibility sharing. Our allies and friends have made important contributions, both military and non-military, to these operations – from Bosnia and Kosovo to the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan.¹³

¹¹ Daniel Keohane, “More Bang for Our Bucks,” New Statesman, November 30, 2003, pp. 11-12.

¹² The Honorable Paul Wolfowitz, “Address on Security Policy,” 38th Munich Conference on Security, Department of Defense, Office of Public Affairs, Press Release, February 2, 2002, p. 2.

¹³ Department of Defense, Responsibility Sharing Report, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., June 2002, p. 2.

Even as the members of NATO have continued their incessant bickering over issues of strategy and defense spending, they have cooperated extensively in the war on terrorism. Immediately after the strikes on New York City and Washington D.C., NATO nations came together to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which declares that an attack on one is an attack on all. NATO AWACS surveillance aircraft flew patrols over the continental United States.

Beginning with the mounting of the U.S.-led operation against the Taliban, called Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), in Afghanistan through Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and the present stability operation in Iraq, the United States has been supported, sustained and accompanied by Allied forces. Special Forces from no fewer than six NATO countries participated directly on the ground in OEF. Naval forces from France, Great Britain, Spain, the Netherlands, Canada, Germany, Italy, Bahrain, Greece and Japan participated in maritime surveillance and interdiction operations; some such as France, Italy and Great Britain conducted strike missions.

More than 7,000 troops were committed by a dozen nations to the war in Afghanistan. France deployed a light infantry and Special Forces, Mirage reconnaissance and fighter aircraft, C-130 transports and the Charles de Gaulle Carrier Battle Group. Italy also contributed a carrier battle group and has since maintained a continual naval presence in the north Arabian Sea. Germany provided the coalition with both Special Operations forces and combat vessels. Canada provided a Light Infantry Battle Group, Special Forces, C-130 transports and naval forces. The UK provided elements of 40 Commandos, a battle group of Royal Marines, Nimrod reconnaissance aircraft, cruise missile-armed submarines and a variety of surface combatants.¹⁴

After the fall of the Taliban, Allied forces, principally from NATO countries, continued to operate in Afghanistan. Some 5,000 troops from Allied nations formed the International Stabilization Force, or ISAF, and have provided security for Kabul since it was liberated. In the fall of 2003, the United States gave command of Stability Force (SFOR) over to its allies. Turkey and Germany have both taken turns commanding this force. In fact, Germany took control over SFOR in the spring of 2003, at precisely the same time that the Schroeder government was locked in a bitter political fight with Washington over the approaching war with Iraq.

Elsewhere around the globe and at home, the nations of Europe, Japan, the Republic of Korea and other states also conducted military and other security operations as part of the war on terrorism. Ships from Spain, Germany, Italy, France, the Netherlands and Turkey conducted maritime surveillance and interdiction operations in the Mediterranean, Arabian and Red Seas. On December 10, 2002, Spanish naval vessels patrolling off Yemen intercepted a North Korean cargo ship carrying SCUD missiles. In Europe, more than 300 al Qaeda suspects were arrested and some \$35 million in terrorist assets have been frozen. These successes led NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson to declare 'NATO's history, NATO's habit of working together, the NATO standards, the

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 4

NATO interoperability have allowed this campaign to be successful and will continue to underlie the success in the future.”¹⁵

The character of the global war on terrorism largely fit the capabilities that U.S. allies were able and willing to provide. Tracking and engaging terrorists and insurgents does not require large ground combat formations and sophisticated air and naval forces. Light infantry, Marines, military police and special operations/commando units have proven their worth in this war. So too have patrol craft, Coast Guard vessels and airborne surveillance aircraft. These are the kinds of forces that U.S. allies and coalition partners have in relative abundance.

The same cannot be said for more intensive operations such as Operation Iraqi Freedom. From the beginning of OIF the Bush Administration characterized the coalition as one of like-minded nations. Yet, with the single exception of Great Britain, which provided an armored division equivalent, nearly 100 combat and support aircraft and dozens of ships and submarines, the coalition members brought relatively little real combat power to the field.

Some allies have “punched above their weight,” providing to the coalition significant military power, particularly relative to the sizes of their military establishments. An example of this is Australia. In the global war on terrorism, the Australians have been no less than strategic and operational trailblazers. Australia was one of the first nations to commit military support to the U.S.-led war on terror in Afghanistan. Over 150 Australian Special Air Services (SAS) troops participated in Operation Enduring Freedom, with more than 1,000 other members of the Australian Armed Forces operating in the Persian Gulf in support roles. Australia answered the bell again in Iraq, this time with 2,000 troops (including 150 Special Forces troops), a commando unit, warships, a squadron of F/A-18 Hornet jets, three Hercules transport aircraft and a specialist team for chemical and biological defense. The Australians proved yet again that they are willing and able to put boots on the ground with American forces when the need arises. Since President Bush's May 1 declaration that major combat operations were over, more than 300 ADF (Australian Defense Force) personnel have remained in Iraq, with another 700 engaged in support operations in the Persian Gulf.

There are approximately 40 countries with troops in Iraq. The total strength of non-U.S. coalition forces at present is 28,000 soldiers.¹⁶ Aside from the British contingent of 12,000, the next largest formations are the Italian forces at 2,700, the Polish brigade of some 2,400, the Ukrainian units at 1,600, Spanish forces of 1,300 and the Netherlands at 1,100. The United States has cobbled together two multinational divisions, one under British command and the other under Polish leadership. Most of these forces had to be transported by the U.S. to Iraq and are supplied and supported by U.S. logistics and communications units.

¹⁵NATO General Secretary Lord George Robertson, “Transforming NATO to Fight Terrorism,” Speech to the American Enterprise Institute, August 1, 2002.

¹⁶ Jeremy Sharp, Post War Iraq: A Table and Chronology of Foreign Contributions, RL32106, Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C., 2003.

In OEF and OIF, the U.S.-led coalitions relied on a set of regional allies to provide critical bases of operations. Some of these states, notably the former Soviet Republics of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyz were new allies. They lacked even the rudimentary elements of interoperable forces but served as launching platforms for coalition operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan. Pakistan, an erstwhile U.S. ally during the Cold War, also allowed U.S. forces to stage from bases in that country.

Another set of geographically and politically important allies were the states of the Persian Gulf, including Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Oman, as well as Saudi Arabia. The smaller Gulf States served as staging bases for coalition ground, air and sea forces. These nations have invested heavily in capabilities to enable them to operate alongside NATO forces. In addition, a number of them have begun a process of political reform. The DoD report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense noted that:

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations provide a major contribution to regional security by allowing U.S. forces the use of military facilities, transit rights, and other forms of access. In 2001, the United States had defense cooperation agreements permitting access and repositioning with Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE. Kuwait continued to house the bulk of U.S. ground troops in the region.¹⁷

Other U.S. allies have provided some out-of-area resources to support operations in the global war on terrorism. Japan, admittedly limited in what it could do by its Constitution, sent a relatively small contingent of combat support units, primarily medical personnel and engineers, to Iraq. South Korea, with an army of more than 600,000 has, to date, sent some 700-support troops. Only the British contingent has the integral command and control and support capabilities to function autonomously and to serve as the core for a multinational division.

There is no question that allies and partners can provide assistance in both low-intensity conflicts and stability operations. These are situations where numbers count. Even lightly equipped units have value. For this reason, the United States sought significant ground force contributions from Turkey, India, Pakistan and even South Korea for the Iraq stabilization operation. This effort is similar to the global search for participants in the Balkans Stabilization Forces.

Despite the strong response by NATO and other U.S. allies to September 1 and the participation of dozens of long-standing allies in both OEF and OIF, it became quite evident that the majority of U.S. allies lacked the capability to make a significant contribution to coalition operations, particularly when they were required to project military power beyond their own borders.¹⁸ Typically, even allies willing to provide

¹⁷ Responsibilities Sharing Report, op. cit., Chapter 11.

¹⁸ Philip H. Gordon, "NATO After 11 September," Survival, Winter 2001-2002, pp. 89-106.

forces lacked the infrastructure to deploy and support their assets. Five years after Kosovo, most NATO Allies had not invested in the qualitative improvements needed if Allied forces were to fight alongside those of the United States and Great Britain.¹⁹ SFOR units required U.S. assistance in order to deploy to Afghanistan and, in most cases, Iraq. Overall, Allied units were not rapidly deployable, lacked long-range strike capabilities, were served by limited logistics and support structures and still did not have sufficient interoperable communications and intelligence systems to permit them to match U.S. concepts of operations. A review of non-U.S. NATO military capabilities to support an expanded presence in Iraq quickly led NATO officials to conclude that of the more than 2.8 million under arms in Europe, less than 50,000 were actually fit for out-of-area deployments. The rest were too poorly trained, equipped and funded for missions in Iraq.²⁰

B. Programs and Plans for the Modernization of Allied Military Forces

The experience in OEF and OIF strongly support pre-September 11 assessments of the limited military capabilities of most U.S. allies. The greatest disparity between the efforts expended to create military forces (in terms of numbers of personnel and budgets) and capabilities, exists among U.S. European allies. U.S. NATO Allies deploy as many active duty forces as does the United States and spends overall approximately 60 percent of the U.S. defense budget. Yet, repeated efforts to enhance Europe's military effectiveness, whether through NATO or as part of a parallel European defense capability managed by the European Union, have failed. The so-called capabilities gap continues to grow.²¹

The problem is not only that of increasing Europe's "bang for the buck." There is a growing incompatibility between U.S. forces and those of its principal allies. This incompatibility has historic roots in the focus of U.S. defense investments on forward defense and power projection and that of its allies in local security. But it also reflects the impact of a new trend, that of transformation. U.S. investments in so-called transformational capabilities, particularly in the areas of command, control, communications and intelligence, are enabling the U.S. military to conduct a new kind of warfare unmatched in speed, reach and precision.²² Unfortunately, a recent study of NATO military capabilities noted that "for several years NATO members have been pursuing divergent paths in developing their military forces. As a result, NATO forces are progressively less able to work well together."²³

¹⁹ Bernard Jenkins, M.P., "The War Against Terrorism, the EU's Response and the Future of NATO," Heritage Lecture #735, The Heritage Foundation, March 7, 2002.

²⁰ "There Must be Some Way Out," The Economist, November 15, 2003, p.5.

²¹ Wesley K. Clark, et al., Permanent Alliance? NATO's Prague Summit and Beyond, The Atlantic Council, Washington, D.C., April 2001.

²² Hans Bennendijk, ed., Transforming America's Military, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, Washington, D.C., 2002.

²³ Robert Hunter and George Joulwan, New Capabilities: Transforming NATO Forces, The Atlantic Council, Washington, D.C., September 2002, p. vii.

This imbalance in capabilities also creates a potential political rift within the Alliance. Even when the United States and its allies can agree on the need for action and the form it should take, the latter cannot accept their fair share of the responsibility. This lack of capabilities creates an imbalance in NATO's security burden and with it a potential political crisis.²⁴ One danger is a fracturing of the Alliance over the relationship between military capability and decision-making authority. Another danger is the creation of a two-tiered alliance with most allied countries in a second-tier role.

The end of the Cold War did not put a halt to efforts by the United States and some allies to improve the latter's military capabilities and more equitably distribute the burdens of common defense. Concerns over the capabilities gap, as demonstrated during the Kosovo campaign, led NATO in 1999 to propose the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI). The goal of the DCI, which encompassed some 53 priority areas for improvements, was to ensure that U.S. allies were capable of engaging in the full spectrum of possible NATO operations up to high-intensity warfare.²⁵

Some European governments took a different lesson from the experience of Kosovo. For them, the answer was not to become militarily like the United States but rather to define a European approach to security and a corresponding European military capability. EU leaders proposed the creation of a European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) to conduct a range of less-stressing missions (the so-called Petersberg tasks) than those envisioned by NATO.²⁶

Following September 11, the United States and its NATO partners again looked to ways to enhance the role and relevance of NATO in the new security environment. The focus was on both expansion and a redefinition of the role that European members of the Alliance could play in enhancing global security. The decision to expand the Alliance and the announcement at the November 2002 Prague summit of the decision to create a NATO Response Force (NRF) signaled a renewed desire among all parties to ensure the continuing relevance of NATO. Barely three years after the last round of expansion that saw the accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, NATO decided that seven more nations were ready for entry: Rumania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Slovenia and the Baltic Republics of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. While the addition of these states will add little to NATO's military security, their entry could shift both the political balance of power in the Alliance as well as its strategic perspective. Ensuring that these new members can meet NATO's minimum standards for interoperability and military capability will further challenge an organization already stressed by its own transformation agenda and by the needs of its members to maintain forces in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq.

²⁴ John C. Hulsman, A Grand Bargain for Europe, Heritage Backgrounder Number 1360, Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C., April 17, 2000, p. 1.

²⁵ NATO Press Office, "Defense Capabilities Initiative," April 25, 1999, Press Release.

²⁶ Robert Hunter, The European Security and Defense Policy: NATO's Companion - or Competitor? MR-1463-NDRI/RE, The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2002, pp. 62-66.

The creation of the NRF addressed the fact that the DCI had failed. Europe made only slow progress over the past year towards fulfilling the demands of the DCI or the ERRF. According to a report published in April 2001, in the first year since the DCI was announced, only 14 of its 59 action items have been nearly or fully implemented.²⁷ Virtually all of the action items dealing with improved mobility, deployability and combat effectiveness on the part of European forces have not been implemented. In most instances, inadequate national defense budgets are at the root of the problem. A similar situation affected the ERRF. Although basic capabilities have been committed, there are large gaps in specific critical capabilities associated with independent out-of-area operations. These include satellite surveillance, air and sealift, surveillance and reconnaissance, communications and precision munitions.

Announced at the Prague Summit in November 2002, the NRF would consist of a cadre of European forces capable of sustaining high-intensity combat. The NRF is intended to enable U.S. allies to fight alongside the United States in high-intensity out-of-area operations for at least 30 days. The NRF will be a force of about 20,000 soldiers, sailors and airmen with three to five squadrons of tactical fighters plus supporting transport, tanker and reconnaissance aircraft, a brigade equivalent of ground troops and eight to ten combat ships. These forces will be drawn from the standing forces already committed to NATO. Three rotating aggregations of units will be identified, each to be available for deployment on a rotating basis. For this reason, the NRF forces would be expected to represent the bulk of European investments in advanced weapons systems and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR).²⁸

The NRF proposal was a response, in part, to the insistence by the United States that NATO refocus itself away from a traditional regional perspective and focus on the political and operational requirements for meeting new threats, particularly those posed by international terrorism. President Bush described his vision of the future of the Alliance thus:

The role of NATO is different as we go into the 21st century. NATO used to be a way to defend Europe from the Warsaw Pact. But the Warsaw Pact no longer exists. Russia is not our enemy and we face new threats, and the new threats are global terror. And so, one way to make sure NATO is relevant is to focus on the true threats to freedom, address those threats and figure out ways we can work together to accomplish what we want, which is a peaceful world, which means better intelligence sharing, the capacity to cut off money, and a military operation that reflects the nature of the wars we'll be fighting.²⁹

The NRF proposal also reflected the disheartening reality that European defense spending was simply inadequate to meet the goals set by the Alliance. In June 2002,

²⁷ Barry, op. cit., p. 257.

²⁸ NATO Response Force- NATO's Expeditionary Capability, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium, Briefing, December 2002.

²⁹ President George W. Bush, "NATO Must Focus on 'True Threats' to Freedom to Stay Relevant," Interview on Czech Television, U.S. Embassy Prague, November 18, 2002.

NATO ministers voted to reduce the number of objectives within the DCI to only essential capabilities absolutely required for the full range of NATO missions. These capabilities were focused on a few selected areas: chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defense; command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I); interoperability of deployed forces and key aspects of combat effectiveness; and rapid deployment and sustainment of combat forces.

Taken together, the new proposals for focused investments in a set of critical forces and programs reflect the widening capabilities gap occurring between the United States and its NATO Allies. According to one defense expert, the NRF proposal “acknowledges the failure of the DCI to produce European forces compatible with American forces across the combat spectrum.” One observer, immediately after the end of OIF, described NATO’s problem thus:

A NATO in which the United States has more than 200 strategic lift aircraft, Britain has four and the rest of the allies have none, is unsustainable. America’s European allies must now begin to meet their commitments to address rapidly the alarming imbalances in airlift, precision-guided munitions, air-to-air refueling, and secure communications. Without these capabilities, most European nations will not, in the future, be able to meaningfully contribute to modern military operations, making hollow any plans for a serious European-American security partnership.³⁰

Although the NRF concept appears relatively straightforward, many questions remain regarding how this concept is to be implemented. What is to be the relationship between the NRF and the ERRF? Are these two forces to be competitors, drawing from the same common pool of capabilities? What efforts will be taken to ensure interoperability among the component parts of the NRF and between that force and those deployed by the United States? What capabilities will the United States be required to provide to the NRF? Some in Europe viewed the NRF idea as a way of short-circuiting Europe’s efforts to develop an independent ERRF. Yet, even a casual assessment of Europe’s current 2.6 million-man military suggests that it should be relatively easy to find enough capability to be supported by the ERRF and the NRF.

In the view of many in the United States, the concept of the NRF is the last best hope for making NATO relevant and keeping the United States connected to NATO. If the European allies cannot muster resources to sustain even this minimum capability to operate alongside the United States, then, putting at risk the fundamental principles of the Alliance, a two-tiered alliance will result: shared responsibilities and shared risks.

At the Prague Summit, NATO also endorsed a new military concept for combating terrorism and improving cyber security. In addition, the Alliance identified a number of defense initiatives to address the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction, including creation of a deployable nuclear, biological and chemical analysis laboratory,

³⁰ R. Nicholas Burns, “NATO has Adapted: An Alliance With a New Mission,” International Herald Tribune, May 24, 2003, p. 12.

funding a NATO biological and chemical defense stockpile and developing a NATO-wide disease surveillance system.

While NATO was navigating its way from the DCI to the NRF, the EU too was wrestling with the challenge of enhancing its capabilities for 21st Century security missions. The nations of the EU have been working for several years to define a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). This process began with the Franco-British Summit at St. Malo, in 1998, which concluded that the “Union must have the capability for autonomous action” in defense matters.³¹ In 1999, at the June Cologne Summit, the EU agreed on the need to create the capability for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces.³² The nations of Europe then began the process of creating a common security framework, formalizing the commitment to develop the structures and means to pursue a common approach to security and defense.

The experience in Kosovo, where the European members of NATO were able to provide only a small fraction of the needed force, propelled them to action. The EU has moved with surprising speed and determination to give substance to their vision of the ESDP. At the December 1999 European Council in Helsinki, the members of the EU defined a set of so-called “headline goals” for the creation of a rapid-reaction capability that would permit autonomous action.³³ By the end of 2003, the EU should have had the capability to deploy the equivalent of a corps of ground forces, some 15 brigades (50-60,000 men), supported by the necessary air and naval forces, on two months’ notice. This force would possess the necessary logistical infrastructure and other supporting capabilities to be sustainable in the field for up to a year.³⁴ At the end of November 2003, the EU held a Capabilities Conference in Nice where they formalized the national contributions to the rapid deployment force (RDF) and defined procedures for planning and coordinating security activities.

Each member of the EU has made specific pledges of forces and equipment. France has pledged 12,000 troops, 75 combat planes, two AWACS, 30 drones, 15 ships, and two naval battle-groups including one built around the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle and one around the spy satellite Helios. The United Kingdom has offered 12,500 combat and 18,000 support troops, 18 ships and 72 combat planes. Germany has committed a similar number of troops, including up to seven combat battalions, air-defense units and 93 combat aircraft. In addition, these nations and those with the capability have pledged combat support capabilities including naval transports, aerial refueling, surveillance, intelligence and transport aircraft and mine countermeasure ships.

The EU also has taken a number of steps since Helsinki to create the necessary institutions and develop the required plans to support an autonomous military capability.

³¹ Hunter, *op. cit.*, Chapter V.

³² Minister of Defense of Luxembourg Alex Bodry, “The Results of the Cologne Summit,” in XVIth International Workshop On Political-Military Decision Making in the Atlantic Alliance, Hungarian National Parliament, Budapest, Hungary, 20-23 June, 1999.

³³ EU Council, Military Capabilities Commitment Declaration, Press Release Number 20, November 2000.

³⁴ Christoph Betram, Charles Grant and Francois Heisbourg, “European Defence: The Next Steps,” CER Bulletin, Issue 14, October/November 2000, p. 1.

Three defense-oriented committees created at Helsinki, the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the Military Committee (MC), and the Military Staff (MS), were declared operational in March 2000. These organizations have been tasked to support the realization of the Helsinki goals, the coordination of national-defense activities, and the conduct of initial operational planning. In addition, the PSC has held planning meetings to consider ways of transferring the functions and institutions currently operating under the Western European Union (WEU) into the EU. Early targets for transfer include the WEU's Satellite Center and its Institute for Security Studies.

The Military Staff was declared operational on June 11, 2001 and is based in Brussels. The Military Staff will provide military expertise to EU decision-makers and serve as a link between the Military Committee and the military resources available. It will perform three major operational functions: early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning. The purpose for creating such a permanent staff is to provide a capability to assist the European Council in that body's exercise of its political and strategic responsibilities under the ESDP. The Military Staff will not, however, conduct any operational level military planning.

It is true that European nations are investing in some of the necessary military capabilities to support the goals of the ERRF and, naturally, of the NRF. The A400 airlifter, the Eurofighter, the Horizon frigate and the Tiger helicopter are examples of major multinational programs that will enhance the ability of European nations to operate with U.S. Forces or as part of an ERRF. EU officials claim that about 100 of 144 so-called capability targets, including multiple-launch rocket systems and electronic-warfare battalions, have been met. But, of the remaining 40 or so are most of the critical capabilities that would permit the ERRF to operate out-of-area and to conduct high-intensity, precision warfare. The ERRF remains woefully short of capabilities for air and sea transport, intelligence, long-range precision strike, expedient logistics and command and control.

No additional troops have been raised to embody this force. The ERRF will be constituted from forces that are already a part of NATO or national-force lists. This was done deliberately, both to save on costs and because it maintains the principle of "separable but not separate" essentials to avoiding a NATO-EU crisis. A major difficulty confronting the EU in the creation of a deployable ERRF is the decision that it will not be a standing force. Although the members have pledged specific numbers and even types of troops, aircraft and ships, a EU force would be assembled only in response to a crisis, and only for the duration of that crisis. Individual nations, each accountable to their national parliaments, will decide whether, when and how to contribute troops. This means that for each crisis the response force would be ad hoc in nature. It also means that with the exception of units drawn from the Euro-Corps, there will have been little or no opportunity for these forces to train together.

Many observers of the Continent's defense environment are skeptical regarding the ability of EU members to meet defense requirements laid down at St. Malo and Helsinki. A recent study of future U.S. defense budgets demonstrates that there is a

significant gap between resources required to support U.S. force structure and the resources that are likely to be available. The situation for U.S. allies, if anything, is worse. Europe spends almost two-thirds as much on defense as the United States and actually deploys more combat formations. Yet, for their expenditures, the Europeans receive much less in the way of modern capabilities. Europe spends only one-fourth as much on research and development as the United States. The Europeans spend about half as much on procurement as the United States. Recent reports that Germany may withdraw from a number of collaborative defense programs critical to the future ability of the RDF suggests that it may not be possible for the EU to create the kind of RDF laid out at Helsinki.

Despite the optimistic start to the ERRF, many problems must be overcome before a credible capability can be fielded. Investments are lagging in key areas, including transportation, logistics, precision strike, intelligence and command and control. Moreover, there is no structure to the rapid-response force. It consists of a military headquarters that cannot do operational planning and has no authority over training, equipment or joint exercises. There is no basis for joint or combined training or exercises in peacetime. Even were the rapid-deployment force capable on paper of conducting an operation, it may not be competent for such responsibilities.

Some European countries continue their efforts to streamline and modernize their military organizations and structures. Germany remains committed to its military reform program that will both reduce the overall size of the Bundeswehr and reduce the number of conscripts. Greece published its Strategic Defense Review calling for increased professionalization of the military, a reduction in the number of combat units and increased spending on advanced weapons systems. However, these states are moving in the direction of military reform at a slow, sometimes even glacial, pace.

Despite the progress made to date on creating the ERRF, questions of policy and capability remain. There was great pressure on EU members to declare the ERRF operationally ready, at least for limited deployments. Yet, the EU had still not decided under what conditions such forces would be employed, the degree to which individual members were free to opt out of a EU-sponsored deployment, and even who would lead such a mission. Although the EU had created a military staff and had nominated Lt-General Klaus Schuwirth to direct it, it had not been staffed or equipped. Indeed, in conversations with U.S. defense officials it was agreed that the EU would rely on the staff at NATO's military headquarters for strategic planning support.

Even some European observers have concluded that "...there is not the slightest indication that ESDP will resolve the capabilities gap."³⁵ While EU members committed over 100,000 troops to the ERRF, less than 1000 troops were actually deployed by the end of 2003.³⁶ Such improvements as are underway will have a relatively small impact on the overall capability of NATO/European armed forces to conduct out-of-area operations. In a number of other areas, from space-based surveillance and unmanned aerial vehicles

³⁵ Jenkins, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

³⁶ Brooks Tigner, "Compelling Times for European Union," *Defense News*, December 22, 2003, p. 24.

to airborne intelligence collection, logistics and long-range precision strike, the capabilities gap will grow.³⁷ The Headline Goals established to empower the ERRF do not include these kinds of high-end capabilities that are absolutely vital if the EU is to be able to carry out peacekeeping operations in any but the most benign military environments.³⁸ The majority of European forces are not equipped, trained or supported for out-of-area operations.

Europe also suffers from overcapacity in its defense industries that contribute to redundancy in deployed capabilities. That has been reduced somewhat through industrial consolidation, but redundancy remains. The members of the EU have moved only slowly to rationalize their defense efforts. They have rejected the idea of role specialization, ensuring that there will be increased overhead, maintenance of inefficient industries and forces, and reduced capabilities.

Elsewhere, the situation is much the same. Investments by U.S. allies such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are still directed primarily at self-defense. They suffer from many of the same capabilities deficits as U.S. European allies. Only Japan has been investing in advanced technologies in such areas as airborne surveillance, satellite reconnaissance and air and missile defenses. Japan has been the most forthcoming of U.S. non-NATO allies in conducting out-of-area operations. But even Japan is able to deploy only a small fraction of its overall military capability over its horizons and cannot sustain such deployments on its own.

Investments in self-defense capabilities are relevant, however, when it is by those countries that are likely to serve as forward bases for U.S. (and other allies) power-projection forces. Even a cursory examination of past coalition military operations and potential areas of political-strategic instability suggest that the countries of interest for forward basing of U.S. and other forces rest on an arc running from Eastern Europe through Turkey and the Persian Gulf to Central and South Asia before ending with Australia, Singapore and the Philippines. Efforts by new NATO members, the GCC states, India, Australia and others along the arc to obtain modern self-defense capabilities should be encouraged.

The bottom line is that while the criteria by which the United States assesses the military value of its traditional alliance relationships has not changed significantly since the end of the Cold War, the practical contribution by those same allies has declined. The armies of traditional U.S. allies naturally bore a greater share of the security burden when the threat was Soviet aggression in Europe or Northeast Asia. The forces of NATO, Europe, South Korea and Japan provided the quantitative base of the common defense. This defense was given depth, strength and reach by qualitatively superior U.S. forces. In addition, bases in Europe, Japan and South Korea were important to support both the movement of reinforcements and deep strikes against the expected Soviet/Warsaw Pact adversary.

³⁷ Kori Schake, *op. cit.*

³⁸ Clark, et al., *op. cit.*, p. 10.

As the locus of conflict has shifted from the inner German border and the 38th Parallel to a southern arc of crisis running from the borders of Eastern Europe through the Caucasus and the Middle East to South and Southeast Asia, the geographic centrality in U.S. security planning of traditional allies has declined. So too has the value of their military contribution to the common defense. The experiences of the 1991 Gulf War, the Balkans operations, the global war on terrorism and Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom have demonstrated that the ability to conduct out-of-area operations defines the utility of traditional allies to current U.S. national security.

It is precisely the ability to participate in out-of-area operations that the Allies lack. Their deficits are both qualitative and quantitative. Most allied military establishments are, as yet, not structured to support significant out-of-area deployments. Qualitatively, the Allies lack critical capabilities, such as intelligence and information systems, precision-strike weapons, electronic-warfare and air-defense suppression capabilities, and aerial lift and refueling to engage in high-intensity power-projection operations. Even when forced entry and high-intensity combat does not occur, U.S. allies generally lack the ability to sustain a high capability out-of-area presence without significant U.S. assistance.³⁹ This lack of investment has been a chronic NATO problem. A senior U.S. defense official warned recently that this could undermine the NRF.

NATO's first challenge is for the Allies to remedy their military shortcomings. NATO will not be able to perform its military missions if it does not fix longstanding shortfalls in such areas as strategic lift, communications, nuclear, biological and chemical defense and precision-guided munitions. Allies promised to address these shortcomings through the Prague Capabilities Commitment, but NATO suffers from a long history of unfulfilled force goals. Continued failure in this regard will jeopardize the NATO Response Force.⁴⁰

Finally, the total fraction of allied military capability that is capable of being deployed beyond national borders remains quite small. NATO's NRF and the EU's ERRF, when fully organized, will provide some 20,000 forces on a steady basis or between 60-100,000 with rotations. U.S. allies simply do not provide sufficient usable military capability to sustain their share of the common defense. In the words of Lord Robertson, "I put it bluntly, the overwhelming part of the (Alliance's) soldiers are useless for the kind of missions we are mounting today. In other words, the non-U.S. NATO countries have lots of soldiers, but far too few of them can be deployed."⁴¹

C. Transformation and the Allies

The problem for coalition operations created by the chronic misdirected and under-resourced investment by U.S. allies in advanced military capabilities is rendered even more challenging by the simultaneous efforts by the United States to transform America's military. As described in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, the United States is

³⁹ Kori Schake, *op. cit.*

⁴⁰ Under Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith, "Statement on the Future of NATO," Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, March 27, 2003.

⁴¹ NATO Secretary General George Robertson, Speech, Berlin, November 3, 2003.

intent on transforming both the means and methods by which it conducts warfare across the spectrum of conflict.⁴² The QDR emphasized investments in such areas as space systems; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities; long-range-precision strike; information systems; and defenses against chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.⁴³ It also envisioned a new way of warfare involving the exploitation of information superiority and advantages in long-range, high-speed, precision-strike capabilities to rapidly defeat adversaries.

The Bush Administration believes that if traditional alliances are to remain relevant the members must be able to act together across the full spectrum of threats that confront them in the 21st Century. This necessitates a change in the way allies approach force planning and modernization. At the February 2002, security conference in Munich, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz called on the NATO Allies to transform their militaries.

A key objective for the Prague summit should be to launch a military transformation agenda. One that can have profound implications. During the Cold War we sized and shaped our forces against specific geographic threats. Yet, the only Article V attack in NATO's history came from an unexpected source, in an unexpected form. What this tells us is that our old assumptions, our old plans, and our old capabilities are out-of-date. Article V threats can come from anywhere, in many forms.

Rather than trying to guess which enemy the Alliance will confront years or decades from now, or where that may occur, we should focus on what capabilities adversaries could use against us, on shoring up our own vulnerabilities, and on exploiting new capabilities to extend our military advantages. That is the essence of a capabilities-based approach to defense planning.⁴⁴

NATO recognized the need to prevent a transatlantic gap from emerging as a result of U.S. efforts at transformation. To this end, NATO disestablished the venerable SACLANT (Supreme Allied Command Atlantic) command and created a new strategic command, Allied Command Transformation (ACT). Lord Robertson defined the purpose of the new headquarters thus:

We have changed the purpose of this headquarters and are creating a whole new NATO alliance all together. Allied Command Transformation is making our new military capabilities a reality and will make certain NATO's transformation keeps in time with the U.S., which will personify the Alliance's transformation into the 21st century.⁴⁵

⁴²Richard J. Kugler and Hans Binnendijk, "Choosing a Strategy, in Binnendijk, *op. cit.*, Chapter 3.

⁴³ Quadrennial Defense Review, pp. 41 -46.

⁴⁴ Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Speech at the 38th Munich Conference February 2, 2002.

⁴⁵ NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, "Giambastiani Assumes New NATO Transformation Command Reins," Press Release, JFCOM, June 19, 2003.

Transformation requires investments not in next-generation weapons systems but rather in so-called leap-ahead capabilities. With a few exceptions, U.S. allies are investing in the next generation and not in transformation. Much of this investment is in platforms, and not in enablers such as command and control, communications and intelligence systems.⁴⁶ One long-time defense expert observed that Europe lacked the backbone of any transformation, the battle-space management capabilities, as well as precision-strike systems. Absent increased defense spending, this analyst declared, there was no way for Europe to close an ever-widening capabilities gap with the United States.⁴⁷ The RAND Corporation offered a similar assessment:

U.S. military transformation will be difficult for European allies to match, especially if their defense budgets continue to decline and their investment in new technology and equipment falls far behind U.S. levels. So far, the EU's European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) have failed to arrest these trends, mainly because European publics feel more secure than ever.⁴⁸

Moreover, some among U.S. allies reject the idea that they must transform their militaries in order to remain relevant to 21st Century security strategies. European and Asian allies tend to see military transformation as part of a larger and more complex dynamic involving regional political and economic integration, rationalization of oversized defense industries, exploitation of advanced commercial technologies and a new approach to international diplomacy.⁴⁹ Military forces are of lesser importance in this construct of security relations than other instruments of national or collective power. Thus, transforming those forces is less of a priority for the Allies, it is argued, than it may be for the United States.

Many of the strategic and political aspects of transformation have been sharply criticized in allied defense and foreign policy circles. Some criticisms focus on the premise that transformation must improve the capability of the allies to conduct high-intensity warfare. They, along with some U.S. defense experts, argue that NATO's future military forces must be designed for less intense forms of warfare and other missions such as peacekeeping and stability.⁵⁰ Other critics argue that the operational concepts associated with transformational warfare – speed, precision, preemptive action – run counter to Alliance consultative mechanisms and could enable the United States to free itself from the constraints of having to operate within Alliance structures.⁵¹

⁴⁶ Charles Barry, *op. cit.*, pp.232-247.

⁴⁷ Francois Heisbourg, "Europe's Military Revolution," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Spring 2002, pp. 28-32.

⁴⁸ RAND Corporation Europe, "Peace and Security: U.S. and European Views and Strategies," *RAND Review*, Issue 1, Number 1, Newtonweg, Netherlands, 2002.

⁴⁹ Robbin F. Laird and Holger H. May, *The Revolution in Military Affairs: Allied Perspectives*, McNair Paper Number 60, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington, D.C., April 1999, Chapters 3 and 4.

⁵⁰ Ronald Asmus, "Rebuilding the Atlantic Alliance," *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2003; and US-CREST, *Future Military Coalitions: The Transatlantic Challenge*, September 2002, pp. 1-4.

⁵¹ See for example Peter Volten, "The Prague Summit: A Strategic Reorientation of NATO?" Netherlands Atlantic Association, November 12, 2002; and Andrew Pierre, *Coalitions: Building and Maintenance*, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, 2002, pp. 41-44.

The one area of transformation where regional states could significantly enhance U.S. and their own security and power-projection capabilities is missile defense. Great Britain, Japan, Australia, Canada, Israel and India are all currently collaborating with the United States on the development or operation of early-warning and missile-defense systems. Nations located close to potential launch sites for missiles targeted against the United States can serve as forward bases for sensors and, in the future, interceptors.

D. The Resource Base for Allied Defense Modernization

For U.S. allies to fulfill their commitments for enhancing their capabilities and improving the prospects for interoperability, much less transform themselves in the image of the U.S. military, they must spend adequately for defense. There is virtual unanimity among experts in the United States, Europe and Asia that America's allies are not spending enough to maintain an effective defense capability.⁵² No less a personage than Lord Robertson declared in a recent speech that as a result of its levels of defense spending "...mighty Europe remains a military pygmy."⁵³

The decade of the 1990s was one of reduced defense spending throughout the world. United States defense spending fell by some 40 percent in real terms between 1986 and 1998.⁵⁴ Reductions in the defense expenditures of most U.S. allies were equal or even greater.⁵⁵ What made their situation all the worse was the fact that most U.S. allies had begun that decade spending far less than the United States, either as a percentage of GDP or as a percentage of their overall national budgets.

U.S. allies, in general, have failed to reverse the downward trend in their defense expenditures even in the face of growing threats. As U.S. defense expenditures rose beginning in the late 1990s – and dramatically so after September 11 – that of U.S. allies, most particularly European NATO, remained flat.⁵⁶ European NATO countries repeatedly failed to achieve the levels of defense spending and military modernization to which they had committed at a series of summits. The former head of NATO's Military Committee, General Klaus Naumann, was moved by exasperation to exclaim that all nations were "...very generous in giving themselves a peace dividend. That has to stop."⁵⁷

One only has to examine current allied defense budgets and acquisition programs to understand the difficulty most allies will have in meeting even the modest modernization goals set out by NATO and the EU, much less the more ambitious targets

⁵² Most recently see Jean-Paul Bechat and Felix G. Rohatyn, co-chairmen, The Future of the Transatlantic Defense Community, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., 2002.

⁵³ Lord George Robertson, untitled speech, First Magazine Dinner, London, January 24, 2002.

⁵⁴ Daniel Gouré and Jeffrey Ranney, Averting the Defense Train Wreck in the New Millennium The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., 1999, pp. 9-10.

⁵⁵ Charles Wolfe and Benjamin Zither, European Military Prospects, Economic Constraints, and the Rapid Reaction Force, MR-1416-OSD/SRF, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2001, Chapter 3.

⁵⁶ NATO, Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defense, Defense Expenditures of NATO Countries (1980 - 2002), Mons, Belgium, 2002.

⁵⁷ General Klaus Naumann, former Head NATO Military Committee, cited in "Kosovo Reveals NATO Interoperability Woes," Aviation Week and Space Technology, August 9, 1999, p. 32.

of a transformational modernization path. European defense planning, even after September 11, has not seen a serious increase in the resources available for defense. Over the past several years it has been marked by two trends. The first was the continuing decline in levels of defense spending with the resulting erosion of readiness and overall capability. The second was the pursuit of selective acquisitions and research-and-development efforts in areas intended to enhance those areas identified by NATO and the EU as critical to the continuing relevance of European forces to the security of the Continent.

For example, on December 5, 2002 German Defense Minister Peter Struck announced that as part of his government's new plan for restructuring and modernizing the Bundeswehr he was cutting procurement of a number of advanced weapons systems about to enter production or advanced development. Struck reduced from 73 to 60 the number of A400M medium-range air transports that Germany intended to procure. He also announced reduction in purchases of the Meteor and IRIS-T air-to-air missiles. This decision came on top of persistent rumors that the Defense Ministry would also delay acquisition or development of a number of systems. These include the Multi-role Armored Vehicle, the NH-90 multi-role helicopter, the German variant of the Tiger armed helicopter, a replacement maritime patrol aircraft and even the Medium Extended Range Air Defense System (MEADS) in which Germany and Italy are partnered with the United States.

Germany's decision reflects a chronic European problem: the unwillingness to spend enough on defense. In 1985, at the peak of the Cold War, overall defense expenditure by the Federal Republic of Germany was approximately 3.2 percent of GDP. Current estimates show that the defense budget will decline to less than 1.4 percent of GDP by the year 2003. As a result, Germany's defense expenditures will be approximately 6 percent below the average for NATO members. It also means that the purchasing power of the defense budget continues to decline as inflation takes its toll.

The situation is largely the same across Europe. The Netherlands recently announced its intention to reduce defense spending by approximately 5 percent over the next four years. Only France, Italy, Norway and the UK have successfully completed programs of defense reform and relatively modest defense-budget increases that should permit additional investments in high technology. But even in the case of France, a recent parliamentary report judged the state of availability of military equipment to be insufficient across all three Services. A proposed 5 percent increase in the new six-year French defense budget is expected to face strong opposition from Parliament. Overall, the landscape of European defense is rather bleak. According to the U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Alexander Vershbow, "...rhetoric has far outstripped action when it comes to enhancing capabilities, and with respect to defense investments, NATO as a whole gets a failing grade."⁵⁸

⁵⁸ Merrick Carey, "Does NATO Still Have the Will?" Sea Power Almanac 2003, Navy League, Washington, D.C., pp. 23-28.

Concerns regarding policy issues arising from the creation of the ERRF pale in comparison to still unanswered questions regarding the ability of European nations to deploy sufficient real-military capability to make good on their NATO commitments, much less those to the EU. In the eyes of many observers, Europe is failing to make good on the commitment arising from the experience of Kosovo to modernize and strengthen its military forces. Supreme Allied Commander, General Joseph Ralston, warned earlier this year that a serious imbalance continued to exist between United States and European military capabilities due to growing asymmetry in technology. Ralston said that “Europe’s shrinking defense industrial base and limitations in production of advanced military capabilities could lead to a future in which only the United States had the capacity to engage globally.”⁵⁹

Recent reports suggest that overall defense R&D spending in Europe is falling by 2 percent a year, while expenditure on procurement among European NATO members is at its lowest level in decades. Procurement spending has dropped by 6.9 percent since 1996. In the United States, procurement has increased by 4.7 percent over the same period. Great Britain has managed to increase defense spending slightly. Other countries such as France, Belgium and the Netherlands have increased procurement only by shifting money from other accounts. The budgets of still other countries, most notably Germany, continue to fall.

This situation is likely to be exacerbated by the differing national responses to the events of September 11. The United States is pouring billions of additional dollars into military programs, some \$40 billion dollars extra in FY 2002 alone. European allies have made no changes to their defense budgets. In some instances, critical program areas are even being cut. France’s 2003 defense budget at \$35 billion dollars was only a slight increase in real terms over the 2001 and 2002 budgets. The French Defense Ministry will increase spending on missiles and aerospace capabilities, but will have to absorb spending reductions in air, land and sea transport and in deep-strike systems. Germany may review its June 2000 Capabilities White Paper in light of September 11. The German government approved a \$1.4 billion anti-terror fund, half of which will go to the armed forces. This money may be used to accelerate procurement of advanced reconnaissance and surveillance assets such as the SAR-Lupe reconnaissance satellite constellation. There is no evidence that Great Britain plans to increase defense spending despite the events of September 11 and the conclusion in the MOD (Ministry of Defense) study on Future Strategic Context for Defense that warned of the dangers of asymmetric warfare and that critical civilian infrastructure might be the target of terrorist attack. Other countries such as Greece, Spain, Italy, Poland and the Czech Republic still plan to reduce defense spending over the next few years.

A recent RAND Corporation study concluded that the cost of the modernization requirements for the ERRF could not be met within current budget and force-structure

⁵⁹ Paul Mann, “NATO’s Transatlantic Market Pits Politics Versus Business,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, June 17, 1995, p. 7.

constraints. In their concluding observations, the study's authors stated that "without substantial reallocations from existing military spending and military investments, the requisite capital costs for the ESDP/ERRF cannot be met until the end of the decade."⁶⁰ Another observer of the European defense scene came to a similar conclusion:

Military transformation, especially the kind which European militaries require in order to close the gap with the United States, will be expensive and institutionally difficult to implement. The savings from cutting in-place forces will not be enough to pay for the required initial expenditures in the area of transformation.⁶¹

Yet, as has been discussed above, there is very little apparent interest on the part of European NATO defense establishments or political leaderships to radically restructure their armed forces and associated investment programs. Defense programs are as much about jobs and export earnings as they are about security.

If it will be difficult for U.S. allies to meet the requirements for near-term modernization necessary in order to create a minimum capability for out-of-area operations, is there any realistic prospect that these same allies will be able or willing to invest in transformation? A transformed military is likely to cost between 25 and 50 percent more than one that merely replaces the present generation of tanks, artillery and aircraft with the next.⁶² It is unclear that even the United States can afford its current transformation program.⁶³

The prospects for increasing defense spending or for the reallocation of resources away from domestic programs and to defense were judged to be virtually non-existent.⁶⁴ Assessments of Europe's demographic and economic futures generally predict an aging population – in some countries even a significant net population – skyrocketing entitlement costs and slower economic growth.⁶⁵ The same will be true for Japan and, to a significantly lesser degree, the United States. The combination of birth rates well below the numbers necessary for population stability plus relatively modest levels of immigration will result in the population of major U.S. allies such as Germany, Italy, Spain, Greece and Japan actually declining over the first half of the 21st Century.⁶⁶

⁶⁰ Wolf and Zycher, *op. cit.*, p.36.

⁶¹ Brendan L. Wilson, "Military Strategy for Transformation: NATO's Rubicon," Center for Contemporary Conflict, December 2, 2003.

⁶² Gouré and Ranney, *op. cit.*

⁶³ Niall Ferguson, "Going Critical: American Power and the Consequences of Fiscal Overstretch," The National Interest, Fall, 2003; and Jeffrey Record, Bounding the War on Terrorism, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, December, 2003.

⁶⁴ This conclusion is confirmed by the author's interviews with European defense experts, political leaders and journalists.

⁶⁵ Brian Nichiporuk, The Security Dynamics of Demographic Factors, MR-1088-WFHF/RF/DLPF/A, RAND Corporation, 2000.

⁶⁶ Paul Hewitt, Meeting the Challenge of Global Aging, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., 2002.

Aging populations generally tend to save less as increasing fractions of the population move from the workforce to retirement and become net consumers of resources.⁶⁷ In addition, because this aging will occur primarily in the developed world, it could adversely effect overall global economic performance, reduce demand for goods from the developing world and create a global economic recession/depression.

Aging populations will place enormous burdens on government programs. The cost of programs to address the needs of an aging population will simply overwhelm national governments, crowding out most discretionary spending.⁶⁸ By 2040, public benefits to the elderly will consume the following percentages of national GDP: Spain, 33; Italy, 32; France, 29; Japan, 27; Germany, 26; the UK, 17 percent; and the United States, 21.⁶⁹ Because the United States and the UK have birth rates and immigration policies that ensure a growing population, they will be less constrained by the budgetary demands of the aging segment of their population than will the other nations listed above. But for the major nations of Europe and Japan, the problem of paying for public benefits to the elderly is likely to prove catastrophic to national expenditures.

The “squeeze” on defense spending will only grow in the years and decades to come making it ever more difficult for U.S. allies to invest in a military that is interoperable and able to project power to distant regions of crisis. It is also possible that aging populations in Europe and Japan increasingly may be unwilling to send their military forces in harms way.

E. A Net Assessment: The Limits of What the Allies Can Really Provide

The current effort by NATO to create the NRF and the EU to stand up to the ERRF may well be the last chances for U.S. European allies to establish themselves as fully equal partners with the United States. Even then, U.S. allies will constitute, at best, a “Mini-Me” version of the U.S. military. Such a force, if fully resourced and supported, would allow U.S. European allies to operate alongside U.S. forces in high-intensity conflicts. This force also would provide a limited capability for U.S. allies to conduct out-of-area operations. Even then, it must be noted that the initially deployable 20,000 ERRF force would be only one-third the size of the current active duty Libyan military, one-sixth that of Saudi Arabia and but one-fifteenth of Syria’s armed forces. Thus, its ability to project power independent of the United States will be limited.

For all of their possible deficiencies, the NRF or ERRF will be a significant military force in comparison to the power-projection capabilities of other U.S. allies. Even close allies such as South Korea, with more than 600,000 soldiers under arms, would require significant assistance in order to deploy even a single division beyond its own borders.

⁶⁷ Robert England, The Macroeconomic Impact of Global Aging: A New Era of Economic Frailty?, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., 2002.

⁶⁸ Richard Jackson and Neil Howe, The 2003 Aging Vulnerability Index, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., 2003.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 7.

Without question, there will be situations in which what the United States will seek from its allies is quality, not quantity. This was certainly the case in both OEF and OIF. In both operations the nature of the battlefield and the character of the war plans dictated that only selected allied capabilities capable of operating in a manner and at a tempo similar to that of U.S. forces be deployed. NATO nations, Australia and Japan possess some high quality, “high end” military units. In some instances allied units are equipped with U.S. hardware. These high-quality formations generally can operate fully alongside U.S. forces, particularly if they train together. Certain kinds of operations that do not require extremely close coordination or precisely compatible technologies, such as maritime interdiction, are relatively easier for multinational forces to conduct, while others, such as integrated air operations, are not.

One of the problems in operating in coalitions can be the unevenness of the capabilities of the participating countries. This is true even in NATO, which has spent decades working on the problem of interoperability. The air war over Kosovo showed that while some allied air units possessed advanced systems and great skills, most allies demonstrated significant capabilities gaps.⁷⁰ These problems led the Air Component Commander, General Michael Short, to restrict the employment of allied air forces because of concerns for the safety of their pilots and the danger of collateral damage from poorly aimed munitions.⁷¹ Five years later, there has been relatively little improvement overall in the technological sophistication of most allied militaries.

In most cases, it is likely that what the United States will want from its allies is quantity. This appears to be the case now in Iraq. The U.S. attempted to secure some tens of thousands of soldiers from Turkey, India, Pakistan and South Korea to augment its own deployed forces and the 28,000 Coalition troops from dozens of countries, mostly current or aspiring members of NATO. Here the Coalition was not looking for units with the capability for high-intensity combat. It simply wanted soldiers who could patrol streets and guard infrastructure.

To some extent, military power is additive. Therefore, the contributions of allies and friends to coalition operations cannot be discounted. However, this is true only up to a point. The value of specific contributions allies might make to the common defense must be assessed according to criteria that have changed. This change is due, in part, to the growing disparity in military power between the United States and its allies and partners. Simply put, the United States either spent more than its allies or, in the case of NATO Europe, spent it more efficiently.

The change was also a result of the way warfare could be conducted as a product of military transformation. Military forces of the kind the United States has been building for the past decade can conduct a style of warfare that differs qualitatively from the experience of modern states up to this point. This not only makes interoperability more of a challenge, it also raises questions about the ability of U.S. and allied forces to coexist

⁷⁰ Peters, et al, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

⁷¹ Lambeth, *op. cit.*, p. 168.

on the same battlefield. Clearly, the inability of allied forces to operate in the same spatial and temporal dimensions as U.S. forces will limit their desirability as coalition partners.

The crises and conflicts of the past 15 years led one European observer to conclude that there had been a fundamental change to the role that allies played in U.S. security policy and military strategy. Put simply, allies and partners no longer carried the same weight for the United States in military terms as they traditionally had.

The purely military benefits of coalitions may be of declining importance to the United States, however, given its predominant military capabilities compared to those of any potential coalition partners. Non-American contributions of armed forces to the coalition created for the Gulf War, Kosovo, and Afghanistan were certainly helpful but by no means essential (apart from bases and over-flight rights) . . . Except for reasons related to access and geography, or the need for specialized units such as foreign special forces, the military benefits of coalition partners will be limited.⁷²

⁷² Pierre, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

CHAPTER IV:

Divergence of Values

A great philosophical schism has opened within the West, and mutual antagonism threatens to debilitate both sides of the trans-atlantic community. At a time when new dangers and crises are proliferating rapidly, this schism could have serious consequences. For Europe and the United States to come apart strategically is bad enough. But what if these differences over world order infect the rest of what we have known as the liberal West? Will the West still be the West?¹

Alliances are about power, but they are also about values, interests and leadership. Before the rise of a community of democratic nations, it was possible for a British Prime Minister to declare that his country had “neither permanent friends nor permanent enemies; only permanent interests.” But for nearly a century, American foreign policy has sought to create a security system, indeed an international order, based on shared values of the rule of law and respect for human rights. It was generally recognized that these values were those most consistent with democratic forms of government. This objective was central to the institution-building efforts of the victorious Allies after World War II.

There has been (and many would say still is) no closer security relationship among sovereign nations than that between the United States and its major Cold War allies. In particular, we must note the relationships with the countries of Europe, especially those that are members of NATO, but also Japan, the Republic of South Korea and Israel. These relationships evolved over time. In the case of NATO, the relationship survived, even flourished, as new members were added to the Alliance – and one member, France, left its formal structures – and the nature of the threat to their security changed. These relationships weathered a long series of disagreements and conflicts regarding specific security concerns. The bond between Europe and the United States, in particular, even survived the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the end of the Cold War.

The future of U.S. alliance relationships was a subject of concern in Washington (and abroad) almost from the day the Soviet Union collapsed. Much effort has been expended in capitals around the world since that day on justifying the continuation of the Cold War alliance structure, albeit recast to fit the altered circumstances. The effort to rejustify and recast the traditional alliances was based not on the appearance of serious new threats to the alliance members’ collective security, but rather the sense that it was important for nations that shared a common set of political and social values, and held to a common conception about the rules that should govern the international system, to stick together. Underlying much of the effort to redefine and reenergize Cold War relationships and institutions was a growing sense of political, social and even

¹ Robert Kagan, “America’s Crisis of Legitimacy,” *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 83, Number 2, March/April, 2004, p. 66.

psychological dissonance between the United States and its long-time friends in Europe and Asia.

How important are shared values and perceptions to the maintenance of alliance relationships? Can the political and psychological value of such relationships, even the simple existence of a community of shared values and interests, outweigh the limits of the military or economic power that those same allies and partners bring to these relationships?

Despite a 50-year history of adjustment to change, traditional U.S.-alliance relationships are shuddering under a series of strains, stresses and even assaults from all sides. Some of the current difficulties can be attributed to the change in administrations in Washington. Certainly, a slight shudder passes across the globe each time a new administration takes office in Washington. This is the result, in part, of the imbalance in power between the United States and its allies and resulting concerns whenever a new hand is at the helm of the most powerful military in the world. The end of the Cold War left the United States in possession of unprecedented military and economic power. This led some overseas to be concerned about how and to what ends such power would be wielded. Former French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine was the first allied official to term the United States a “hyperpower.”²

This reaction also reflects real differences on particular matters of policy and concerns in foreign capitals regarding how a new Administration will approach longstanding difficulties. There was always the strongly held belief abroad that no U.S. administration really understands its allies or their security issues. Some Europeans suggested that the election of a southern Republican president in 2000 in particular, would further exacerbate trans-Atlantic problems. As French political analyst Dominique Moisi declared in *Foreign Affairs*, “It is highly significant that no one in Europe seriously considers George W. Bush’s America a political model . . .” This is certainly a more polite version of the statement by the former German minister of justice comparing Bush to Hitler. But it amounts to the same thing.

This clash of values exists at several levels and involves differences in perceptions far beyond disagreements over the war in Iraq or the diplomatic style of the present U.S. Administration. First, there appears to be a growing difference of views on basic social, political and economic issues between the people of the United States and the population of a number of major allied countries. Second, a significant fraction of foreign elites, particularly in Europe but elsewhere as well, have a different perspective than do U.S. elites on the nature of and limits to state sovereignty and the roles and rights of multinational institutions. Third, there are growing differences over basic aspects of national security policy, including the right to resort to armed forces, the value of so-called “soft power.”

² “Japan, France to Join Forces Against U.S. ‘Hyperpower,’” *Asia Times*, December 17, 1999, p. 1.

One U.S. analyst provided a partial listing of the wide range of topics on which the United States and Europe have been at odds. This list is impressive in terms of breadth alone.

In the past several years, genuine policy differences between the U.S. and its European allies have emerged over trade issues such as the ‘banana war,’ genetically modified foods; the American Federal Sales Corporation (FSC) tax; America's increase in steel tariffs; Europe’s refusal to substantially reform the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the repercussions this holds for the Doha global free trade round; the moral justness of the death penalty; whether Cuba, Libya, and Iran should be engaged or isolated; Iraq; the Israeli-Palestinian crisis; the role international institutions should play in the global arena; when states ought to be allowed to use military force; ideological divisions between European Wilsonians and American realists and neoconservatives; the Kyoto Accord; the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC); National Missile Defense (NMD) and the U.S. abrogation of the ABM treaty; the military debate within NATO regarding burden-sharing and power-sharing; American unilateralism; Turkey’s ultimate role in the West; widely varying global threat assessments; the doctrine of humanitarian intervention and the efficacy of nation-building; and how to organize an economy for the best societal effect, to name a few.³

This list encompasses social, political, security, diplomatic, economic, cultural and legal issues. Prior to the debate over military action against Iraq, few of them had been the source of a strategic breach between the United States and its European allies. Yet, taken together, they suggest a deeper and wider gulf is emerging between the two sides of the Atlantic. As the author of the above list notes:

This incomplete list should make it crystal clear to the most complacent of analysts that drift in the transatlantic relationship is about far more than carping, black-leather-clad, ineffectual Europeans glowering about American dominance from the safety of a Parisian café. It is centered on fundamental philosophical and structural differences held by people with a very different view of how the world should be ordered from that of the average American; it should be evaluated far more seriously than has been the case in Washington.⁴

The Bush Administration also resonated to the apparent widening gulf between the United States and its friends on matters of values. Following September 11, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld spoke about the need to create “coalitions of the willing” to fight the global war on terrorism. The term naturally is subject to interpretation and has been applied rather loosely by Washington over the past two and a half years. But in a way it did crystallize the problem. In Washington’s view, “willing” meant a shared understanding of the threat, a commitment to national sovereignty as the foundation for the legitimacy of states and their right to use force, a belief in the need to use force to

³ John C. Hulsman, European Arrogance and Weakness Dictate Coalitions of the Willing, Heritage Lecture #777, February 10, 2003.

⁴ Ibid.

address that threat and a degree of comfort-taking action, including, if necessary, outside the scope or bounds of established international institutions.

There is reason to believe that the United States and some of its traditional allies no longer share the component beliefs that support a willingness to act against the threats of the 21st Century. Indeed, an examination of differences in attitudes, beliefs and values at all levels between the United States and its major allies suggests that at least with respect to Europe, but possibly also including major Asian allies, the United States and its Cold- War friends are drifting apart. The three great allied “continents” of North America, Western Europe and East Asia that once formed a super-continent, a political Gondwanaland, are no longer tied together. This drift has been gradual but inevitable. Now it has reached the point that there is a distinct rift between the continents. As the plates drifted apart, flora and fauna in each developed differently. This same phenomenon may be occurring between the United States and its major allies.

The evidence of this drift exists at all levels. It might be possible to dismiss the writings of political scientists and journalists as the usual scribblings of the chattering class. But elite views are reflected in public attitudes. At the end of the Iraq War, in June 2003, the Pew Research Center survey of global views indicated a growing negative attitude towards the United States and desire by most major allies for greater distance from it.

. . . majorities in five of seven NATO countries surveyed support a more independent relationship with the U.S. on diplomatic and security affairs. Fully three-quarters in France (76%), and solid majorities in Turkey (62%), Spain (62%), Italy (61%) and Germany (57%) believe Western Europe should take a more independent approach than it has in the past.⁵

A year later, it is evident that the rift between the United States and its major allies had, if anything, widened. The most recent Pew Research Center study of world attitudes showed growing hostility towards the United States and the desire of many publics to ways of countering the perception of unchecked U.S. power.

A year after the war in Iraq, discontent with America and its policies has intensified rather than diminished. Opinion of the United States in France and Germany is at least as negative now as at the war’s conclusion, and British views are decidedly more critical. Perceptions of American unilateralism remain widespread in European and Muslim nations, and the war in Iraq has undermined America’s credibility abroad. Doubts about the motives behind the U.S.-led war on terrorism abound, and a growing percentage of Europeans want foreign policy and security arrangements independent from the United States. Across Europe, there is considerable support for the European Union to become as powerful as the United States.⁶

⁵ Pew Research Center, Views of a Changing World 2003 :War With Iraq Further Divides Global Publics, Washington, D.C., June 3, 2003, p. 2.

⁶ Pew Research Center, A Year After Iraq War: Mistrust of America in Europe Ever Higher, Muslim Anger Persists, Washington, D.C., March 16, 2004, p. 3.

A. Cultural Divides

The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principle conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations.⁷

Thus did Samuel Huntington describe the forces that he thought would shape the international system in the post-Cold War era. Some who saw in it an argument for a new apocalyptic conflict, perhaps between the oriental and occidental worlds or between Christendom and Islam, eagerly seized upon this seminal work. What was not considered either by Huntington or those who accepted his thesis is that the clash of civilizations might come from within the Western community of nations. Yet, in the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of Communism and the new threat of global terrorism, what emerged was a significant and growing disparity of values and attitudes between the American people and many citizens of countries that were America's closest allies.

Recent events, most particularly the Bush Administration's declaration of a global war on terrorism and its decision to invade Iraq, have only exacerbated the basic cultural and attitudinal divide between the United States and its allies. But the sense of a growing clash over values and sensibilities predated September 11. A decade after the end of the Cold War it was safe for U.S. allies, particularly in Europe, to express their cultural and political chauvinism. After November/December 2001 this often took the form of anti-Bush rhetoric. In a recent commentary, Dominique Moisi neatly encapsulated the prevailing view in France that U.S.-French and U.S.-European relations are headed for troubled times with the change of administrations in Washington.

Europe has much more in common with California than with Texas. Most Europeans, including Frenchmen, are moved by the universal nature of Hollywood's message, because they have contributed to it. If they feel anything towards the Texas culture taking over the White House, it is alienation. Texas is another world, one most Europeans want nothing to do with.⁸

On its face, this statement was absurd. Europe had found common ground with Presidents Truman, Johnson, Carter and Clinton, all of whom came from the South. It suggested that with the end of the unifying influence of the Soviet threat, the differences in values, attitudes and beliefs between the United States and its allies, particularly in Europe, were more noticeable. The argument really obscured the larger issue, what can only be termed a clash of visions and values between the United States and some of its closest allies. As analyst Andrew Blinkin noted, "From values-laden issues like the death

⁷ Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 72, Number 3, Summer 1993, pp. 22-28.

⁸ Cited in Antony Blinken, "The United States, France, and Europe at the Outset of the New Administration," *U.S.-France Analysis*, The Brookings Institution, March 2001.

penalty to interests-based differences over missile defense, the French fear that the Bush administration could exacerbate transatlantic tensions that lurked under the surface during the Clinton years.”⁹

That such comments now come so easily to European – and other – elites and officials reflects the change in circumstances as much or more than a change in values. Now such things could be said because Europe’s security was no longer at risk and America was less necessary. Seeking to explain changing European political attitudes, Moisi went on to say that:

The central problem lies in the divergence of U.S. and European agendas. Whereas Washington remains obsessed with rogue states and weapons of mass destruction, Europeans are more concerned with the future of the planet and of their food. This dichotomy explains not only the gap between a ‘responsible’ global power and ‘selfish’ regional players but also the shift from the Cold War to the global age.¹⁰

There is clear and growing evidence that on many social, economic and political issues European elites believe that their continent and America parted company some time ago. What is evident is that foreign and security policies in the United States and Europe, for example, are increasingly reflections of trends in domestic values and sentiments. Those who seek to maintain or even reinvigorate the transatlantic relationship speak of the unifying influences of democratic values, economic and trade relationships and common interests in a secure and orderly international system. Yet, it is increasingly the case that in these fundamental areas, differences abound and are growing in scope and intensity.

Those who speak of the great bonds of common values and interests that bind the United States and its allies together, often fail to note the extent of the sociological and psychological differences between them. For example, popular attitudes towards risk-taking behaviors are distinctly different in the United States and Europe. As one recent study concluded, “Europeans are more concerned about avoiding risk than Americans are.”¹¹ This would suggest that Americans are more likely to push boundaries than are Europeans. Such studies typically find that the citizens of many other countries in both Europe and Asia are less optimistic and satisfied than Americans.¹² Some of this may be attributable to different attitudes towards traditional values. One study found that American society is far more traditional in its values than almost any in Europe.¹³ These specific differences appear to be what led one noted French strategic analyst to conclude that America and Europe were no longer part of the same civilization.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ Dominique Moisi, “The Real Crisis Over the Atlantic,” *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2001.

¹¹ “Entrepreneurial Attitudes in Europe and the U.S.,” European Commission, available: http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/enterprise_policy/survey.

¹² Thomas Riehle, “American Colossus,” *Public Perspective*, March/April 2003, pp. 27-28.

¹³ “Living With a Superpower,” *The Economist*, January 2, 2003, pp. 11-17.

The biblical references in politics, the division of the world between good and evil, these are things that we simply don't get. In a number of areas, it seems to me that we are no longer part of the same civilization. You have a fairly religious society on one hand and generally secular societies on the other, operating with different references. What would unite us does not seem to be in the forefront.¹⁴

Cultural and social differences take on a concrete form in such areas as the differing U.S. and European views on biotechnology. The American public is generally positive on biotechnology and engineered foods while European public opinion is generally opposed to the idea.¹⁵

Recent public opinion surveys suggest a growing antipathy to what are identified as American ideas and customs among the public of major European and Asian allies. In a recent survey conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and the German Marshall Fund, the majority of respondents in such countries as Germany, Italy, France and even Great Britain expressed negative feelings about a wide range of American values, ideas and views.¹⁶ A study conducted in late 2003 found that a majority of Europeans did not want to see a strong U.S. presence in the world.¹⁷

What is surprising about these results and the attitudes of foreign elites towards the United States and American culture is the extent to which what passes for a global civilization is American. That about which many in Europe and elsewhere object, the invasion of American values, products and images, is what binds people together. A longstanding observer of the transatlantic scene, Josef Joffe, suggests that a partial explanation for the international hostility to U.S. values and ideas is precisely their attractiveness:

. . . we often don't like the stuff that seduces us. You see America, the McDonald's-to-Microsoft syndrome, is enormously seductive, and we don't like what we are being seduced by. So there is always ambivalence. We sometimes hate our girlfriends or our boyfriends. That is point one.¹⁸

Joffe goes on to point out that the very seductiveness of U.S. values and ideas is the source of the intense opposition to American culture seen in some parts of the world:

¹⁴ Francois Heisbourg, "The Religious Divide Between the U.S. and Europe," a discussion sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, available: <http://www.brook.edu/comm/events/20030710.htm>

¹⁵ "Biotechnology's Transatlantic Divide," Council for Biotechnology Information, Washington, D.C., 2003.

¹⁶ "European Public Opinion and Foreign Policy," *Worldview 2002*, Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Chicago, IL, 2002.

¹⁷ *Transatlantic Trends*, survey by the German Marshall Fund and Compagnia di San Paolo, September 2003, available: www.transatlantictrends.org.

¹⁸ Joseph Joffe, "The Power of the United States," *Power and Culture in International Affairs: A Conversation with Josef Joffe*, Institute of International Studies, U.C. Berkeley, February 10, 2004.

The other thing is that the seducer is enormously subversive. . . . So America is the steamroller of modernity which, like any steamroller, flattens not only old habits but old power and status structures. And that, as you know, creates a counter-revolutionary situation. We don't like to lose our power and status to the 'new, new thing,' to coin a phrase. So that too explains the enormous resistance.¹⁹

Some allies appear to reject U.S. values, policies and culture for more narrowly self-centered reasons. One motive for French anti-Americanism is that nation's desire to rid Europe of the pernicious influences of American capitalism and culture. France's opposition to American politics, entrepreneurial capitalism and bold exploitation of science and technology stems from a firm determination to maintain a social and economic order firmly rooted in the past. As one expert on European politics recently noted, the cause of conflict with France is not a result of what the United States has done wrong. Rather, it is a French reaction to what America has done right. Speaking about the roots of France's anti-Americanism, Walter Russell Mead pointed out that:

These causes are not, as perennially optimistic Americans want to think, American shortcomings and failures. For that we must look to American success, American power, and America's consequent ability to thwart the ambitions of other states and impose its agenda on the rest of the world.

Mead went on to argue that the U.S.-French contretemps resembles nothing more than what an observer might characterize as a bad case of sibling rivalry.

Anti-Americanism developed and persisted in France because the United States thwarted, threatened, and diminished that country. Anti-Gallicism in the United States has had a fitful and shadowy life because France has only rarely risen to more than a nuisance in American eyes. In the realms of power politics, economics, and culture, French anti-Americanism is the psychological footprint of a conflict – a conflict all the more irksome to the loser simply because the winner never seems to have paid it much attention.²⁰

The political values and views on the three allied "continents" were always informed by different and distinct sets of experiences. Most important among these appears to be different experiences with war and vulnerability. The allied continents had experienced war and destruction a number of times in the 20th Century while the U.S. continent had been free of the experience. While all three continents were vulnerable to Soviet nuclear attack during the Cold War, this was a rather abstract threat, particularly for the United States. European and East Asia, in comparison, faced the continuous reminders of their vulnerability in the form of Soviet conventional forces and surrogate powers along their borders. These unique sets of experiences contribute to the rift in threat perceptions between the United States and its allies.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ Walter Russell Mead, "Why Do They Hate Us? Two Books Take Aim at French Anti-Americanism," *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2003.

Three important psychological factors are shaping policies on both sides of the Atlantic. The first is that America is discovering vulnerability at a time when Europeans, who have known major wars since the 17th Century, no longer are focused on it. The second is diverging views on the key strategic issue of sovereignty. The United States is insisting on a complete and unprecedented freedom of action at a time when the Europeans are ceding their state sovereignty to a supranational authority – the European Union. In Europe, this process is, if anything, accelerating with the prospect of incorporating new East European members into the EU. The third psychological factor relates to time: America is focused on the present and the future, and that is the source of its dynamism; in Europe, the present remains the past because of the continuing legacy of World Wars I and II.²¹

This description of the reasons for the psychological divide between the United States and Europe is supported by the Worldview 2002 analysis. The assessment of European public opinion found “Europeans largely focused inward, preoccupied with domestic economic and social issues rather than broader foreign policy concerns.”²²

Similar factors are influencing U.S. alliance relationships in East Asia. In both Japan and South Korea, but particularly the latter, a newfound freedom from fear and traditional anti-foreignism are combining to cause many in both those countries to question the value of their security ties with the United States.²³ In South Korea, these trends have been exacerbated by the growing popular sentiment for rapid reunification and by the Seoul government’s Sunshine Policy towards Pyongyang. Most supporters of the Sunshine Policy see the United States as interfering with efforts to bridge the divide between the two Koreas.²⁴ In a move reminiscent of the German elections in 2002, there is a growing willingness among Korean politicians to play the anti-American card.²⁵ The context for this is a growing popular resentment towards both U.S. foreign policy and the American military presence on the peninsula.²⁶

What is most striking about public attitudes across the three allied continents is not the extent to which U.S. values and attitudes differ from those of allied countries. Rather, it is the degree to which other populations hold negative views about America, its values, behavior and conduct. The comment by a former State Department official captures the essence of the view of the United States held by the majority of people in many of the major allied countries.

We’ve gone from the lighthouse on the hill to an image of an aggressive imperial force that wants to control the world and that uses everything from

²¹ Therese Delpech, Speech, Final Report of the 2002 Eisenhower National Security Conference, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 2002, p. 44.

²² Worldview 2002, *op. cit.*, p. iii.

²³ Victor Cha, “Values After Victory: The Future of U.S.-Japan-Korean Relations,” Comparative Connections, Pacific Forum, CSIS, July 2002.

²⁴ Scott Snyder, “China-ROK-US Relations and Regional Security in Northeast Asia,” Comparative Connections, Special Annual Edition, Pacific Forum, CSIS, July 2003, pp. 15-17.

²⁵ Ralph Cossa, “US-ROK: Tough Times Ahead,” PACNET, No. 5, January 27, 2004.

²⁶ What the World Thinks in 2002, Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 2002.

ICBMs to Starbucks coffee to get people to tow the line. Our brand is very damaged, more damaged than I ever thought it would be.²⁷

B. Policy Divides

Allied anxieties regarding the attitudes and policies of the U.S. administration grew more acute with the end of the Cold War. Even Bill Clinton, whose platform became the model for Europe's so-called "Third Way," did not fare well early on in the eyes of European critics of U.S. foreign and security policies. However, no U.S. President has caused as much anxiety among Europeans as did George W. Bush, save perhaps Ronald Reagan. Bush had raised concerns in Europe regarding security policies that the allies thought had long been agreed to by Washington. In addition, Europeans feared that the new Administration would take a much more confrontational line with Moscow at a time when it was hoped that the new Russian leadership would prove to be a stable partner. Finally, there was a commonly held view in Europe that Bush was insufficiently internationalist in his treatment of so-called global issues.

The Bush Administration came to Washington seemingly intent on challenging the fundamental principles that had animated the defense and security policy of the Clinton Administration. During the campaign, the candidate and his closest advisors had made a number of provocative statements regarding security issues that affected Europe. Soon-to-be National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice suggested that the new Administration would review U.S. military deployments in the Balkans with an eye to reducing the presence of U.S. forces in that part of Europe. This was part of a larger concern among Republican policy-makers that the United States needed to reverse the policies of its predecessor on peacekeeping that had resulted in U.S. forces being increasingly bogged down in a series of nation-building exercises with little prospect for success, at least in the near term.

Europe was also concerned that the new Administration would undermine what many perceived to be stable military and political relationships with Russia and China. Candidate Bush had made clear his belief that the 1972 ABM Treaty was a historical anachronism and that he was committed to deployment of a national missile defense (NMD), even if that meant withdrawal from that treaty. Indeed, Bush had gone even further, arguing that the Cold War strategy of deterrence, at least as it related to Russia, was no longer relevant. He suggested that both Russia and the United States were free to find their own path to strategic stability without the necessity of entering into formal arms-control agreements. Bush foreign-policy advisors had been on record as believing that the next strategic challenge to the United States would come from China. They had criticized the Clinton Administration for taking insufficient recognition of the Chinese military buildup. They also had signaled their intent to be more supportive of Taiwan's requests for advanced military hardware.

²⁷John Kornblum, a former American Assistant Secretary of State who now heads the Berlin office of the international investment bank Lazard, cited in Mike Moran, "Trans-Atlantic Troubles: Europe, America and the Split Over Iraq," [MSNBC Online](#), January 23, 2004.

There was almost no honeymoon period in relations between the new Administration and Europe. The concern among many Europeans that the new leadership in Washington was intent on taking a unilateral approach to global issues was given concrete form when Washington announced that it was abandoning the Kyoto Agreement on Global Warming. The Bush Administration also made it clear that it had no intention of moving forward on other international agreements such as the Comprehensive Test Ban, the Protocol to the Biological Warfare Convention, the Landmine Ban and the International Criminal Court.

The new Administration also put Europe on notice early that it was going to take a very assertive approach to transatlantic security issues. In his first visit to NATO at the beginning of February 2001, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld apparently stunned much of his audience by articulating a very clear set of concerns and priorities. He made it clear that the Bush Administration shared its predecessors concerns that the European Union's efforts to create a European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) could undermine NATO.

Secretary Rumsfeld also asserted to his European hosts that the United States had a "moral" duty to move ahead with NMD. Although at the time Washington had not settled on an architecture for its NMD system, any initial system would have to include upgraded early warning radars at Flyingdales in the United Kingdom and Thule in Greenland. The Bush Administration sought to reassure Allied concerns that the pursuit of NMD was the initial step in a process of decoupling U.S. security from that of its allies. Washington sought to address the concerns of its allies by introducing the concept of global defenses against ballistic missiles of which national defenses deployed by the United States and any allies would be the constituent parts.

Europe was also concerned by Washington's approach to security issues in other parts of the world. There was a very negative reaction to the Bush Administration's initial decision to re-evaluate the Framework Agreement with North Korea. Reflecting its concern, the EU sent its own delegation to Pyongyang to discuss ways in which the nations of Europe could assist in stabilizing the situation on the Korean peninsula. Europe also reacted negatively to Washington's handling of the 2001 EP-3 incident and to its subsequent decision to provide Taiwan with a major arms package. The fact that this package included diesel-electric submarines particularly worried those European nations that designed and built such systems. These countries were worried that the United States might put pressure on them to provide support for the Taiwan submarine program, placing at risk their relations with the mainland.

The Bush Administration was intent on recasting U.S. security policy towards Asia. Bush advisors had been harshly critical of the Clinton Administration for what they perceived to be a tendency to appease dictators and to undervalue its relationship with traditional friends and allies. The new Administration was particularly unhappy about U.S. policy towards China and North Korea. In the view of the incoming Administration, their predecessor had turned a blind eye towards China's military buildup and espionage activities in the United States and efforts to divert dual-use technology. In addition, the

Clinton Administration had failed to stop Chinese technology transfers that had contributed materially to the proliferation activities of Pakistan and North Korea. The Bush Administration entered office also highly critical of the U.S.-North Korea Framework Agreement, the centerpiece of Clinton-era efforts to stop and eventually roll-back Pyongyang's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. Critics of the Framework Agreement, including senior Bush Administration officials, believed that the agreement unduly advantaged North Korea while that country continued to deploy ballistic missiles and proliferate that technology to other rogue states.

Overall, Bush Administration security policy for the region emphasized a return to a more traditionally "realist" approach to foreign policy in Asia. This included a renewed focus on unilateral and bilateral initiatives over multilateral ones, a greater focus on narrow military security issues over economics, and the de-emphasizing of newer issues like the environment and health. Candidate Bush declared that:

We must show American power and purpose in strong support for our Asian friends and allies. This means keeping our pledge to deter aggression against the Republic of Korea and strengthening security ties with Japan. This means expanding theater missile defenses among our allies.²⁸

Even as the Clinton and Bush Administrations were reshaping U.S. security policy to reflect evolving American interests and security concerns in the aftermath of the Cold War, so too were leaders in Europe and Asia beginning to articulate distinctive views on security policy and the role of different instruments of national power in maintaining security and stability.

Three strategic factors also shape trans-Atlantic policies. The first is the declining centrality of Europe in Washington's security perspective. The Balkan wars in the 1990s maintained that illusion for the decade after the Cold War. The second geostrategic factor is America's increased focus on security in Asia and, of course, global terrorism. The third geostrategic factor is that the centers of gravity of European and American security are moving in opposite directions: Europe is moving east with the enlargement of the EU, whereas the United States is increasingly focused on the Middle East and Asia.²⁹

The centrality of these factors on the European security perspective was reflected in the new European Security Strategy (ESS) published in December 2003. In many ways it echoes the key elements of the Clinton Administration's national security strategy of enlargement and engagement. While identifying terrorism and proliferation as security concerns, the European strategy focuses largely on broad global challenges to security including regional rivalries, failed states, disease, hunger, crime and humanitarian disasters. Although there is an acknowledged need for military capabilities to pursue

²⁸ Terry M. Neal, "Bush Outlines Defense Priorities: Pay Hikes, High Tech," The Washington Post, September 24, 1999, p. A3.

²⁹ Delpech, op. cit., p. 44.

stability and peacekeeping tasks, the focus of the document is on the other elements of state power.³⁰

Europe's preoccupation with widening and deepening the European Union resulted in more than merely a difference of security priorities on the two sides of the Atlantic. Many Europeans see in the EU not the creation of a super state but of a different state. This new creation not only must be preserved in the form in which it was created; its principles must be extended to the broader international community. If the new kind of state is to be made secure, the tenets by which it was created must be extended to other parts of the globe.

Europeans have done something that no one has ever done before; created a zone of peace where war is ruled out, absolutely out. Europeans are convinced that this model is valid for other parts of the world.³¹

This zone of peace was created, Europeans will argue, through the skillful and patient use of non-coercive elements of power. The ESS reflects a theme in European security thinking: the growing value of soft (economic, diplomatic, cultural) power as distinct from hard or military power. It is true that the EU maintains some 2.8 million men under arms. It is also true that some states, notably Great Britain and France, still hold out a more traditional role of military power in statecraft. Nevertheless, as one notable scholar of European affairs points out:

. . . it is true that Europeans prefer soft power. In other words, they prefer to stabilize and shape the world through economic blandishments and sanctions, diplomatic persuasion, cultural affinity and prestige as opposed to military force.³²

Some observers of European political developments saw in the opposition of many on that continent to the war with Iraq an affirmation of the European preference for soft power.

There are better explanations of the widespread European opposition to the war, the first and most obvious is the broad aversion to war itself among European public opinion. Having experienced military conflict on their own continent within living memory, Europeans feel that they know more about the horrific consequences than Americans, and their threshold for deciding when war as a last resort becomes necessary is consequently higher. . . . After 50 years of integration and the overcoming of past enmity, Europeans have also come to place more faith in diplomacy and cooperation than Americans, whose lessons of

³⁰ A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy, European Commission, Brussels, December 2003.

³¹ Karl Kaiser, cited in Timothy Garton Ash, "Anti-Europeanism in America," The New York Review of Books, February 13, 2003, p. 1.

³² David Calleo, "Power, Wealth and Wisdom: The United States and Europe After Iraq," The National Interest, Number 72, Summer, 2003, p. 13.

the Cold War include a greater respect for the need to threaten or use military force.³³

It is not simply that Europeans prefer soft power. They must, in view of their military weakness and lack of power-projection capabilities, of necessity, seek to exploit more fully the other instruments of national and regional power.

It is easy to overgeneralize, but it does appear that the divergence in U.S. versus European military capabilities and attitudes towards vulnerability over the years has contributed to different instincts concerning the use of force on behalf of national interests. The Europeans, facing a constant decline in their ability to project and sustain force beyond their borders, leaned increasingly on diplomatic finesse and economic largess to sustain influence in the world.³⁴

The issue of hard versus soft power is not merely a debate over instrumentalities of security policy among a narrow cast of national security practitioners. For European elites, it goes to the very heart of the conception of a new Europe. In essence, as Charles Kupchan suggests, Europe and the United States see the very nature of statecraft differently and do so because of their different experiences over the past 50 years.

The two have parted company on matters of statecraft. Americans still live in a world of realpolitik, viewing military threat, coercion and war as essential tools of diplomacy. In contrast, Europeans by and large have spent the past fifty years trying to tame international politics, setting aside guns in favor of the rule of law.³⁵

This is clearly an overstatement given European support for the first Gulf War, operations in Afghanistan and even, through the coalition, in Iraq. Nor does the new ESS reject guns in favor of laws. Yet, the idea that Europe is about peace and the rule of law is a myth of growing centrality to the European self-conception. The creation of the EU, so the argument goes, is the triumph of soft power over the hard power that had divided the continent for centuries and led to two destructive wars in the 20th Century. The expansion of the EU to include nations of the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact validates the EU strategy of employing soft power to attract other nations into a web of positive relationships and economic ties leading to the expansion of both the European community but also the so-called zone of peace.³⁶ This strategy of attraction can serve both the narrow purpose of building a European super state as well as the broader purpose of shaping a secure international environment.³⁷

³³ Philip Gordon, "Crisis in the Alliance," Iraq Memo #11, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., February 24, 2002, p. 6.

³⁴ Future Military Coalitions, Report of a French-German-UK-US Working Group, US-CREST, Arlington, VA, September 2002, p. 2.

³⁵ Charles A. Kupchan, "The End of the West," The Atlantic Monthly, November 2002, p. 3.

³⁶ Rob de Wijk, "European Military Reform for a Global Partnership," The Washington Quarterly, Winter 2003-04, pp. 197-210.

³⁷ Heather Grabbe, "Europe's Power of Attraction," The Wall Street Journal Online, April 24, 2003.

After the Cold War, and as the European Union flowered into its full glory, we witnessed a more fundamental shift in philosophy about how to conduct world affairs. Europeans increasingly believed that the international system that they were creating, this miracle of the European Union, where all disputes would be settled under international institutions, international legal mechanisms, with no thought of military power playing any part in the relations among members of the European Union could be and ought to be expanded and brought out into the rest of the world, so that all of the world should soon be operating under the same international legal system and structures that were present in the European Union.³⁸

At the very least, the ideas of soft power employed in the service of a strategy of attraction could present the EU in contradistinction to the United States. In the minds of some, the EU can be the soft-power counterweight to America's hard power.³⁹ European advocates of an alternative foreign and security policy point to the EU's success in engaging Iran on that country's nuclear weapons programs, as evidence that Europe does not need to be a military power to achieve its security objectives.⁴⁰ Those Europeans who assert the importance of military power tend to see it as buttressing a security strategy based on shaping a new international order that reflects the European experience with soft power and interdependence (attraction).⁴¹

Nevertheless, even the most extreme advocates of Europe pursuing a security agenda orthogonal to that of the United States see the need for some military power. Advocates of an independent European capability point to unique contributions a "Euroforce" could make to peace and stability operations.⁴² They also argue that the expanding NATO/European military role in the Balkans, Afghanistan and even Iraq indicates the contribution that can be made even by the current Cold War-oriented force.

The transatlantic debate over European military power acknowledges both the current contributions and potential future roles. What is in dispute is the kind of military power Europe intends to develop and how decisions will be taken to employ it. Successive U.S. administrations have taken issue with European decisions that appear to create duplicative capabilities or that suggest an effort to develop an independent decision-making structure that would circumvent NATO. In his latest meetings with NATO leaders, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell reiterated the U.S. position, "The United States cannot accept independent EU structures that duplicate NATO capabilities."⁴³

³⁸ Robert Kagan, "Of Paradise and Power: America vs. Europe in The New World Order," Speech to the Carnegie Council of Ethics and International Affairs, February 4, 2003.

³⁹ Stanley Sloan and Heiko Borchert, "Europe, U.S. Must Rebalance Soft, Hard Power," *Defense News*, September 8-15, 2003, p. 16.

⁴⁰ Samia Amin, "The Success of Europe's 'Soft Power'?", *Proliferation News and Resources*, The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 28, 2003; and "Is Military Power Still the Key to International Security?", a debate between Steven Everts and Gary Schmitt, *NATO Review*, Winter 2002.

⁴¹ See for example, Tom Bentley, "Contribution on the Issue of EU -USA Relations," Notes for the EU Foreign Ministers Meeting, March 5, 2003, available: www.eu2003.gr/en/articles/2003/5/1/2644.

⁴² de Wijk, *op. cit.*, pp. 205-208.

⁴³ Ian Black, "Powell Calls on NATO to Send Troops to Iraq," *The Guardian*, December 5, 2003, p. 1.

For their part, advocates of an independent and self-sufficient European defense capability tend to see hostile motives in any U.S. effort to influence the form and character of such a force. In the words of a former French Foreign Minister “(w)hat fear of duplication really conceals is worry (in the United States) about the appearance of a new political partner, the European Union.”⁴⁴

Other traditional U.S. allies do not share the European infatuation with soft power or even peacekeeping duties. Japan, which has been the quintessential practitioner of a soft-power security strategy, is reconsidering this strategy with an eye to greater reliance on hard power. For the first time in its post World War II history, Japan has deployed its military forces abroad; some 300 Japanese Self Defense Force engineers have been sent to Iraq. Japan is acquiring up to eight Aegis sea-based missile defense systems along with the Patriot 3 land-based terminal missile defense system.

This evolution towards a selective enhancement in self-defense capabilities and expansion of the role of military power in Japan’s security policy reflects the fact that, unlike Europe, Japan continues to see itself as threatened.⁴⁵ The Japanese government increasingly is using the language of national interest (the language central to the current U.S. formulation on national security) rather than the more traditional language of partnership or “attraction.”⁴⁶

C. September 11 and Changing Values

Many of these concerns seemed for a while to have been swept away by the events of September 11 and their aftermath. Talk of a growing transatlantic split was silenced in the wake of Europe’s reaction to America’s tragedy. Nothing spoke louder regarding the inherent strength of bond between the two continents than the minute of silence observed all across Europe. Great Britain leapt immediately to the aid of the United States. Others, including France, Germany and Italy followed suit. Relations between Washington and Moscow appeared to have shifted from wary sparring to close cooperation.

The long-term effects of the attack on the United States and the international war on terrorism are, as yet, unknowable. Some observers in Europe and the United States believe that the result of the Bush Administration’s experience in coalition building will have profound spill-over effects on its overall foreign policy. They believe also that the United States now will be less inclined towards unilateralism and more interested in seeking cooperative solutions to global problems. The natural corollary of this view is that the United States will also be more receptive to the concerns and ideas of others and

⁴⁴ Foreign Minister Alain Richard, cited in Peter van Ham, Europe’s New Defense Ambitions: Implications for NATO, The U.S. and Russia, The Marshall Center Papers, Number 1, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Garmisch, Germany, 2001, p. 17.

⁴⁵ New Frontiers for U.S.-Japanese Security Relations, Policy Paper, The Atlantic Council, February 2002.

⁴⁶ Brad Grosserman, “Mr. Koizumu’s Mandate,” Comparative Connections, Pacific Forum CSIS, October-December 2003.

have a greater inclination to accede to the will of the majority on such issues as global warming, arms control or trade.

Still others believe that both September 11 and the international responses to it are clear and convincing evidence of the United States' international exceptionalism. It is the United States' position as the world's sole superpower that makes it the target of fundamentalist rage. It is that same superpower status that enabled the United States to rapidly bring together a global coalition to fight the war on terrorism. The United States alone possesses the military capability to conduct long-range, high-intensity military operations in inhospitable theaters. It is evident, at least to date, that while the United States is committed to consulting its coalition partners, the war on terrorism is being conducted according to Washington's rules.

September 11 also raised new security issues for U.S. allies in Europe. It was clear in the aftermath of that event that although the legal and institutional bases for European counterterrorism efforts were more robust than those in the United States, some countries in Europe were woefully unprepared to address either threat prevention or consequence management. Nations such as Great Britain, France and Italy, with long and sad histories of dealing with domestic terrorists, had well-established policies, procedures and training regimes for their armed forces to permit them to serve in a homeland-defense capacity. Other nations had done little or no planning for the use of the military domestically. Germany, for one, had a constitutional prohibition against the use of its armed forces for defense against threats from within. The majority of European countries had little in the way of integrated homeland-defense capabilities, relying for the most part on national police to perform counterterrorism missions.

In addition, the transatlantic solidarity experienced in the days and weeks following September 11 has given way to a much more complex relationship. Many Europeans have become increasingly critical of the U.S.-led global war on terror. The European perspective is that it is impossible to deal with chronic terrorism without understanding and addressing the sources of anger and frustration that give rise to the terrorist mindset. The Foreign Minister of France argued that anti-terrorism efforts of the kind being pursued in Afghanistan and Iraq were not sufficient to fully address the problem.

But anti-terrorism efforts will succeed only if we also address the causes of terrorism, namely the sense of frustration in the face of injustice and poverty. The humiliation is exploited by fanatics. So let us work together to eradicate blind violence but also its roots.⁴⁷

This perspective is in line with the overall European view on the key elements of security in the 21st Century. It also is the basis for disagreement with the United States. As one European security expert explained it:

⁴⁷ Michele Alliot-Marie, Minister of Defense of France, "Renewing the Transatlantic Security Partnership," Speech at CSIS, January 16, 2004.

Most Europeans do not accept the idea of a war on terrorism. They are used to dealing with this phenomenon with other methods (intelligence services, police, justice) . . . The Europeans fear that the Americans are engaged in an endless war without considering all the possible consequences.⁴⁸

Another expert was even more direct about the differences on the two sides of the Atlantic. “The Americans feel they are engaged in a war; the Europeans feel they are engaged in preventing one.”⁴⁹

In addition, many in Allied capitals also saw the U.S. policy towards Iraq as undermining the United Nations, an institution in which they put great faith. For some Allied governments, opposition to U.S. policy had less to do with a different perception of the threat in its particular form, than a disagreement with Washington over its seeming determination to prevent the U.N. from peacefully resolving the issue of weapons of mass destruction.

The European view of the appropriate response to September 11 and the threat of terrorism does not stand as the complete opposite of that espoused in the United States. European governments and publics alike believe there is a very real problem of terrorism and that force has a place in any strategy for addressing that problem. A growing number of Europeans reject the idea that the NATO or the transatlantic relationship can be rebuilt or reconsecrated on the basis of a shared perception of the terrorist threat:

During the Cold War, the ever-present Soviet threat helped keep the West united. More recently, however, attempts to mend the transatlantic rift by pointing to present dangers have only deepened the cultural divide. Leaders on both sides of the Atlantic must accept that ‘the West’ has now split into European and American halves.⁵⁰

Elites and publics in many allied nations appear to feel that the U.S. approach to fighting the war on terrorism reflects as much about American attitudes about itself and its allies as it does about the threat. Many see in the U.S. strategy a deliberate rejection of alternative views and strategies put forward by others:

But Europeans tend to believe that the legitimacy and efficacy of American hegemony and of its war on terror depends on a more differentiated view of the world than that evinced by the current mood, which somehow combines a feeling of victimhood, vulnerability and invincibility all at the same time.⁵¹

⁴⁸ Therese Delpech, cited in Joseph Nye, Yukio Satoh and Paul Wilkinson, eds., Addressing the New International Terrorism: Prevention, Intervention and Multilateral Cooperation, Task Force Report #56, The Trilateral Commission, 2003, p. 2.

⁴⁹ Pierre Hassner, “Definitions, Doctrines and Divergence,” The National Interest, Number 69, Fall 2002, p. 30.

⁵⁰ Dominique Moisi, “Reinventing the West,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2003.

⁵¹ Pierre Hassner, op. cit., p. 30.

These differences of views were also recognized by and commented on by U.S. leaders, particularly in the run up to the war with Iraq. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was the most outspoken Administration critic of the views and actions of some allied countries. Rumsfeld elected to take the rare step of publicizing Administration differences with key NATO Allies:

Now, you're thinking of Europe as Germany and France. I don't. I think that's old Europe. If you look at the entire NATO Europe today, the center of gravity is shifting to the East. And there are a lot of new members. And if you just take the list of all the members of NATO and all of those who have been invited in recently – what is it? Twenty-six, something like that? You're right. Germany has been a problem, and France has been a problem.⁵²

But even after the war, the Bush Administration continued to suggest that its views on the threats of the 21st Century were incompatible with those of some European countries. On a trip to Europe, Rumsfeld took on differences in views within the Alliance on the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction:

Many nations in Europe – but not all – see the nexus of terror and weapons of mass destruction as a very serious threat, and recognize that transatlantic unity is more critical than ever if we, collectively, are to be able to successfully deal with those threats. I think it should come as no surprise, that many of the nations with fresh memories of tyranny and occupation have been among those most willing to face the new threats, and contribute to dealing with them.⁵³

Some in Europe saw American efforts to draw distinctions between European nations, based on their attitudes towards terrorism and responses to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, as having a more sinister purpose. They connected this experience to Washington's efforts to discourage the EU from creating an independent military capability:

What they see from here is that the United States has changed its view of the European Union, which was created, after all, to make sure the U.S. never again has to come over here and 'save Europe from itself.' The Iraq debate was the first time it became clear to Europeans that America, or at least this American administration, wants Europe to remain weak and to keep quiet. That was a terrible, terrible shock.⁵⁴

The United States was equally shocked by the behavior of longtime allies such as France and Germany. What was most disturbing was the apparent willingness of these

⁵² Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Press Conference, U.S. Mission to NATO, Press Release, Jan. 22, 2003.

⁵³ Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, "New Tools Needed Against Threats," Speech at the Marshall Center, June 14, 2003.

⁵⁴ Dr. Jens van Scherpenberg, the head of the Americas project at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin. cited in Mike Moran, "Trans-Atlantic Troubles: Europe, America and the Split Over Iraq," [MSNBC Online](#), January 23, 2004.

nations to risk the long-established relationship with the United States for short-term political gain. Many observers had predicted that whatever their initial opposition, certainly France and even Germany would eventually come around and support the United States once they saw that war was inevitable. This did not happen. Ultimately, the temptation was too great. Furthermore, in the absence of the steadying influence of a greater incentive not to seek advantage in U.S. weakness, it seemed that Paris could not resist the opportunity. In effect, the tactical interchanges that marked the period from late 2002 until March 2003 reflected major strategic and political shifts in Europe:

Irritations over American tactics could not have produced such a diplomatic revolution had not the traditional underpinnings of alliance been eroded by the disappearance of a common threat, aggravated by the emergence into power of a new generation that grew up during the Cold War and takes its achievements for granted.⁵⁵

It will be easy to minimize the political firestorm caused by Iraq and weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, both sides of the Atlantic are busily attempting to assuage old injuries and smooth over their differences. But the most serious rift in transatlantic relations since the 1956 Suez crisis cannot be so readily dismissed. Recent events reflect very basic shifts in perspectives, attitudes, values and politics.

Elsewhere around the world, in other allied nations, views similar to those expressed by many in Europe were also given voice, albeit not as forcefully. Popular opinion in both Japan and Korea were against the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. A number of Japanese Diet members not only criticized U.S. policy towards Iraq, but also accused Japan's government of being "Washington-centric" in its foreign policy.⁵⁶ This has been a common refrain from both the far left and the far right in Japan for many years now. Criticism by the Japanese and Korean governments of U.S.-Iraq policy were relatively muted, reflecting their recognition in both Tokyo and Seoul that good relations with the United States were an essential part of their security strategies.

D. The Impact of Values on Alliance Behavior

Without question, there is a values and perceptions gap between Europe and the United States. This chasm was not created by the election of George W. Bush. Nor was it the result of Washington's decision to initiate hostilities with Iraq. Rather, it reflects major changes in the global political and security landscape. It is important to recognize that the gap is real and it is profound:

It is as if America and Europe were now living in two different time zones. For Europe, a new time zone began on November 9th of 1989, when the end of the Cold War seemed to introduce a new century of institutional peace on the Continent after the two World Wars that had conditioned the 20th Century. For the United States, of course, the clock began to tick on September 11 of 2001 which appeared to introduce a new century of global conflicts in the midst of

⁵⁵ Henry Kissinger, "Old Allies Face New Dilemmas," Courier-Mail, April, 14, 2003, p. 11.

⁵⁶ "Criticism of Japan's Iraq Policy Erupts Among LDP Lawmakers," Japan Today, February 15, 2003.

which military power would have to be used assertively rather than the sort of institutional discipline to which the Europeans had become used.⁵⁷

With respect to other traditional U.S. allies, the problem of a gap in values and perceptions also exists, but not to the same extent that it is evident in Europe. But the citizens of U.S.-Asian and -Middle Eastern allies have expressed similar themes and opinions to those so well documented in Europe. Local issues such as reunification for South Koreans or the presence of U.S. troops on Okinawa tend to be the catalyst for much of the population's anti-Americanism.

The United States has gone to extraordinary lengths to maintain its commitment to the security of Europe. The U.S. involvement in the Balkans is evidence of the continuing American willingness to expend resources and even lives in the interest of a stable and prosperous Europe. Until recently, the European members of NATO have responded in much the same way. But we appear to be at a crossroads. In the absence of a direct threat, many in Europe would just as soon focus on their domestic concerns and ignore the very real threats to regional and global security. Few in Europe are willing to spend what it will take to buy a halfway decent defense capability. Apparently a decreasing number are even willing to lend their political support to U.S. efforts to maintain the international security system. The question is whether Washington can afford to give maintenance of the NATO Alliance the traditional place of primacy in U.S. national-security policy when there are such basic disagreements on the fundamentals of the threat and how to respond to it.

Much is being done to address the immediate issues that divide the United States from its allies. The U.S., the UN and some major allies opposed to the war with Iraq are now holding consultations to consider how best to reconstruct Iraq. NATO is now focused on the critical capabilities needed to stand up the NATO Response Force. These are important steps that will serve both the United States and its allies well.

But such steps do not address the differences in such things as basic threat perception or attitudes towards the role of force in national security. The growing distance between the United States and some of its traditional allies cannot be so easily breached. As a prominent American foreign policy analyst observed: "Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus."⁵⁸ This is a difference of truly cosmic proportions. What separates the United States from Europe is not a disparity in power. Nor is it differences in leadership styles (often described as American arrogance). What divides the two shores of the Atlantic is a fundamental difference in worldview.

Given this difference, what are we to make of calls by various experts and world leaders for the United States to exercise leadership and forge a new relationship with

⁵⁷ Simon Serfaty, *Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Europe*, Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 108th Congress, First Session, June 11, 2003.

⁵⁸ Robert Kagan, cited in Mike Moran, "Trans-Atlantic Troubles: Europe, America and the Split Over Iraq," *MSNBC Online*, January 23, 2004.

allies that recognizes the new security threats of the 21st Century?⁵⁹ Many foreign leaders and some in the United States argue that the principle impediment to such a new relationship is Washington's demand to hold all the reigns of power. Logically, then, what the United States must do is lead by following, by ceding some power to its allies and, more important, by acknowledging to some degree the legitimacy of the different allied views on security matters, the principles by which a new international order should be constructed and even how the United States should view certain other allies (notably Israel).

This course of action creates a dilemma for the United States. As Robert Kagan rightly points out "So long as Europeans and Americans do not share a common view of the world's current challenges . . . they will not join in a common strategy to tackle them."⁶⁰ But how is that common view to be achieved? It appears that to create a like-minded coalition to address the threats of the 21st Century, the United States must cede to its allies not merely decision-making power, but also authority to define the nature and severity of those threats. Yet, the most recent Pew study of world attitudes suggests that a growing feeling in allied countries that the United States has overstated the rogue state and terrorist threat.⁶¹ Hence, the search for security through stronger alliance ties could, perversely, create greater insecurity for the United States. As Kagan observes:

Were America now to adapt to [Europe's] vision, neither the United States nor postmodern Europe would remain secure for long. Today, most Europeans believe that the United States exaggerates international security threats. After September 11, most Americans fear that they haven't taken those threats seriously enough."⁶²

⁵⁹ See, for example, Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership, Basic Books, New York, 2004.

⁶⁰ Kagan, "America's Crisis of Legitimacy," op. cit., p. 86.

⁶¹ Pew Research Center, A Year After the Iraq War, op. cit., p. 2.

⁶² Kagan, "America's Crisis of Legitimacy," op. cit., p. 86.

CHAPTER V:

Alliances for the Future

The relationships today between the United States and many, some might say most, of its traditional allies can best be characterized as profoundly ambivalent. Recent disagreements over particular security issues, such as Iraq, North Korea, NATO force structure or the creation of an independent EU military capability, increasingly appear symptomatic of more profound differences. Indeed, those events come after more than a decade of growing contention between the United States and a number of allied governments over a wide range of issues including trade policies, science and technology, counterproliferation, human rights, property rights, the limits of national sovereignty, the power of international and nongovernmental organizations and the death penalty. There is a growing sense, shared by publics and elites alike in a number of countries, that the United States and its allies no longer see the world the same way and no longer share the same basic values, at least when it comes to national and collective security.

Some observers argue that these differences were always present and at times led to significant friction between the allies. What held such conflicts in check, it is argued, was a shared sense of a greater danger from outside the alliance system than from within. The Soviet bloc posed a mortal threat to the survival of the West. The familial disputes within the Western alliances paled to insignificance in the face of that threat. Once the threat evaporated, it was natural that these lesser issues would advance to the foreground and, in some instances, become the source of major disagreement.

During the Cold War the allies came together as a result of their common fear and held together because they developed an approach to dealing with that threat which all members found acceptable. The threat against which the allies coalesced was Soviet aggression and subversion. The Western allies developed a multi-pronged strategy designed to neutralize Soviet military and unconventional advantages while minimizing the risk of general war. The key to this strategy was the maintenance of a unified front, whether confronting Soviet military threats, political coercion or economic blandishments. This required a full spectrum of military capabilities – to include nuclear weapons and a commitment among all the allies to share the risks if conflict should occur. The demonstration of this commitment came in many forms, including the creation of an integrated command structure for NATO, the forward stationing of U.S. forces along the dividing line between the East and West and the creation of programs to make allied forces more interoperable.

Political, economic and even cultural relationships and activities among the allies were normed against the standard of maintaining their collective defenses against the threat. U.S. attitudes towards the European Community and its successor, the European Union, can be traced back to the decision in the early 1950s to rehabilitate Germany and bring it into NATO. Trade deficits with Japan, South Korea and other regional allies were excusable, to a degree, by the importance of those nations as front-line allies in the struggle against the Soviet threat. Efforts by Western allies to bridge the chasm between the two

sides, such as West Germany's Ostpolitik or the transfer of private funds from Koreans in Japan to relatives in North Korea, were tolerated to some degree as the necessary price of maintaining solidarity.

It seems readily apparent that the attractive forces that held the Cold War alliances together are not as powerful as they once were. The glue that holds together both traditional alliances and ad hoc coalitions is made of a few relatively simple ingredients. The most important is a consensus on the nature of the threat. The second ingredient is a sharing of risks, albeit, not always equally. The third is the ability of members to make a meaningful contribution to meeting the threat. The fourth element is a generally agreed upon approach for marshaling and deploying resources to counter the threat. Finally, there must be an accepted system for decision-making.

It is increasingly evident that the glue of the Cold War alliances is no longer a strong binding agent. Threat perceptions vary widely among alliance members. Recent polling suggests that a significant fraction of European public opinion holds the United States to be a greater threat to international security than either rogue states or international terrorists. The sense of shared risk is also weakened. The United States sees itself as particularly vulnerable while Europe and Asian allies, with some notable exceptions, see themselves as less vulnerable and seek to act in ways to ensure that reduced vulnerability. As the locus of security concerns has shifted from central Europe and Northeast Asia to an arc running from Turkey through the Middle East to central, south and southeast Asia, the ability of many traditional allies to make a substantive contribution to the fight against the new threats has diminished. Nor are most of these allies willing to spend the resources necessary to enhance their ability to participate in distant operations. Thus, the basic rationale and bargain central to the Cold War-alliance system is weakening as the international environment changes.

Other experts and commentators assert that the current sense of alienation is the result of new forces at work in the international system. One factor often cited is the place of the United States as the world's dominant military, political and economic power. It is U.S. military preeminence and Washington's willingness to use its military power in particular, that is said to unbalance alliance relationships and unsettle the international order. Interestingly, a few observers argue the opposite, contending that it is the growing power of other nations, notably the EU, that is the source of fissiparous trends in the traditional alliances. Not only do other nations have a growing sense of their own power, but they also have an interest in seeing their role in international affairs increased based on their abilities to wield non-traditional or soft instruments of power. To further this goal, these nations also would have an interest in limiting the role of military power in resolving international disputes, since the United States is so dominant in this form of power. Naturally, the United States would resist these trends.

To the extent that differences in threat perception, risk-sharing behaviors and attitudes towards power in the international system reflect changes in basic socio-political and economic forces, they may be particularly resistant to government efforts to establish a new alliance consensus. Many commentators have speculated on the implications for

national-security policies and public attitudes towards the United States of the rise in Europe, Japan and Korea of a new generation free of the experience of World and Cold Wars. European youth know nothing of their continent before the creation of the European Community. Their experience is one of de-nationalization and increasing reliance on multinational institutions.

Europe and Japan are undergoing a profound demographic change that will unquestionably affect their abilities to develop 21st Century militaries. The consequence of population aging will be slowing rates of economic growth, greater demand for social services, a shrinking cadre for recruitment into the military and stagnant or declining defense budgets. It also may affect their attitude towards security threats and the use of military force as a national security instrument. Older people tend to be more risk averse than younger people.

What is most odd about the current friction between the United States and many of its allies is the degree to which it results from the latter's desire for stability in other parts of the international environment, while they undertake radical transformations in their own particular regions of interest. Europe, but particularly France and Germany, is in the midst of the most radical political reorganization of the continent since the collapse of the Roman Empire. It is generally acknowledged that this exercise preoccupies European governments and populations leaving relatively little time, energy or inclination to focus on security threats outside the European region. This also results in differences in threat perceptions that divide Europe from America. Moreover, because this process is primarily a result of the exploitation of Europe's economic strength and newfound political cohesion, and against a backdrop of a diminishing threat, it is no wonder that European governments and elites would seek to emphasize those features in their security policy.

Beyond the desire of many Europeans to focus inward on building Europe and to devote all their energies and resources to this project, there is a concern in some quarters that the United States is opposed to Europe's grand experiment in integration. Those that hold this view are suspicious of the simultaneous U.S. demands that European NATO spend more on defense, and that the EU not proceed with efforts to create an independent military capability that will result in duplication of NATO capabilities and further dissipation of scarce resources.

A similar phenomenon is being experienced in other parts of the world. The South Korean people and, to a lesser extent, their government, are increasingly mesmerized by the elusive goal of reunifying the peninsula. Courting North Korea is a difficult undertaking. Should South Korea succeed in reunifying the peninsula, it will be faced with a massive reconstruction and integration challenge that is likely to consume its attention and resources for years, even decades, to come. Many Koreans see U.S. policy towards the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK) as an obstacle to that goal. They would much prefer that the United States pursue a conventional strategy towards North Korea, particularly on the issue of proliferation.

Elsewhere, from Indonesia and Pakistan to Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, Egypt and Turkey, revolutionary political and economic change is either underway or being pushed on governments and elites. Managing or even resisting these changes is a major, if not all-consuming, challenge for these nations. U.S. efforts to push states to participate more aggressively in the global war on terrorism are often viewed, at best, as a distraction or, at worst, as destabilizing.

Physicists tell us it is the ratio of visible matter to invisible or dark energy that determines whether the universe is expanding or contracting. Forces of attraction and repulsion have much the same effect in alliance relationships. While there is much that continues to draw the United States and its traditional allies together, there is also much that drives them apart. As a result, there is great uncertainty about the future of the U.S.-led Cold War-based alliance systems. It is evident that if they are to survive, these traditional alliances must be transformed. Yet, even those who are hoping and working towards such a transformation are unsure that it can be achieved or that the results will warrant the effort.

The nations that comprise the “West” have a sense of connection and a desire for collaboration. Economic integration, political heritages, shared experiences and cultural affinity will ensure that the community of democratic and free-market nations will continue to need one another and that they will find ways of working together on a variety of issues. But as their perceived security needs change, will they still need each other to ensure an adequate defense? Can they find enough reasons to hold together the alliances they created 50 or more years ago? If not, can they find new ways of working together that will allow for a considerable variation in views of the threat and the role of military power in international relations?

The United States needs only a little prodding to act multilaterally when it comes to, say, complying with World Trade Organization rules. Europe needs only a little prodding to act forcefully when it comes to, say, stopping ethnic cleansing in the Balkans. The problems come in a handful of really hard cases.¹

The experiences of the past decade have made it increasingly evident that the old alliances no longer serve U.S. interests as well as they once did. Alliance politics and decision-making processes have imposed temporal and operational limits on the ability of the United States to respond to threats. This is particularly problematic in an era when speed of response is necessary to address a new class of mobile targets that may only be accessible for a short period of time. Technological incompatibilities also increase the difficulty of operating U.S. and allied forces together. The lesson of Kosovo, Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom is that efforts to restrict the scope, scale and tempo to reflect the lesser capabilities of allied forces, in comparison to those deployed by the United States, can significantly compromise the character of an operation.

¹ Max Boot, “The Breaking of Nations: Soft Power and Hard, and Perhaps Compromise,” Los Angeles Times, February 25, 2004, p. A22.

Once the loci of strategic concern shifted from Northeast Asia and central Europe to the Middle East, central and southern Asia, the military contribution that NATO nations, South Korea and Japan could make to the collective effort to counter the new security challenges declined, in some instances precipitously. Simply put, the traditional allies were no longer as geographically desirable as they had once been. Their value was not entirely eroded. For example, European bases and logistics centers were very valuable to maintaining Coalition supply and communications lines to the Middle East. But the decision to rebase U.S. forces both in Europe and on the Korean peninsula demonstrates the fact that the geographic focus of U.S. security concerns has shifted to the Southern Eurasian arc.

Contributing to the declining value to the United States of some traditional alliance relationships was the reduction, since the early 1990s, in the resources that most allied nations were willing to devote to defense. Defense spending declined in most NATO countries even as it became clear that without such investments the allies would not be able to participate in a significant way to out-of-area operations. Although several nations have increased nominal defense spending over the past few years, the trend among most allies is for defense spending to remain flat or decline in real terms.

Lack of resources has produced allied military forces that are in many ways useless. Despite having some 2.4 million men under arms, NATO Europe can effectively deploy to out-of-area operations not even a tenth of that number. The remaining 90 percent lack the training, equipment or support to be employed beyond – and some critics would say even within – their national borders. In addition, there has been persistent under investment in critical areas such as lift, logistics, intelligence, precision strike and force protection. As a result, NATO's Response Force and the European Union's Rapid Reaction Force will possess only a limited power projection capability.

But it is the growing dissimilarity in values rather than disparities in military capabilities that most threatens to undermine the Cold War alliance system. Polling data, surveys of elite opinion, public writings and commentaries and government pronouncements all strongly indicate that a political-psychological-perceptual rift exists between the United States and a number of key allies, particularly Europe. Moreover, this rift is likely to widen insofar as it reflects fundamental differences between the United States and other Western countries on a range of social, economic, political and international issues.

No alliance can survive when the parties actively disagree on such basic questions as the nature of the threat and the right of self-defense. When one nation or group within an alliance is of the opinion that its security is threatened by the actions of others within the alliance, then the alliance relationship is effectively sundered. Broader differences in values and perceptions only make it harder still to hold such alliances together. Thus, one can conclude that the fate of NATO, at least currently structured, is very much in doubt. So too may be the relationship with the Republic of Korea, if not now, then once the peninsula is reunited.

This does not mean that erstwhile allies are fated to become future adversaries. Their shared non-security interests will tend to prevent this. Rather, one-time allies will find it increasingly difficult to conduct operations within the established frameworks. Former partners will seek out new friends with whom they have more in common from a security perspective. They will work more with those willing and able to work with them in ways they both find most comfortable. Old alliances will either have to be restructured or they will become irrelevant.

Ultimately, the United States must seek out new allies to expand and enhance its global security. In part, this has been the rationale behind NATO's expansion into Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Security is being exported to those regions. In addition, U.S. and NATO forces could now be better positioned to deal with security threats still further east. This eastward orientation of U.S. security concerns should naturally lead to consideration of developing closer security ties with nations of the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia. The support of the Gulf Cooperation Council states, Australia, Pakistan, India, Singapore, the Philippines and Indonesia has been vital to the success of the global war on terrorism, including operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The United States needs allies willing to commit usable military forces to coalition or alliance operations. Over the past decade, some traditional allies such as Great Britain and Australia have repeatedly demonstrated both the will and the capable forces desired by the United States. But shrinking force structures, declining budgets and changing government policies have made it increasingly difficult for many traditional allies to provide the quantity, much less the quality, of military assistance the United States desires. The United States will be forced to look elsewhere for the additional support it will require.

A. The Changing Role of Alliances

Does the United States still require allies? The answer to this question is clearly yes. At a minimum, the imperatives of strategic geography necessitate establishing relationships with nations that can assist U.S. forces in gaining and maintaining access to critical locations. Even as the U.S. military transforms itself into a more agile, expeditionary force, the requirement for overseas bases remains. The United States is working to establish a new system of global bases. These are generally austere bases to support the rapid deployment of forces into the theater of conflict. For the global war on terror, the pursuit of mobile targets may necessitate that such bases may need to be located close to potential operations areas to reduce transit times to a minimum. Larger, intermediate bases will still be required, as will substantial forward locations in the event of large-scale conflict.

During the Cold War, allied forces and equipment were absolutely vital to establishing an overall deterrent balance and to the ability to conduct most large-scale military operations. In Europe, for example, non-U.S. NATO forces provided the bulk of all air-defense capabilities, initial ground combat forces, theater naval combatants and logistics equipment. These nations also possessed no insignificant strike capabilities. On

the Korean peninsula, Republic of Korea forces provided the majority of ground combat capabilities. U.S. allies possessed extremely large reserve and territorial forces that were counted into the strategic balance because they could be mobilized in the event of a truly dire situation.

Since the end of the Cold War, quantity is no longer as relevant a measure of military power. The capability to defend ones own territory is less important in many instances than the capability to project military power. Reserve formations that take many months or even years to be mobilized are of little consequence in a world in which the difference between success and failure in an out-of-area operation may be measured in terms of days and weeks. While it was once thought that forces for lesser contingencies, humanitarian operations, peacekeeping missions and the like could be readily drawn from standing conventional forces, events over the past decade have shown this not to be the case.

From Operation Desert Storm to Operation Iraqi Freedom, the U.S. military has demonstrated a unique capability to project overwhelming conventional power into distant theaters. This capability is at the center of the new National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy. Against most potential adversaries, this capability alone is likely to be adequate to ensure victory. Efforts to transform U.S. conventional forces are likely to further enhance what already is an unparalleled military capability.

That having been said, it is also clear that the U.S. military is not sufficient in either overall size or the range of its capabilities to address all the likely demands that will be placed on it. This is evident today as the U.S. military struggles to manage ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, pursue the global war on terrorism, interdict weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, maintain the capability to undertake a major regional contingency and address unexpected demands such as the recent deployment of U.S. Marines to Haiti. For a number of years to come, the U.S. military will also be engaging in a technological and organizational transformation, which will require that some combat formations be sidelined for conversion.

What does the United States need, then, from those whom it would call allies? The United States requires allies with usable, deployable military forces. Usability can be defined as having the necessary training and equipment to perform the required mission with, at best, relatively modest support from other forces. Units may be usable that lack strategic transport, for example. But lack of basic equipment, adequate training, communications, intelligence and logistics capabilities would limit the utility of such forces. Usability clearly will vary according to the mission. In Afghanistan, a number of U.S. allies provided highly trained and very effective special operations forces. British air, sea and ground forces conducted themselves well in OIF.

One of the main impediments to organizing and operating international coalitions has been the inability of prospective members to provide forces that meet minimum standards of competency and/or have the necessary equipment to perform their mission. Traditional U.S. allies have relatively few forces that are readily usable for out-of-area

operations. Newer allies are in most instances even more limited. In some instances, what is lacking is not basic military training, but the specialized education that is needed when combat forces are deployed on peacekeeping or humanitarian missions.

Most nations with whom the United States is allied do not possess a full-spectrum military. This is true now even for the majority of NATO members. Many possess niche capabilities such as in chemical/biological warfare, air-to-air combat, mine warfare or engineering. Only a few traditional allies have large, usable ground formations that can be deployed in low-to-medium-intensity conflicts. The test of usability of allied forces therefore may vary greatly depending on the circumstances.

Even when forces meet the test of usability, national laws or policies may prevent their being deployed. Japanese governments have consistently interpreted that nation's constitution as prohibiting the deployment of Self-Defense forces for offensive purposes. German conscripts are not deployable outside that nation's borders. The current deployment of combat engineers to Iraq marks the furthest departure from the strict prohibition on the Japanese military's participation in defensive operations only.

What forms might future alliances take? Traditional Cold War security alliances were intended, in part, to firm up the borders between East and West. The kinds of guarantees embodied in both bilateral and multilateral alliances during the Cold War were intended to ensure solidarity in crisis and to guarantee a certain and significant military response to a threat. The absence of the Soviet threat makes it less desirable both for the United States and a number of potential allies to enter into formal, binding security alliances. The fear of abandonment on the part of the ally and a U.S. concern for the possible "Finlandization" of the ally are not particularly relevant concerns in the early 21st Century.

In Asia, the traditional alliance relationships maintain their relevance due to the presence of regional threats. Alone among Japan and South Korea's neighbors, friends and trading partners, the United States is committed to coming to those countries' aid in the event they are attacked. Even so, it is increasingly unlikely that the treaty partners will confront a threat in their region. With some success, the United States has been pressuring its Asian allies, most particularly Japan, to become more involved in security issues beyond their immediate horizons.

It appears likely that the future will consist more of coalitions of the "willing and able" rather than grand alliances. These informal or virtual alliances might be of limited scope and duration or they could encompass a range of security issues and defensive arrangements and last for a long period of time. The United States maintains such a virtual alliance relationship with Taiwan. Even future NATO operations are likely to be conducted by a subset of the entire members, much as is occurring in Iraq today.

The nature of the new threats to security also may warrant a different organizational approach to the creation of multinational capabilities and forces than was the case during the Cold War. Even under the umbrella of the global war on terrorism,

geographic, political and other differences dictate very nuanced approaches to the roles of coalition partners. The United States brought a host of nations into this new coalition to serve a range of purposes. Some, such as the Central Asian “Stans,” are present by virtue of their geographic importance. Their role will be less as the focus of military efforts shifts from Afghanistan. Other nations are not central to the war effort, but are important players in the effort to root out terrorist cells and their financial networks.

Up to this point, the United States has adroitly controlled the process by which this new anti-terrorist coalition was constructed and how it was employed. In so doing, it may well have established a precedent that will influence not only the evolution of this coalition, but the standards by which current alliances and future coalitions are judged. According to Secretary Rumsfeld, the United States would build a series of coalitions:

“We will engage some countries on one aspect of it and still other countries on another aspect. We will see coalitions that will evolve and change over time depending on the activity and the circumstances of the country. The mission needs to define the coalition, and we ought not think that the coalition should define the mission.”²

Rumsfeld did not make a distinction between traditional allies and new partners.

Commenting on the standards by which the United States evaluated the possible participation of its allies in the war in Afghanistan, Simon Serfaty observed:

Each subset of the grand coalition was to include countries that were not only willing but also capable, and not only countries that were both willing and capable but also necessary. In Afghanistan, for example, Britain was willing and capable, but France, Germany and Italy were seemingly not deemed necessary – irrespective of willingness and capability – for the initial phase of the military campaign in Afghanistan. As the campaign unfolded, the perspective changed and offers to contribute were accepted.³

The events of the last three years have demonstrated the correctness of Rumsfeld’s and Serfaty’s descriptions of the new ways in which nations will join together to enhance their security. The United States has successfully created a series of virtual coalitions. In some instances, such as Afghanistan, the impromptu coalition has given way to the introduction of forces from NATO. In others, such as Iraq, an evolving group of nations has continued to operate together as the mission in that country changed. Recently, in Haiti, an international response force of U.S., French, Canadian and Chilean troops was rapidly assembled. What is noteworthy is the relative ease with which these coalitions and response forces can be organized, dispatched and operated.

² Jim Garamone, “No D-Day in Struggle Against Terrorist Networks,” Armed Forces Press Service, September 25, 2001.

³ Simon Serfaty, The Wars of 9-11, Transaction Policy Network, Autumn Meeting, Washington, D.C. December 1-2, 2001.

Events in Afghanistan, Iraq and Haiti reflect the new U.S. approach to allies and alliances. Under Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith recently defined this approach in a speech:

Our intent is to expand existing security relationships and develop new ones. We want to build partnerships that manage concerns, ensure compatibility among forces and facilitate intelligence sharing. In some cases, U.S. forces will be in a supporting role, in other cases, U.S. forces will be supported.⁴

The redefinition of required military contributions to alliance/coalition operations and expanding technological possibilities for military forces to “plug and play,” may reduce the requirement for the formal military structures and activities that are the hallmark of NATO’s integrated command structure and interoperability efforts. Also, the kinds of computer-based simulation/training capabilities being designed for U.S. forces could support virtual coalition training. As a consequence, there is less need for continuous, in-depth military training and cooperation. The requirement for formal arrangements to ensure military compatibility is being replaced by flexible, even ad hoc relationships.

Informal coalitions can be buttressed by more formal, but narrowly particular, arrangements such as those for cooperative weapons-system development. The United States has a number of major cooperative programs with major allies. The most significant of these is the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program. Foreign partners include Great Britain, Spain, the Netherlands, Canada, Italy and Australia. Many other nations are likely to buy the aircraft thereby creating opportunities for cooperation in technology, system support, training and future operations. Another such program is the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), which involves Germany and Italy. A third is the Aegis air/missile defense program, which has partnerships with Japan, Spain and the Netherlands.

More than military hardware and numbers of soldiers, U.S. partners must possess a shared view of the threat and maintain a consensus as to the general approach to dealing with it. The diverse nature of current threats generally allows any nation that is willing to contribute to the cause to do so. It matters little what capabilities a nation may possess if it is unwilling to employ them in the defense of common interests and values.

B. Restructuring NATO

It is clear that for NATO to be relevant to the United States beyond its political functions, it must change and do so rapidly. It must become more useful to the new security challenges confronting its members. In particular, it must develop a relatively large cadre of usable forces. Despite a rhetorical commitment by European members of the Alliance to provide additional forces for an expansion of the NATO-led International Stability and Assistance Force in Afghanistan, the recently held force-generation

⁴ Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, “Transforming the Global Defense Posture,” Speech to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., December 2, 2003.

conference was barely able to identify enough additional forces to support two more provisional reconstruction teams. This lack of investment in the NATO operation reflected both political attitudes in NATO countries and the lack of capability and training for combat operations in distant, primitive lands.⁵

The future of NATO depends on the willingness of its members to transform their militaries so as to acquire useful capabilities. The effort to stand up the NRF is a positive step in this direction. In the 18 months since the Prague Summit, NATO has achieved progress in reorganizing headquarters and standing up the core elements of the NRF. The Prague Capabilities Commitment identifies a set of investments in such capabilities as airlift, aerial refueling, precision munitions and chemical/biological detection.⁶

The Prague Summit did focus on one important additional factor that NATO members will need to take to heart if national contributions are redefined. This requirement is to ensure that those forces contributed to NATO, or coalition forces, meet minimum standards with respect to competence and training. Under the newly created Allied Command Transformation is the equally new Joint Warfare Center, which is responsible for organizing and conducting realistic training. This nascent effort to enhance training will have to be expanded under a restructured NATO to ensure that national contingents meet acceptable standards of performance. The idea, long accepted in the U.S. military, is to train as you intend to fight.

These efforts still will not address the basic reality that most NATO forces are useless. As a result, a disproportionate fraction of the burden of power-projection operations by coalitions of NATO members will remain on the United States. Furthermore, it will take years of concerted effort and investments to ensure that the NRF-designated forces are capable of being effective in a high-end expeditionary conflict.

It is by no means certain that NATO will be able to implement the NRF or, for that matter, that the EU will be able to create an independent ERRF. Both efforts will require the expenditure of additional resources, something that most NATO members are reluctant to do. Germany, the largest economy in NATO Europe, faces fiscal constraints on future defense spending that all but preclude investments in transformational capabilities.⁷ With a sluggish economy, and facing massive pension deficits, there are reports that the Schroeder Government will cut defense spending still further. Absent the required investment, NATO will be reduced to a second-class alliance.

It is not certain that the NRF is the right direction for NATO to proceed. Rather than an effort to mimic U.S. capabilities, albeit in smaller packages, it may make more sense for NATO members to focus on two different force-building goals. The first is the

⁵ Ann Scott, Tyson, "NATO Far From Relieving U.S. Forces in Afghanistan," Christian Science Monitor, December 9, 2003.

⁶ George Robertson, "Transforming NATO to Meet the Challenges of the 21st Century," in Daniel Hamilton, ed., Transatlantic Transformation: Equipping NATO for the 21st Century, Center for Transatlantic Relations, School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD, 2004, pp. 25-36.

⁷ Stephen Szabo and Mary Hampton, Reinventing the German Military, AICGS Policy Report, No. 11, The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD, 2003, pp. 10-11.

maintenance and even enhancement of niche capabilities that complement U.S. military strengths. The second is the development of a substantial corps of light forces and peacekeepers.

Many NATO supporters view the idea of role specialization as a slippery slope that will lead to the collapse of the Alliance. They are concerned that states with high-end capabilities will seek to dominate NATO decision-making councils while those that only have to provide limited capabilities will be able to slide by without the kind of commitment to shed blood, if necessary, that has been so central to the Alliance's longevity.

There are reasons to explore more closely the idea of an Alliance in which nations are permitted to make different contributions. Such a move is in line with the budgetary and demographic realities of Europe. In addition, NATO members can make a more substantial contribution to their collective security by pursuing role specialization. The smaller NATO members often excel in a few capabilities and provide only mediocre or even non-existent forces in other mission areas.

One means of resolving the need for both high-end and lower-end forces is to create a means whereby the NRF and the EU's ERRF can be linked together, or their roles coordinated. The former fulfills the political requirement that non-U.S.-NATO members be able to engage in major combat operations. The latter provides capabilities best suited for peacekeeping and stability operations. This may require discussions and even planning activities involving the two institutions.⁸

C. New Allies and Alliances

The restructuring of old alliances does not foreclose the possibility, indeed the probable necessity, of finding new allies and creating new relationships. Events of the past decade have demonstrated the need for bases and friendly states in the region from the eastern Mediterranean through central and south Asia, to the eastern borders of Southeast Asia. This region is simply too vast to be addressed from a single location or from the sea alone. When the United States became involved in the Middle East in the early 1990s, Washington found it necessary to station forces in several countries in the region. After September 11, that footprint was expanded to include a larger footprint among the smaller Persian Gulf states and in Central Asia. The demands of a strategy based on containment of regional threats and the need to reassure friendly nations necessitated a local presence.

In addition, fighting the global war on terrorism requires a degree of responsiveness and a continuing presence that cannot be achieved through a strategy of expeditionary power projection alone. Counterterrorism is largely conducted at the tactical level, thus requiring presence on the ground and the assistance of local allies. The United States has found it advisable, even necessary, to seek the assistance of regional states such as Pakistan, India, Indonesia, the Philippines and Singapore, plus that of traditional allies such as Australia.

⁸ Daniel Hamilton, "What Is Transformation and What Does It Mean for NATO?," *op. cit.*, pp. 3-24.

Another reason for considering new allies and alliance relationships is the progressive impact that aging populations will have on the economies, defense budgets and military capabilities of European allies and Japan. Even if Europe is able to successfully undertake the transformations envisioned by the NATO Prague Summit and the EU's 2000 Nice Summit, it will find it increasingly difficult to sustain those newfound capabilities out beyond around 2010. Europe and Japan probably will be unable to sustain even current thin defense budgets. In addition, shrinkage in the prime-age cohorts for military service will force a shrinking in military establishments. It also may make it more difficult for the European and Japanese governments to send their small militaries into harm's way except in the direst of circumstances.

The United States should pursue two strategic objectives in the development of new alliance relations. First it must seek to secure vital locations from which it can rapidly and decisively project power throughout a geographic arc that extends from the eastern Mediterranean to Southeast Asia. One linchpin of this geo-strategy is the Persian Gulf, in particular the smaller states of the Gulf Cooperation Council. These moderate states have provided vital bases for U.S. and coalition forces for more than a decade. Given the vulnerability of these small nations to military threats and terrorist attacks, the United States may wish to consider providing them with formal security guarantees. At the very least, the United States needs to encourage the GCC to pursue the development of critical regional security capabilities such as theater missile defenses, regional surveillance and intelligence networks and defenses against weapons of mass destruction.

A second linchpin would be the democratic and democratizing states of Southeast Asia, notably Australia, the Philippines, Singapore and Indonesia. It probably would be difficult, and at present premature, to try and organize these states into some form of collective defense arrangement. But it is clearly in their interests, as well as in that of the United States, to engage in a greater degree of regional collaboration on security matters. For its part, the United States should redouble its efforts to support counterterrorism efforts by Indonesia and the Philippines and consider an expanded set of military relationships with both of these countries.

The United States also should seek out those countries in or near the Middle East-Asian strategic arc that could provide a significant military force to coalition operations. The United States should establish closer security ties with friendly, preferably democratic, states in this area that appear likely to maintain significant deployable military power over the next several decades. The United States maintains a close relationship with one such state, Israel. However, Israel's usefulness as a coalition partner in operations along this strategic arc is severely limited. Other states that should be considered are Turkey and India. Both will be capable of maintaining large military establishments. Both have security interests in many ways similar to those of the United States with respect to instability and terrorism arising along the strategic arc.

The United States should consider establishing special security relationships with both of these states. In particular, Washington should pursue discussions with Ankara and

New Delhi regarding security threats and common approaches to addressing them. In addition, the United States should consider measures to allow expanded U.S. military-to-military contacts with these two countries and even a broadening of military exports and technology sharing. India, in particular, faces very similar military and security challenges to those confronting the United States and its other friends in the region. Enhancing India's capabilities to deal with those threats could serve U.S. interests as well as those of India.

Finally, the United States should continue to provide security guarantees to its traditional allies in East Asia. These nations face real military threats. Moreover, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are among Asia's true economic and political success stories. Their well-being and security matters greatly and they live in a volatile and changing region. Moreover, these nations serve as advance outposts for U.S. regional influence and power projection, much as the GCC does in the Persian Gulf. All three possess significant military capabilities that complement that of the United States.

Currently, the United States is also seeking to press its traditional allies, particularly NATO, to become more involved in Afghanistan and Iraq. This is useful, both for practical and political/psychological reasons. Ultimately, however, the United States must avoid paying too high a political price to obtain NATO's involvement in either environment, but particularly in Iraq. An excessive price would be one in which the United States agrees to shape its threat perceptions to conform to the sensibilities of those allies or to allow alliance decision-making structures or the United Nations a veto on actions the United States must take in its own defense.

Many of the elements central to the alliances of the Cold War – integrated command structures, combined headquarters, interoperability directorates, etc. – were required to meet the unique challenge posed by the Soviet bloc. They are not so necessary today. The threat has changed, and with it the need for members of alliances and coalitions to be prepared for an instantaneous transition from peace to all-out war, and to fight shoulder-to-shoulder as a single force. The United States has demonstrated that it is possible to build strong and enduring partnerships without all the trappings and structures of formal alliances. This is particularly the case when the goal is not to organize a continent in anticipation of a general war, but rather to address lesser and more localized threats.

Technology also can assist in simplifying the process of organizing and maintaining partnerships and coalitions. So called “plug and play” C4ISR architectures can allow allies to achieve a level of combat integration heretofore only available with years of close cooperation and training. Similar capabilities can enhance combined training through the use of virtual reality programs and networks of computers. Clearly, this will involve a degree of technology transfer that the U.S. government has long resisted.