Issue Brief
The military services are rushing to complete assessments of what lessons can be learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom, before defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld draws his own (less congenial) conclusions. Some service findings are likely to be controversial, such as the Army’s contention that Apache helicopter losses were due to poor tactics rather than poor technology. Other service conclusions seem inescapably true, such as the Air Force’s finding that airborne sensors for tracking ground targets (Joint STARS, Global Hawk) mark a major advance in warfighting.
Perhaps the most fundamental lesson of the war is that air dominance — unfettered access to the skies above enemy nations — is a critical enabler of every other warfighting capability. It was air dominance that allowed a small ground force to quickly prevail and pacify a country the size of California, despite the numerous advantages Iraqi forces seemed to enjoy. Air Force and Navy leaders will undoubtedly invoke the importance of air dominance in Iraq to reinforce their arguments for fighter modernization.
But each service has its own preferred solution to fighter modernization, and will strive to make the lessons match that preference. The Air Force will emphasize the importance of stealth while neglecting the challenges posed by base access. The Navy will minimize the importance of stealth — its new Super Hornet relies mainly on other features for survivability — while stressing the role of aircraft carriers in reducing dependence on land bases. Neither of them is likely to notice how well the Marine Corps’ Harrier jumpjets performed, because that isn’t the lesson they want to learn.
The aging Harriers have been dogged by readiness problems in recent years, due in part to their unique technology for taking off and landing vertically. But in Iraq the Harriers maintained an availability rate of 85% while operating from austere forward locations. They delivered over a thousand munitions, mostly smart bombs, providing precise and responsive close air support to Marines on the ground. Unlike helicopters, they were able to keep fighting even during the worst sandstorms. And unlike other fixed-wing aircraft, they could function from locations within Iraq itself — such as a forward air refueling point near Nasiriyah.
The flexibility of Harriers in Iraq is a lesson worth considering as the Pentagon moves forward with plans to build 3,000 stealthy F-35 Joint Strike Fighters for the U.S. Air Force, Navy and Marines, and the British Navy. The Marines have been the strongest advocates of F-35 because their variant will provide short takeoff and vertical landing capabilities similar to the Harrier. In combination with the V-22 Osprey tiltrotor, the Marine F-35B would enable U.S. forces to quickly deploy and operate almost anywhere — even when no friendly bases or allies are within sight.
The Air Force and Navy have been less enthusiastic about F-35, especially the Marine variant. They say the appeal of vertical agility is eclipsed by a reduced bombload and range, and question how a forward-deployed F-35 could be supported. But perhaps they are looking through the wrong end of their targeting pods. Would range or payload matter as much if they could deploy closer to the fighting? Someday U.S. forces may face an enemy smart enough to destroy nearby bases and threaten carriers. When that day comes, having the uniquely deployable F-35B could make a big difference.
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